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Abstract 
The importance of labelling has been considerably increasing over recent 
years. This study analyses two main topics. The first one (chapters 1 and 2) 
regards Private Labels (PLs), while the second concerns Geographical 
Indications (GIs) and “Made-in” power (Chapter 3). 
Private Labels make up a significant share of market and have a wide 
offering, both in terms of different segments and number of products within 
each segment. PLs represent a strategic tool in the power balance between 
manufacturers and retailers. The relations between mass retail chains and 
suppliers/manufacturers are quite complex and involve economic, 
managerial and competition based issues. Among several strategies, we 
identify promotion as a crucial one. Promotional strategies have been 
changing over the last decade. Our study highlights the existence of a new 
defensive and supporting strategy. It can be considered a defensive strategy 
as its main task is to maintain the market share of PLs against NBs, while it 
can also be regarded as supporting in nature because it supports the 
introduction and penetration of premium (or organic) PLs, since directly 
promoting premium PLs using an offensive promotion strategy would lead 
to undesirable effects in terms of product perception and consumer 
behaviour. To test our hypothesis and reach our conclusion we perform 
several empirical analyses on a unique dataset provided by a leading 
retailer with stores in central Italy. Geographical Indications and “Made-in” 
labels constitute a valuable resource for companies and, more in general, 
countries and industries that have distinctive features in terms of quality, 
knowledge, traditions and excellence. Developing a mixed-method 
approach, the third chapter analyses GIs and “Made-in” power, initially 
through quantitative analyses on global trade and the behaviour of major 
countries. Then it individuates, through a proposed replicable method, the 
anomalies and the existence of a possible kind of arbitrage from companies 
of countries with high “Made-in” power and a favourable Export-Import 
price differential. In the second part of our study, we focus our attention on 
an analysis of Italy (a major hub in worldwide trade, with a significant 
“Made-in” power) and on a specific case study (i.e. the Fungo di Borgotaro 
IGP). For their special characteristics, which fit perfectly with the aim of our 
research (i.e. perishability and absence of significant value added), we 
chose two types of edible wild mushrooms and truffles (i.e. fresh/frozen 
and fried/powdered) to perform our analyses and to examine a focus 
country and an example of a GI (i.e. Fungo di Borgotaro IGP).  
1 
 
Introduction 
 
Labelling has been increasing in importance over the past few years in mass 
retail channels and food trade due to Private Label (PL) expansion and the 
rising support for establishment with respect to Geographical Indication 
(GI) (see, among others, Cuneo et al., 2015 and Belletti et al., 2015). 
However, it appears that an integrated approach in available studies on this 
matter is missing and is, therefore, much needed. 
It should be noted that the depiction of such a complex and comprehensive 
analysis represents both the considerable value added of this work and its 
main issue. 
After the collection and the discussion of the existing academic literature in 
chapter 1, we present our specific data analysis on retail (chapter 2) and 
we move towards issues regarding GI and country of origin (chapter 3). The 
selection of specific methodology has been made according to the needs 
and characteristics of each individual subject, first exploiting the more 
generalised approach and moving then towards more distinct ones. 
Labelling represents the common thread that unites the entire study. 
The effort described above turns into a study on labelling in retail and 
global food trade that is able to stimulate further analysis and discussion 
on the proposed topics. 
The study concerns two main matters. The first one is about Private Labels 
and their importance in the mass retail channel, whereas the second deals 
with Geographical Indications and the “Made-in” power of certain countries 
in global food trade. 
We shed light on new PL strategies in the “rivalry” between suppliers and 
retailers. Although their role has changed over years, nowadays PL 
strategies aim to solve two main tasks: first, they defend existing PL market 
power and share, and, second, they seek to improve PL share and power in 
premium segments. Among others, PL promotional strategies represent a 
primary tool. 
Furthermore, we show that labelling might represent an essential aspect 
towards guaranteeing, both for producers and consumers, product origin 
and quality through GIs and “Made-in” labels. “Made-in” labels are also a 
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proxy for the value perceived by consumers due to the assumed country of 
origin of a specific product. 
Several major contributions result from this research, specifically from the 
empirical research carried out, distinctive datasets, novel approaches and 
focused case studies. The main contributions concern, at first, several 
empirical analyses of a unique and representative dataset on PL 
promotions. Moreover, an innovative economic depiction of wild 
mushroom and truffle trade, as well as a general method to detect “Made-
in” power and possible kinds of arbitrages, is illustrated. Finally, we 
propose a connection between trade anomalies (i.e. exploitation of 
arbitrage) and GI and “Made-in” labels, which represent the solution to the 
first issue. 
The first two chapters underline the central role of PLs in some crucial 
supermarket strategies. 
Our work starts with a comprehensive analysis of the retail sector with the 
aim to understand the key factors that need to be emphasised through this 
research. 
We analyse retail from four different points of view: economic, 
management, marketing and competition. 
We point out that in the first papers to address these issues1 , scholars 
focused their attention on both the retail market as a whole and on the 
complex relationships of its players. Key issues result in supermarket buyer 
power and in those practices aimed to reinforce retailer buyer power. 
This comprehensive study of retail market emphasises the role played by 
PLs in terms of: market share2, brand awareness and penetration in new 
markets and point out the strategies and the outcomes, both the desirable 
and the less desirable ones, linked with PLs. Moreover, it discloses the 
existence of a hidden agenda beyond the more proximate implications of 
retailer strategies.  
Retailers might have multiple objectives3, which can even be in conflict with 
each other. Sometimes, strategies aim to increase buyer power in the 
                                                             
1 See, among others, Dobson et al. (2001), Dobson & Waterson (1999), Inderst & 
Wey (2007), Dobson & Inderst (2008) and Inderst & Valletti (2011). 
2 Ailawadi & Harlam (2002). 
3 Porter (1979), among others. 
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upstream market 4  more than to gain market share and raise brand 
awareness.  
To offer the widest depiction of the retail industry, we discuss both 
undesirable and desirable outcomes. The former, mainly supported by 
antitrust authorities and some scholars interested in buyer power 5 , 
comprehensively consider short and long term consequences as well as 
competitor and consumer perspectives. The latter focus mainly on PLs and 
their effects. 
Even though abuse of power deriving from PL strategies mostly generates 
undesirable outcomes6, we can identify several desirable consequences as 
well, such as producer/retailer collaboration and synergies7. The reaching 
of an equilibrium in combination level between PLs and National Brands 
(NBs), where both leaders and followers are present, might be profitable 
for the whole industry8.  
Given the importance of PLs in the retail industry, we focus our attention 
on an analytic study of this issue. 
Similarly to the retail industry as a whole, supermarket strategies have 
been profoundly transforming over recent years 9 . We can presently 
identify three predominant different PL programs (Geyskens et al., 2010), 
which can be defined as economy, standard and premium. 
The stage of maturity reached by PLs has persuaded retailers to shift from 
a promotion based strategy to a quality oriented one10. A “good value for 
money” is the consistent logic of PLs 11 . Hence, premium PLs maintain 
comparatively low prices with respect to equivalent NBs. Given this new 
                                                             
4 Among others, see Wang (2006) and Doyle & Inderst (2007). 
5 Among others: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981), OECD (1981), Office 
of Fair Trading (1985), OECD (1998), Dobson et al. (2001) and Stichele & Young 
(2009). 
6 Dobson et al. (2001) and Waterson & Dobson (1998), among others. 
7 Colla (2003) and Choi (2017), among others. 
8 For a survey on consumer perception of supermarket assortments, please read 
Nielsen (2014). 
9  For more literature insights see, among others, Mullick-Kanwar (2013) and 
Molinillo et al. (2014 and 2016). 
10 Among others, Nielsen (2014), Bontemps et al. (2008). 
11 Collins-Dodd & Lindley (2003) and Vahie & Paswan (2006).  
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phase, premium PLs represent the key for attracting consumers still loyal 
to NBs12. 
According to this philosophy, retailers have begun to introduce premium 
products and to gain a significant market share in this segment 13 . To 
understand the causes of and the solutions for this new scenario, we start 
from a review of the last fifteen years and then conduct empirical analyses 
that are focused over specific three years. We implement both logistic, ATE 
and ATT estimations considering promotion as the dependent variable. 
We demonstrate the shift from offensive to defensive and supporting 
strategies recently devised by retailers. The most relevant consequence of 
these changes is the new power relations between manufacturers and 
retailers. 
Defensive PL promotions represent the instant and effective short-term 
response to counterbalance intense promotions of National Brands.  
Promotion as a supporting strategy seeks, through discounts on standard 
PLs in the same category, to indirectly attract customers to buy premium 
PLs, which cannot be directly promoted for intrinsic reasons. 
The new defensive and supporting tasks of promotions are relevant since 
they identify the new battlefield among retailers and NB manufacturers. 
The third chapter of this study deals with two different type of labels, both 
related to quality and local excellence: the Geographical Indication (GI) and 
the “Made-in” label. Instead of being a brand positioned in the upper bound 
quality segment, the former distinctive sign operates as a (standardised) 
guarantee of quality and origin14. The latter, instead, is a less standardised 
- yet still powerful - tool, linked with the origin of a product. 
To examine GIs and “Made-in” power, we study, from an economic angle, a 
peculiar, yet representative, market: the global trade of wild mushrooms 
and truffles, with an Italian focus, using a general-to-specific approach. The 
rationale behind this choice is the existence of only one certified PGI label 
(i.e. the Italian Fungo di Borgotaro) together with the importance that has 
recently arisen regarding the introduction of standard labels that protect 
both producers and consumers, as well as local economies (read the 
introductory section of chapter 3 for more details). 
                                                             
12 Ailawadi et al. (2008) and Geyskens et al. (2010), among others. 
13 Nielsen (2014) and Lee et al. (2016). 
14 Correa & Yusuf (2008).  
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We employ several different methods of analysis (e.g. networks and others) 
to depict the main characteristics and the anomalies of the worldwide trade 
of two wild products: fresh/chilled and dried/powdered wild mushrooms 
and truffles of certain edible species. The aim is to describe and 
comprehend the existing relationships among all the players first of all, and 
then to reveal irregularities and propose a possible solution based on a case 
study. 
One of the most interesting results is the detection of the countries that 
operate as hubs. Some Asian countries (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Japan) import considerable quantities of dried/powdered wild mushrooms 
and truffles and directly re-export them, even to faraway countries. Some 
Western countries (i.e. Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, France and the 
USA) play the same role. Moreover, in addition to dried/powdered wild 
mushrooms and truffles, the latter countries also import and then directly 
re-export fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles to nearby countries, 
mainly originating in Eastern European countries (i.e. Romania and 
Bulgaria). 
Anomalies in this trade exist because of the lack of transparency concerning 
the definition of the country of origin and quality standards. Moreover, 
differences in average price of identical, and not easily discernible, 
products between countries make the exploitation of a kind of arbitrage 
possible. Furthermore, someone might exploit the ambiguities deriving 
from some not clearly defined rules in terms of the products’ country of 
origin. We propose a method to identify the existence of a possible kind of 
arbitrage. 
Hence, at the basis of these anomalies we can identify the benefits that 
come from what we call “Made-in” Power. 
Neither value nor quality assurance is added to the re-exported product. 
Hence, the gap between import and export price comes entirely from the 
fraudulent change of country of origin information. 
The quality usually attributed to the agribusiness sector of some Western 
countries is the only factor augmenting the price of re-exported products. 
That enhancement corresponds to the value of the “Made-in” logo: it 
represents a good proxy of “Made-In” power of that specific country.  
When there is neither assurance nor traceability of product origin, the 
exporter (or re-exporter) labels can be confusing and can lead to frauds for 
the final consumers. 
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Since the designation of the country of origin, or at least the alleged one, 
enhances the value of a product, in particular when the country of origin is 
renowned worldwide for the quality of its products, this aspect is usually 
the most counterfeited element in those trades. We believe that the 
authenticity of the products and their correct labelling is something to 
safeguard to protect and develop local recognised quality production. 
We want to assess whether GIs represent a solution to quality assurance 
and certification of origin for products. To achieve this task, we analyse the 
case of the Fungo di Borgotaro (species: Boletus edulis). 
Due to the general-to-specific philosophy, we first analyse the Italian 
market and then we move towards the considered example. 
From this case study, we understand that brand awareness of the Fungo di 
Borgotaro, together with its acknowledged traditions, allows producers to 
set prices that are higher than the average Italian Boletus edulis. At the same 
time, consumers are willing to pay more for having the guarantee of high 
quality and the observance of health standards. 
From the analysis of the Fungo di Borgotaro case study we can suggest 
extending the utilisation of GIs to those areas where product quality and 
know-how is famous worldwide. This will not only guarantee for the 
consumer safe and quality food products, but it will also provide benefits to 
local areas both from social and economic point of views. 
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Chapter 1 
1. An Analysis of Private 
Label and Retail 
 
Supermarket chains have grown in importance in recent years in several 
ways. For example, they have grown in size15, their products have reached 
a considerable market share 16  and they have changed consumers’ 
behaviour17 . These issues have attracted increasing attention from two 
categories: academics and governments18. The former have started to study 
the whole phenomenon from a theoretical and empirical perspective in 
depth. The latter have focused their attention on policies implemented and 
power gained by supermarkets alongside both upstream and downstream 
market effects. 
Much of the debate has focused on the relationship between all of the 
players involved in the retail market. A crucial perspective regards the 
buyer power exerted by supermarkets19. Buyer power has been studied for 
many years, its origins rooted in so-called “unfair” practices. 
Many authors have emphasised the role of the new so-called “malpractices” 
of retail companies as a means of gaining buyer power. We can observe 
these malpractices from different angles, and by doing this we gain the 
opportunity to employ several academic notions; not only is this is our goal, 
but it is what caught our attention and our interest. 
                                                             
15 Messinger & Narasimhan (1997). 
16 Ailawadi & Harlam (2002). 
17 von Schlippenbach & Wey, 2011. 
18 See the previous (and following) references for the academic category. For an 
example of government interest, see Dobson et al. (2001) and Davis & Reilly (2010), 
among others. 
19  Dobson et al. (2001), Clarke (2002), Chen (2007) and Inderst & Mazzarotto 
(2008), among others. 
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Various aspects concerning supermarkets can be analysed, some of which 
have unquestionably increased their importance as of late. Private Label 
(PL) inter alia, have been playing an increasing role in terms of market 
share, strategic importance and consumer awareness, and they have caught 
scholars’ attention20.   
According to an economic analysis, the Private Label has been considered 
an effective instrument to enhance buyer power21 because, through their 
introduction, retailers have become direct competitors with producers22.  
Hence, supermarkets simultaneously find themselves as both distributors 
of producers’ goods and as one of direct competitors with their PL goods. 
The present study extensively analyses this remarkable feature. 
Despite the drafting of several papers and reports that contribute, with 
different approaches, to this debate, most of them only focus on individual 
aspects and do not offer a more comprehensive interpretation. 
The review of the literature currently available on supermarkets and 
specifically about PLs, shows that the adoption of the PL is not a mere 
management strategy: it has important implications both in the 
management of big retail companies and in shaping the relationships 
between retailers, suppliers and manufacturers23. Thus, as new strategies 
have been adopted heretofore by supermarkets to expand their power over 
suppliers, additional perspectives must be taken into account. 
 Before analysing the strategies carried out by supermarkets, it is worth 
distinguishing between management matters and marketing strategies. 
A relevant number of papers examine the supermarkets’ actions from a 
marketing perspective 24 . While more traditional approaches to the 
analyses consider product promotions or other traditional marketing 
                                                             
20 Steenkamp & Dekimpe (1997), Ailawadi & Harlam (2002), Steiner (2004), Hyman 
et al. (2010), Inderst et al. (2015), Villas-Boas & Chambolle (2015), among others.  
21 Berges-Sennou (2006), Mills (1995), Inderst & Mazzarotto (2008), Villas-Boas & 
Chambolle (2015), among others. 
22 Among others: Inderst (2013). 
23 Among others, see: Mills (1995), Bontems et al. (1999), Mills (1999), Bergès-
Sennou et al. (2004) and Tarzijan (2004). 
24 To get a basic idea of the different marketing (focused) perspectives on the retail 
industry, see, among others: Greenley & Shipley (1992), Campbell et al. (2012), 
Whyatt & Koschek (2010). 
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mechanisms25 , more recent contributions examine the introduction and 
development of PLs. On the other hand, some other papers analyse the 
strategies carried out by the management to increase supermarkets’ power 
in terms of customer loyalty, brand awareness, market share and 
bargaining power26. Apparently, these topics are very similar, since all of 
them seem to focus on the same subject. Notwithstanding, from a deeper 
investigation of each aspect, we discover that some undertones help us to 
give a different interpretation of every action carried out, whether we 
consider it from the marketing or the managerial point of view. Due to their 
multifaceted meanings, defining the differences between marketing and 
management is no straightforward task. For the sake of simplicity, we are 
going to consider “marketing” to encompass all the aspects regarding those 
decisions concerning the relations with customers (e.g. brand awareness, 
shelf allocation, promotions, supermarket layout, etc.). Whereas we shall 
refer to “management” as the processes of administrating and 
implementing the policies aimed at giving the company an advantage over 
all the other players (business administration in a broad sense). A key 
concept, that needs to be promptly highlighted, regards the remarkable 
differences that can be attributed to viewing things from one perspective 
rather than from another. This could play an important role when trying to 
combine all the different perspectives. 
Competition policies represent the fourth branch analysed by scholars to 
review retail trade. Many practices used by supermarkets could be 
considered unfair. For instance, unfair contracts proposed to suppliers, 
non-written conditions that are habitually imposed, the abuse of a 
dominant position and violations committed by supermarkets are just a 
few aspects that we consider. Starting from the final years of the 20th 
century, an increasing interest in trying to identify the effect of 
supermarkets’ policies on competition has been shown by scholars and 
authorities27. Some countries have been dealing with this matter for years, 
since the time it rose to prominence. A clear example is the United Kingdom, 
whose Competition Commission was among the first ones28, together with 
the European Authority’s studies29, to affront abuses of dominant positions. 
                                                             
25  Grandi (2011), Cuneo et al. (2012), Choi (2017), Lamey et al. (2012), among 
others. 
26 Chambolle & Villas-Boas (2015), Berges-Sennou (2006), Miquel-Romero et al. 
(2014), Sarkar et al. (2015), among others. 
27 Chen (2007), Dobson et al. (2001), Dobson (2003), among others. 
28 Dobson (2005) and Davis & Reilly (2010). 
29 Dobson (1999), Dobson et al. (2001), among others. 
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In contrast, other countries have not yet conducted any adequate 
investigation, merely supervising the evolution of this phenomenon as a 
whole, with no specific studies or interventions. These two different kinds 
of behaviour do not depend on a country’s particular line of reasoning or 
level of efficiency. Rather, this matter is directly correlated to the level 
importance garnered by those actions within a given market. From the 
analysis of the whole European market we can appreciate how different the 
development of the retail industry is30 across all countries. Therefore, if we 
could hypothetically take a picture of this phenomenon across the entirety 
of Europe, we could analyse its evolution from an early stage to maturity. 
With some exceptions due to differences between national markets, it is 
possible to identify a common path of retailing throughout the course of the 
last ten to twenty years31. This approach constitutes the basic concept of 
our study and maintained throughout the thesis, together with a 
combination and harmonisation of all the different views into an integrated 
depiction. Furthermore, we provide two different tools to interpret the 
whole phenomenon: the first (mainly supported by antitrust authorities 
and some scholars 32 ) concerns possible undesirable outcomes, both 
immediate and future, for competitors and consumers; the second (more 
favourable to supermarkets) emphasises the enhancements they fostered 
and the resulting desirable outcomes33. In the former case, we discuss the 
main aspects leading to undesirable outcomes in the most comprehensive 
way possible. In the latter, we consider the opposite view, mainly basing 
our analysis on PL products and their effects. 
 
1.1  A Common Thread 
Our hypothesis traces a common thread that underlies every aspect 
considered in this study and that further serves to identify a global 
connection. This thread may be a direct cause-and-effect relationship or a 
result of the market itself. The cause may also be a hidden wire (linking, for 
example, an apparently pure-marketing-strategy, e.g. loyalty cards, with 
the increasing of retailers’ buying power when targeting suppliers with 
                                                             
30 Dobson (2003). 
31 Dobson (2003), among others. 
32 Dobson (2005), Davis & Reilly (2010), Chen (2007), Dobson et al. (2001), Dobson 
(2003), among others. 
33 See, among others, Steiner (2004). 
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temporary specific discounts). The following section provides an extensive 
review of this common thread and pertinent connections. 
 
1.2 Increasing Retailer Power and Undesirable 
Outcomes 
This part analyses the possible undesirable outcomes deriving from an 
increasing role played by supermarkets, consistently with the primary logic 
of an integrated analysis. 
We first start considering mergers and acquisitions as a factor augmenting 
retailer power, together with buying groups. Then we present the most 
important and diffused malpractices, which connect all the different 
aspects involved and represent a significant problem to deal with. Finally, 
we provide an example of some problems arising for farmers as a 
consequence of the examined issues. 
 
1.2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Managerial decisions, marketing strategies and malpractices in general 
have a big role in modelling the colourful retail environment. However, they 
operate together with other common forces that exist in any other kind of 
market. Efficiency, coupled with the ability to compete internationally 
while maintaining domestic dominance, is often the key to survival34. The 
most common way to achieve this feat comes by way of mergers with other 
firms. 
From the findings presented in some papers (including for example Dobson 
& Waterson, 1997, Inderst & Shaffer, 2008, Normann, 2009, von 
Schlippenbach & Wey, 2011, and Normann, 2011, among others) we can 
notice that mergers and acquisitions, both “vertical” and “horizontal” ones, 
have affected the diffusion of buyer power. While it is intuitive that bigger 
firms have more power, we are interested in understanding how they reach 
that dominant position. 
Both “vertical” and “horizontal” integration exist. Broad differences occur 
between these two types of mergers or acquisitions. 
                                                             
34 For the survival of small stores after the entry of bigger firms see Borraz, Dubra, 
Ferrés & Zipitría (2014); they used data on food retailing firms in Montevideo from 
1998 to 2007. 
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The most common type of integration is horizontal: a company merges with 
or buys another one operating in the same field (e.g. a supermarket chain 
buys other supermarkets). As demonstrated almost two centuries ago by 
Cournot (1838), in doing so the new company is inevitably bigger and can 
count on economies of scale, a larger market share, more stores, geographic 
breadth, etc. These aspects all lead to having power to wield against 
competitors and the increased ability to exploit buyer power with respect 
to suppliers and producers, as analysed by Tarzijan (2004). 
Vertical integrations are less traditional, hence more “innovative”. The 
retailer does not acquire another supermarket, but the resulting firm 
comes by way of the integration with a company from the upstream market 
that is already part of the supply chain. Usually a chain store buys (or 
merges with) a supplier or producer, or another firm that offers useful 
services for the retail process. This strategy gives a supermarket the ability 
to become a direct competitor of both suppliers and producers, instead of 
being only a customer (i.e. buyer). Despite appearing to be ordinary, simple 
activities, vertical integrations have many and not necessarily immediate 
consequences. When dealing with suppliers a vertically-integrated chain 
can rely on many resources, since it has the ability to find some products by 
relying directly on its own resources. Moreover, the vertically-integrated 
company can also acquire its knowledge through direct and comprehensive 
insight of the business aspects of the supplier. In essence the supermarket 
can leverage two gateways for providing goods to its store: the “classic” one 
(external suppliers) and the private, in-house one. Supplier integration 
represents indeed a favourable scenario for the wealth of the retail market. 
Similar integrations, such as “buying groups”, empower retailers in their 
bargaining with suppliers. As will be clarified later, their frequency and 
importance are both increasing. 
We presently propose a concise, yet non-exhaustive, scheme of the profile 
we have just presented. Later in the discussion we will go deeper into the 
analysis of some aspects listed below, given their connections with private 
label products. 
 
1.2.1.1 Horizontal Integrations 
From a brief economic analysis we can conclude that, as in any other 
market, it is imperative for chain stores to find a way to increase their 
efficiency and keep the pace with the current global competitive market. 
The easiest path towards this goal is to integrate their retail-focused 
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business with other companies. Historically, companies initially merged 
together or tried to extend their influence by acquiring smaller chains 
(horizontal integration). The main result was the creation of bigger 
companies and the launch of the supermarket as we know them today35. 
With bigger chains of stores, new opportunities arose for retailers: 
• Exploitation of economies of scale (as written above): 
o reduction of administration and logistic costs (e.g. 
creation of big warehouses) after the adoption of a more 
efficient managerial organization; 
o possibility of centralising purchases and correlated 
benefits (for more details please see section 1.2.3 
Malpractices). 
• When bargaining with producers and suppliers the company can 
obtain better conditions thanks to its central role in reaching the 
final consumers36: 
o perpetration of malpractices when a chain becomes big 
enough to have this possibility. An analysis made by the 
competition authority is strongly needed. 
• Creation of big malls in the suburbs37 (this aspect plays a strong 
role in changing consumer habits. See next point for more details), 
helped by the diffusion (starting from the 50s and 60s) of 
consumer car ownership  
o there is an evolution in the types of stores. Ellickson 
(2011) and Kaynak & Cavusgil (1982) describe the 
evolution of supermarkets: from small neighbourhood 
stores (first years of 20th century 38 ) to huge 
                                                             
35 According to Ellickson (2011), the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) 
changed (in the USA) the idea whereby “meat was purchased from a butcher, fish 
from a fishmonger, bread from a baker, and produce from a vegetable stand”: “the 
economy format was a standardised store, selling branded products produced in A&P 
factories and delivered through a vertically integrated supply chain of factories, 
warehouses, and trucks.” 
Together with A&P, other firms started to set this new type of markets: “Kroger, 
American Stores, and Safeway were all among the early adopters of this new business 
model”. 
36  For exclusion originating from retail power see Rey & Whinston (2013). 
37 Like the ones considered for the model in Wang, Rojas & Lavoie (2010). 
38 Starting from the 1930s “the combination of the self-service and combination 
store into one retail unit resulted quite naturally in the supermarket”, as written in 
Kaynak & Cavusgil (1982). 
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supercentres39 that offer a vast range of items, from milk 
to do-it-yourself products, from gardening goods to books, 
from the last several decades. 
This strategy has a pure managerial purpose for 
capitalising on new kinds of stores while another one 
tended toward a change in customer perception of the 
supermarket and the idea of shopping in general. 
• Change in consumer habits: 
o diffusion of the so-called “one-stop shopping trip”, 
extensively studied by Messinger & Narasimhan (1997). 
Big chains have the possibility to obtain goods at lower 
prices and therefore to sell them at more favourable 
conditions with respect to small or medium stores. 
Furthermore, exploiting their power, they can ask 
producers to supply goods at discounted prices for a 
certain period (Clarke (2002) and Dobson et al. (2001)); if 
the management coordinates this request with other ones 
from different suppliers, consumers are presented then 
with a vast and diversified offering. The prospect of lower 
price shopping attracts many consumers to malls, but 
since it provides everything, and frequent trips to the mall 
might not necessarily be possible (which is also linked to 
new consumer behaviour: less time for making smaller 
but recurrent purchases, needing to economise, changing 
habits, i.e. free time spent in huge malls), customers end 
up buying everything there. 
The diffusion of the one-stop shopping trip forces 
producers to accept even the worst conditions. Otherwise 
they might have no other possibility to reach the final 
market (i.e. the consumers) and, hence, they are forced to 
leave it. 
With the new habit of the one-stop shopping trip (a similar 
result can be reached with loyalty programmes, as well) a 
customer usually goes, periodically, to the same 
supermarket. When the shopper does not find a product 
there, she/he automatically shifts her/his choice towards 
a competitor brand’s good. This reveals how fundamental 
                                                             
39 According to Singh, Hansen & Blattberg (2006) “a supercentre combines a full-line 
discount store with a full-line supermarket under one roof”. 
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it is for a brand to be available in the highest possible 
number of stores; 
o consumers look for promotions. Whenever it is possible, 
they prefer waiting until goods are offered at lower prices 
in a supermarket. Otherwise they are also willing to 
exchange their usually purchased good with a discounted 
one from a different brand. 
• Change in marketing strategies: 
o from the supermarket side (not an exhaustive list): 
▪ fidelity cards40 
▪ promotions (whose intensive use is examined in 
Volpe (2011)) 
▪ creation of a “shopping experience” 41  (the 
atmosphere of a mall is examined by Michon, 
Chebat & Turley (2005) to understand how it can 
influence shopping behaviour); 
o from the supplier (or producer) side: 
▪ pull strategy: a good is promoted via advertising 
channels to make consumers aware of its 
presence and its qualities. This strategy leads 
consumers to search for that specific product 
therefore forcing supermarkets to have it in their 
offering. The better the campaign is set up, the 
bigger the result will be in forcing the chain. 
Hence, the supplier (or producer) will have more 
power when bargaining with the retailer. 
- The supplier (or producer) wants her/his 
product to become essential in the offering of 
supermarkets. In other words, the product 
should be a prerequisite to induce customers 
to have a positive perception of a 
supermarket’s offering. If a supplier (or 
producer) manages to reach this status, then 
                                                             
40 For Mauri (2003) “the basic idea behind the introduction of loyalty cards is that a 
firm’s performance in terms of revenue and profit is related more to the loyalty of 
existing customers than to the mere number of customers”. Mauri (2003) also refers 
to the 1990s as the starting period in which “all the largest European grocery 
retailers introduced loyalty cards with the aim of acquiring consumer knowledge”. 
41In Volpe & Lavoie (2008) additional services are illustrated and shops introduced 
in big malls to enlarge and accentuate the shopping experience. 
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the retailer would like to sell her/his goods 
and will grant better conditions to that 
supplier (or producer), maybe avoiding the 
use of (some) malpractices; 
▪ push strategy: the supplier (or producer) tries to 
convince the chain store to have its products in 
the offering provided in the supermarkets. It can 
propose discounts on quantity, better conditions 
or other agreements that give the possibility to 
the supplier (or producer) to have its own 
products on the shelves of the chain’s stores. 
These agreements are risky for the supplier (or 
producer) since some malpractices involve 
practices similar to the proposed ones. 
The bigger the new company is, the more power it can exert. Authorities 
monitoring competition are then forced to decide whether they can allow 
the integration or not. Simultaneously, they should evaluate all the possible 
consequences without, in case of any violation of antitrust principles, 
impairing the retailer. 
 
1.2.1.2 Vertical Integrations 
After describing in detail the horizontal integration, the one we have 
defined more “classical” since it is present with similar purposes in every 
kind of market, we will proceed by analysing the other type of possible 
integration introduced above. 
When a chain store integrates with a producer more critical effects result42. 
As a direct advantage, the supermarket can produce goods autonomously 
and therefore the product does not need to go through an intermediary. 
Furthermore, the strategic knowledge that is gained through the merging 
with a producer is much more relevant than that which would be obtained 
from a supplier. Costs, materials, productive processes, added value are just 
a few examples of the relevant pieces of information obtained by retailers 
via vertical integration, otherwise difficult or impossible to gain because 
not shared. This gives the vertically-integrated chain a huge advantage 
when bargaining with producers of goods like ones made by the subsidiary. 
Nonetheless the chain becomes a direct competitor with other producers 
                                                             
42 See Cotterill (2006). 
17 
 
whose goods should be sold on the shelves of the chain’s stores. 
Considering all the consequences embedded in this issue, we can 
understand how a vertical integration might massively affect the retail 
market. 
Even though the PL is a distinct phenomenon with respect to vertical 
integration, the combination of the two issues leads to a more critical 
scenario. Both PLs from subsidiaries and from partner firms contribute to 
enforce power originating from integrations. According to our research it 
is worth analysing them together to stress the importance of the 
relationship between retailers and PL producers. The study of vertical 
integration in connection with the diffusion of PLs gives us the opportunity 
to draw a multifaceted picture in which each of the four subjects presented 
in the introduction plays a role in muddling itself with all the others. 
In the following passages we will take into consideration vertical 
integrations. Those involving former external producers are the most 
interesting ones, since the general logic is similar but they lead to further 
implications. The main and immediate effect reached with this action is that 
the company becomes a direct competitor of the producers. Previously the 
chain had the possibility to decide what, how and when to buy from 
different and independent producers; with the integration, it has the ability 
to decide whether or not to buy goods from an external producer (or, more 
often, decide the percentage of goods produced on its own and those 
bought “outside”). A synthetic (not exhaustive) list is provided with the 
purpose of harmonising different aspects. Consequences of vertical 
integration are: 
• Access, for the retailer, to all the crucial information regarding 
production (we had a quick view of this above). This has a bigger 
impact than we might think at a first sight: 
the knowledge of production processes gives a great 
advantage not only when buying National Brand (NB) 
goods but also when asking for the production of PLs from 
independent firms (we will discuss this point in more 
detail later on). 
• Exploiting of all the possibilities that can be derived from private 
labels (see also Erzene (2012)): 
o as we will explain in the next section, the introduction of 
PLs has many purposes. One of them is definitely the 
ability for supermarkets to become direct competitors 
with producers. If PL production is carried out by external 
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companies, chains can sell goods with their own brand 
even though they usually do not know everything about 
the production. When a PL is made by a firm owned by a 
chain, it means that the management knows essentially 
everything (or at least the crucial aspects) of the 
production and they can use this knowledge for wielding 
even more power when bargaining the purchase of goods 
similar to PLs. Then they could then even ask for bigger 
discounts if they know the margins coming from 
production or, in general, they might want to inflate their 
earnings from production to a maximum. 
Here PLs are used as a “weapon” to gain a significant 
advantage over producers; supermarket managers know 
that it is possible to use previous strategies as instruments 
for other purposes (in the next section we will consider 
the PL mainly as a marketing idea, but then we will see 
that it is used for many other incidental goals, sometimes 
even more effective than the first ones). 
• With this new kind of integration, both the chain and the producer 
marketing strategies must be modified: 
o chain stores can try to use the awareness of PLs for 
improving their own brand awareness, as studied by 
Vahie & Paswan (2006)43; while advertising PLs they can 
promote the store brand (and vice versa); discounts and 
promotions are set according to marketing strategies 
related to PLs and the erosion of producer earnings can 
lead to lower prices of NB (in the short run; thus, 
producers can go bankrupt or, in the long run, can be 
pushed out of the market. Consequently, retail chains 
might set oligopoly prices, unless antitrust commissions 
try to prevent this unpleasant situation); 
o due to higher brand awareness and direct PL competition, 
producers of NB must enforce their marketing strategies 
while differentiating and instilling in the consumer mind 
a good perception of their brand (e.g. good value for 
money or different taste due to patented recipe, etc.). 
                                                             
43  See also Wu, Yeh & Hsiao (2011) for a sort of analysis from the opposite 
perspective. 
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Without the intervention of antitrust authorities, vertical integrations 
might lead to an increasing buyer power deriving both from direct 
competition as producers and from bypassing supplier help in collecting 
goods for selling. As in the previous case, it is not possible to prohibit 
vertical integration, which might also be harmful, but it is necessary to 
monitor and then forbid the abuse of power that may arise from these 
integrations. In cases of malpractice, what is taken from producers or 
suppliers is not transferred on to customers; except for a small percentage, 
the rest is collected by supermarkets. Therefore, contracts that transfer all 
the revenues from producers to retailers, to the detriment of the former 
and no savings for consumers, should not be permitted. We are cognizant 
that vertical integration can sometimes guarantee savings and eliminate 
the wastefulness of multiple steps, and we are also aware that horizontal 
mergers might help to exploit economies of scale with all the benefits 
deriving from them. Moreover, several studies, also carried out by the EU 
commission for competition 44 , have pointed out that without any 
intervention by public authorities it is not possible to prevent a worsening 
of producer and supplier conditions. Therefore, in the long run many small, 
medium and not-strong-enough firms (producers, suppliers but also less 
powerful chains) will not be able to operate anymore. In such a scenario, 
innovation might be carried out with less effort45 but brand diversification 
will be lower. Moreover, competition will consequently be less vigorous 
and many other disadvantages will emerge. It is redundant to say that the 
social welfare, both from the side of small and medium destroyed firms and 
the final consumers, will suffer greatly and, after a certain point, a 
diminishing number solutions will be effective. If we do not consider all the 
perspectives from the four subjects illustrated in the introduction of this 
proposal jointly we cannot fully understand the hazard we are facing now 
by underestimating this phenomenon. 
 
1.2.2 Buying Groups 
A phenomenon similar to that of the integration is represented by buying 
groups, as discovered by Dobson et al. (2001) while analysing practical case 
studies. Some European retailers decided to collaborate towards gaining a 
                                                             
44 Among others, Dobson et al. (2001). 
45 As Inderst (2013) wrote, we should consider different cases from which diverse 
incentives and results might come out. 
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centralised purchase capability46. This option gives them similar benefits to 
those discussed in terms of horizontal integrations. Buying groups are an 
increasing phenomenon in the European Retail Market. Furthermore, 
deeper insight might come from the knowledge of the circumstances that 
lead some chains and not others to be part of a buying group. 
 
1.2.3 Malpractices  
We shall now define the problem of managerial “actions”/ “malpractices” 
used by supermarkets to gain an advantage called buyer power. Managerial 
“actions” attempt to increase supermarkets’ power against suppliers. From 
a certain point of view those actions might force suppliers and 
manufacturers to accept hard conditions to avoid delisting or other 
punishments by retailers, hence here we call them “malpractices”. 
The perspective from which this point is viewed might exert considerable 
influence on our final consideration. If we consider the viewpoint of a 
supermarket chain top manager, we can understand how crucial this 
behaviour is. First of all, it allows for the creation of big chains with huge 
power. Moreover, it enhances the possibility of survival in a European 
market with big firms and large buying groups that are able to propose an 
offering that remains competitive independent from location. Supermarket 
management must face two problems: being able to have best offerings at 
the lowest prices (alongside the other aspects that we consumers now 
expect from a good supermarket – e.g. large variety of products, 
promotions, different price-level goods, etc.47) and the ability to face the 
fierce competition of enormous supermarket chains that operate in Europe 
and sometimes worldwide. These two main tasks must be carried out by 
maximising the advantage and the highest profit for the supermarket itself. 
Therefore, the management must exploit all the power they have and, if 
possible, gain even more power over suppliers, producers and competitors 
(in terms of market share, brand awareness, geographic presence, etc.). The 
“exploiting all the power” philosophy brings about, however, a type of 
                                                             
46 In King (2013) a buying group is defined as “a subset of downstream firms that 
pool their demand for an upstream input to negotiate a better deal with suppliers”. 
About buying groups see also Chen & Li (2013). 
47 In Matamalas & Santandreu Ramos (2009) and Baker (2003) the “marketing mix” 
(from whose idea we extrapolate our idea of a good supermarket) is “the only way 
to maximise customer’s satisfaction”. In McCarthy (1960) the 4-Ps are Product, Price, 
Promotion and Place, that according to Laterborn (1990) should meet the 4-Cs 
Customer solution, Customer cost, Communication and Convenience. 
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management that is drawn to devising strategies that are not always fully 
lawful. One might say that some firms act in an unlawful manner on 
purpose, others might argue that some are forced to follow this approach 
for the survival of their firms. We will now examine both views in the 
following sections.  
 
1.2.3.1 Tentative List of Common Malpractices  
Candidate malpractices of supermarkets as presented by Stichele & Young 
(2009) and by the study by Nicholson & Young (2012) are enumerated in 
this illustrative, yet not comprehensive, list: 
• unit prices 
• temporary forced discounts (that retailers demand from 
suppliers for specific goods) and imposition of very low prices48 
• unilateral changes to prices and to related contractual 
terms 
• below-cost selling of some products in order to promote 
special offer to consumers 
• change in quality or quantity of products without any 
compensation payment 
• change in packaging and labelling with no extra-payments 
• payments of extra and unexpected costs. 
• payment of extra costs in order to obtain: 
o better positioning in the shelves 
o good visibility in the store centre 
o dedicated advertisement campaign 
• retroactive payments 
• extra discounts 
• delisting 
• after-sale rebates (at the end of the year) 
                                                             
48 “Paying very low prices can include deep discounting and can result in producers 
making little or no profit”. Stichele & Young (2009). 
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• “minus margins” practices and exclusivity contracts, 
according to which suppliers of a supermarket are not authorised to sell 
their products to other retailers at a lower price 
• listing fees 
• delaying payments 
 
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, we will only go into detail on the latter 
malpractices, since they have the most relevant, yet hidden, impacts. With 
delaying payments, supermarkets defer the money transfer long after 
customers have paid for their store purchases, as stated by Stichele & 
Young (2009). They may use that money to pay for other things, e.g. 
interests from the banks. Delayed payments provide extra earning to 
retailers by enabling them to have a sort of “free credit” for which they do 
not have to pay any interest. Delaying payments represent a big economic 
problem in many European countries. 
According to Mills (2003), listing fees are paid by suppliers for products 
available on supermarket shelves. It could be the only way for suppliers to 
show their products in that supermarket. Without paying this unfair fee, the 
supplier might not have the possibility to sell its products in that area, 
because that supermarket is probably the only one with such a wide range 
of customers for one-stop shopping trips (this aspect will be treated later 
in this work). Listing fees are often requested at the beginning of the 
supplier-vendor relationship, and not in later transactions, allowing us to 
define the fee as a sort of “entry barrier”. Nevertheless, some supermarkets 
continue charging listing fees indefinitely. Small retailers usually do not 
receive such payments because they simply do not have the power. Listing 
fees represent a critical point in the world of retailing. They can determine 
if a good will be available on the shelves of a supermarket and it means, 
considering one-stop shopping trip and buying alliances, that a supplier 
must consider this point carefully before refusing to pay such a fee. Small 
suppliers are of course the most affected by this problem. However, this is 
only a brief and general representation of a problem that needs to be 
considered within a wider framework. 
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1.2.3.2 An Example: Problems Arising for Farmers 
In this section, we provide a concrete example to show the consequences of 
malpractices and the abuse of buyer power by retailers. Among others, one 
case in the literature caught our attention: according to Davis & Reilly 
(2010)49, agri-food issues caused by retailers to farmers have, and will have 
in the future, a great impact in Europe (and in the United States as well50), 
particularly in those countries in which agriculture has a particularly 
important tradition. Hence it is of great interest to scrutinise, in synthesis, 
the problems arising for farmers51 as a result of supermarket buyer power. 
Considering fruit and vegetable offerings in supermarkets, one of the 
problems related to retailer strategies is the lack of choice in terms of 
horizontal diversification. There are differences in type and quality (e.g. 
exotic, organic or biological), but there are only few brands for each type of 
product. Moreover, sometimes it is impossible to find a locally grown food 
or regional item. Thus, only few firms manage to reach the final consumers. 
Consequently, farmers are forced to sell their products only to those firms. 
The agriculture problems related to buyer power in retailing is not a purely 
European problem; the USA also has several unfair practices against 
farmers that have been demonstrated, Grimes (2005). Some scholars and 
experts from Antitrust Institutes and other associations have pointed out 
that nowadays it has become harder for small suppliers to gain room on big 
retailers’ shelves because they are unable to cope with a plethora of 
malpractices such as, for example, slotting allowances, the excessive 
quantity of goods demanded and other unfair requests. In Europe, many 
studies 52  have explained that farmers represent the group that is most 
affected by retailer malpractices. In many European countries, farmers 
                                                             
49  They have already written in 2009, for “the UK Competition Commission’s 
Groceries Market Investigation”, that “looking at four key UK farming sectors—dairy, 
red meat, pig meat and fresh fruit— found that a variety of factors have influenced 
returns for farmers in recent years” and that “if unchecked, the supply chain practices 
would ultimately cause harm to consumers.” 
50  The Farm Foundation published in 2006 a report stating that “continued 
concentration of large-scale processing, food distribution and retailing [warehouses] 
may reduce consumer choice in markets. Large retailers will offer a variety of foods”. 
See also Timmons, Wang & Lass. (2008) for more details about US local capacity and 
consumption. 
51 See Buccirossi, Marette & Schiavina (2002). 
52  Among others, see Dobson (2003), Busch & Bain (2004); also, the European 
Commission in 1999 commissioned a report to Dobson Consulting in which effects 
of buyer power for farmers were considered alarming: Dobson et al. (2001). 
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have organised public protests on the low amount paid for their products 
by retailers. Thus, a deeper and comprehensive discernment of this issue is 
required. Moreover, a shared and fair solution to these relationships must 
be attained. 
1.3 Private Labels and Their Effects 
Some authors consider the development of supermarkets and the 
introduction of new strategies as considerable value added for the whole 
market. In this section, we focus our attention on the Private Label and, 
starting from them, we debate all of the relevant features that go in favour 
of supermarket chains. 
First, we introduce the PL in general, moving from an analysis of the main 
aspects linked to their introduction and development to an emphasis on the 
key factors and main strategies. Second, we compile a succinct history of 
the PL. Then we briefly review the literature about Italian market and 
recent years. Finally, we show some opportunities. 
 
1.3.1 The Private Label: Origin and Definition 
There are plenty of papers dealing with PLs from a managerial and 
marketing point of view 53 . First of all, we want to stress an important 
concept: PLs embody a brilliant innovation. At the beginning of 20th 
century, market brands were not well known: shopping was done at 
neighbourhood grocery markets. Later, with changes in the retail sectors 
and with the birth of retail chains, some retail brands started to be noticed 
by customers: our idea is that they were the first kind of supermarkets54. At 
first, no-brand products, mainly sold unpackaged, started to be sold using 
the retailer’s name: they were the first private labels. However, this 
phenomenon did not reach true importance until the final years of 20th 
century55. During the 90s, PLs were mainly first price products, introduced 
to offer convenient goods among mass products. Customers did not 
consider them good quality commodities. Managers subsequently came to 
                                                             
53 Among others: Ailawadi et al. (2008), Matamalas & Santandreu Ramos (2009), 
Bridson, Evans, Mavondo & Minkiewicz (2013), Zippel, Wilkinson & Vogler (2013), 
Ter Braak, Deleersnyder, Geyskens & Dekimpe (2013). 
54 A&P was, again, the firm who started the production of “many of their own 
products, specialising in what would later be known as store brands and private 
labels”; Ellickson (2011). 
55 For a deeper analysis see Ceccacci (2013). 
25 
 
understand the potential of PLs and started to differentiate their 
positioning: first price PL goods and mass-market PL products. Chains 
wanted their products to be considered a good value for money and able to 
compete with the most well-known ones. The offering included mainly 
common goods, those that were most frequently found among goods sold 
at supermarkets. Also, advertising campaigns started to be more effective 
and oriented towards making the customer aware of quality and value of 
PLs. Nowadays supermarket, as a result of the systematic adoption of 
marketing skills, have introduced many different kinds of PLs (Kumar & 
Steenkamp, 2007, and Bontemps et al., 2008), including:  
• First price 
• Mass market (standard) 
• Premium price 
• Bio 
• Vegetarian 
• Ready to eat 
• Kids products 
and many others. Now PLs can easily compete with the NB both in terms of 
strategic positioning and brand awareness. Advertising has shifted from 
promoting discounts to presenting PLs and showing all of their 
characteristics. 
Market researchers have demonstrated how well customers perceive 
PLs56; they are considered a good value for money, good quality products 
and moreover many chains try to promote the good values linked to their 
own brand. Quite often PLs are considered as good as NBs but at a lower 
price. Do customers think that the difference between a PL price and a NB 
price is only due to a mere increase as a result of being branded? It might 
be the case, since sometimes retailer advertising aims to communicate just 
this. This logic is enforced by the fact that often the goods are produced in 
exactly the same factory but then are sold both under the retailer’s brand 
and under the NB. Here the aim of the marketing is overtaken by 
managerial strategies: it is a great opportunity for supermarkets to exploit 
PLs for purposes that are less linked to marketing. 
                                                             
56 In the report of ACNielsen (2006) Private label is considered “a ‘good alternative’ 
to other brands” with “the same quality & value”. Other studies lead, more or less, to 
the same result: Symphony IRI Group (2011) and Symphony IRI Group (2012). 
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PL advertising is efficient in increasing brand awareness of the chain and in 
showing its worth in terms of quality, convenience and values, too. But at 
the same time, it is used to gain an advantage towards NBs and therefore 
towards producers. Special promotions are set to decrease the selling of 
NBs: by selling PLs retailers have higher margins, as also stated in 
Richardson, Jain & Dick (1996), and the market share of NBs could be 
diminished, together with their positive perception. There are dedicated 
campaigns for PLs for fidelity card owners57: these create a relationship 
between regular customers and PL goods, and after a while they might start 
to prefer PLs to NBs. Also, shelf positioning has become a vehicle that has 
to the advantage of PL sales to the detriment of NB products. Well-known 
NBs were usually positioned at eye level, so that consumers could easily see 
them.  Although producers were occasionally asked to pay a fee for this 
service, it ensured that they were able to secure the best product placement 
inside the store. Nowadays, some shelves are entirely dedicated to PLs, 
especially eye-level shelves and particularly when there are dedicated 
promotions. It is hard to consider those campaigns as purely envisioned 
with marketing in mind. Naturally, they strongly contribute to enhancing 
PL sales. We think, however, that the driving factor behind advertising is to 
improve retailer bargaining power. This power is exerted over both 
independent producers and PL manufacturers. Sometimes these two kinds 
of firms coincide. Retailers might request specific changes to be made to a 
given PL’s characteristics; while all changes are costly for the manufacturer, 
the supermarket rarely agrees to pay a bigger amount than the one 
originally agreed upon. The producers are reluctant to make changes 
because if the retailer breaches the contract he cannot recoup the expenses 
later. There are several other practices (or malpractices) used by chains 
when dealing with manufacturers. However the factors just illustrated are 
truly the fundamental ones in terms of understanding how critical the 
situation is. In Italy, for example, many producers are small or medium 
firms and are therefore even less powerful; in some instances their entire 
production is sold to a retailer as a PL. The bargaining power of retail chains 
is enormous and there is no regulation preventing them from abusing it. 
The most common effect is the setting of incredibly low prices paid by 
retailers resulting in very low earnings for manufacturers, who then face 
the very stark risk of going bankrupt, virtually eliminating any chance of 
                                                             
57According to Baltas (1997) “a loyalty-card holder gets money-off coupons toward 
private label products”. 
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R&D investment58. It is no coincidence that Olson (2012) finds many PLs to 
be too similar to well-known NBs. 
The resulting awareness might allow retailers to provide non-core services 
to customers, especially by means of fidelity programs. Fidelity programs 
create an illusion of proximity between the customer and the retailer, 
giving the latter the possibility to count on strong customer confidence59. 
Before analysing other positive aspects more in detail, we now list some of 
the generally positive aspects of PL production: 
• When manufacturers and retailers collaborate some 
synergies 60  can be exploited (as in the case of vertical 
integration). Each party can use its own knowhow for 
improving the knowledge of the other. Since retailers 
usually have higher power, it is advantageous for 
producers to keep something “secret” so that the retailer 
always needs their knowledge for reaching good quality 
PLs. 
• When companies can direct their unused production 
potential towards making more goods to sell under the 
retailer’s brand (signing a specific contract for this), as 
suggested by Plotnikov, Ponosova & V'jyugova (2013). 
This can occur when the product is identical but marketed 
as both a PL and a NB. By doing this the manufacturer 
earnings indeed increase, but with this careful attention 
must be paid to potential hidden retailer strategies. 
• PL production gives small firms the chance to reach many 
different markets that would not be achievable otherwise, 
especially if they are too small and their brand is unknown 
(Timmor, 2007). 
Finally, it is helpful to emphasise another general feature: some important 
and well-known brands or products are considered so fundamental that 
must be part of a supermarket’s offering regardless. For instance, Nutella 
and Coca-Cola must be present in almost any European store (if we do not 
consider hard-discount stores or similar). With these brands retailers have 
less chance to exploit their power, but for a reason precisely contrary to the 
                                                             
58 Inderst (2013) proposes different scenarios about innovation related to PLs. 
59 See marketing research carried out by “AC Nielsen” or “Symphony IRI Group”, e.g. 
ACNielsen (2006) or Symphony IRI Group (2011) and (2012). 
60 An interesting study about cooperation is Zippel, Wilkinson & Vogler (2013). 
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previous one: the supermarket needs to have them, even if it means giving 
them better treatment. 
 
1.3.2 Private Label Exploitation and Philosophy 
Brazauskaitė et al. (2015) state that precisely identifying the key factor 
behind the success of a PL is very hard, considering that the PL’s success 
can be traced back to its inception as a “value for money” opportunity. As 
previously illustrated, PLs augment brand awareness, store loyalty and 
contribute heavily towards the increase of market share and profits, being 
profitable for consumers, too. 
PLs provide, according to many scholars, bargaining power to retailers 
when negotiating the supply of NBs. This happens in several ways. 
In Meza & Sudhir’s (2010) investigation, the authors focus their attention 
on PLs increase of retailer bargaining power. They state that analysing the 
literature regarding the factors facilitating PL success, it is possible to 
identify three sets of factors: demand characteristics, costs and benefits of 
PLs and competitive conditions of the category. The first deals with 
consumer demographics and preferences, the second concerns, among 
others, lower quality and lower prices in comparison to NBs (however, this 
is not true according to several other scholars, among others: Sachon & 
Martinez-de-Albeniz, 2009) and the third regards several components like 
number of competitors, level of advertising and others. 
With respect to the first factor, it seems unclear, analysing the relevant 
literature, who the typical PL buyer is exactly. Some state that education 
influences the choice, claiming less educated people are more prone to buy 
PLs, while others claim exactly the opposite. Furthermore, looking to 
difference characteristics does not simplify the definition of this figure. The 
only aspect that seems to unite all PL purchasers is price sensitivity 
(Ailawadi & Harlam, 2002). According to Whelan and Davies (2006), 
ambition and sociability are determinant factors when choosing NBs, due 
to mechanisms linked to social affiliation.  
If we consider costs and benefits of PLs it is important to consider, among 
others, margins, prices and value for money. 
Supermarkets enjoy, obviously, higher margins for PLs with respect to NBs 
(Ailawadi & Harlam, 2002). In another study carried out in 2004, Ailawadi 
& Harlam also noticed that high PL share allows retailers to increase 
margins for NBs as well. This, according to Pauwels & Srinivasan (2004), 
29 
 
means that retailers gain bargaining power with respect to NB producers. 
On the other hand, consumers do not directly benefit from NB price 
decrease, but only from the lower prices of second-tier brand products. 
However, providing “value for money” PLs is no longer the main task for 
retailers, who are instead increasing investments in order to be able to offer 
consumers higher quality products in aesthetically pleasing packaging 
specifically designed for precise categories. Nevertheless, despite an 
increasing market share, NBs are still preferred, possibly due to their 
perceived higher quality (Ailawadi & Harlam, 2002). This might also be the 
reason why retailers occasionally adopt a copycat strategy (e.g. for 
packaging, Olson, 2012), trying to reach and exceed the share of NBs, which 
is considered to be a benchmark. 
Nevertheless, PLs also allow retailers to offer niche products that fill a gap 
left by a NB (Sachon & Martinez-de-Albeniz, 2009).  
Doyle & Murgatroyd (2011) emphasise this concept by stating, thanks to a 
UK Competition Commission inquiry, that retailers usually introduce PL in 
the categories where price competition, innovation and assortment have a 
lower degree.  
According to Sachon & Martinez-de-Albeniz (2009), PLs have a lower cost 
structure. Furthermore, the role of PLs is also to help in augmenting store 
image and loyalty (Ailawadi & Harlam 2004). 
Supermarkets might also use shelf positioning as an advertising lever: by 
placing PLs in the prime spots, it can be assured that their merchandising 
is adequate. By positioning PLs next to NBs, retailers implicitly invite the 
consumers to compare the two products. Furthermore, they give PLs more 
credibility, increasing the possibility that they will be purchased. It is no 
coincidence that the price difference between PLs and NBs, which might 
range from 15 to 40 percent, is mainly due to marketing expenses and R&D 
investments (Ailawadi & Harlam, 2002). 
This last point is strictly connected to the third set of factors individuated 
by Meza & Sudhir (2010): competitive conditions of the category. 
Competition between PLs and NBs is very high, even though some authors, 
among them Kumar & Steenkamp (2007), debate that they have different 
tactics for branding, labelling, advertising, pricing and many other 
marketing mix strategies. Nevertheless, retailers often suggest comparing 
their products with branded ones (Olson, 2012). This should fill the NB 
marketing expenses gap and perhaps inspire a better perception of PLs as 
not just mere copies of the NB versions. On the other hand, a number of 
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scholars (Morton & Zettelmeyer, 2004, and Aribarg et al., 2014) suggest 
that some PLs heavily imitate NB products. 
 
1.3.3 Focus: Supermarkets and Private Labels in Italy 
The origins of Italian supermarkets may be found, as for many other 
countries, in the development of North American and British retail 
companies in the 20th century. A&P, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea and 
Saynsbury’s were the first to introduce the “chain restore revolution”, while 
Michael Cullen opened, in August 1930, the first supermarket with all the 
typical characteristics still present today (Caprotti, 2014). 
In Italy there were three important cornerstones that affected supermarket 
development (Caprotti, 2014): 
• 1938: the so-called “one-price-warehouse” law. 
Supermarkets were only allowed to sell goods that were 
already packaged and priced 
• 1971 (n° 426/1971): small deregulation of the previous 
one. No more pre-packaged and pre-priced products only. 
Larger warehouses, up to 1,500 square meters, with 
delicatessen and fruit and vegetables aisles. 
• 1998 (“legge Bersani”: deregulation in size) and other 
recent minor laws: 1969, liberalisation of tobacco; 1975, 
liberalisation of perishable goods purchase; 1982, 
deregulation of opening hours and 2006, liberalisation of 
fresh bread selling. 
Substantial differences can be noted between Italian regions (Eales, 2014). 
PL sales revenues are concentrated mostly, 60%, in northern Italy, where 
the main chains (e.g. Coop, Esselunga and Conad) operate. In southern Italy, 
on the other hand, there are plenty of small retailers and they can invest 
much less in their own brand awareness and PL development. 
According to an IRI special report (Eales, 2014), after a good positive trend, 
PLs in Italy has faced a period of crisis in conjunction with the strong 
promotional activity carried out by the food industry. This comes alongside 
a generalised PL crisis throughout Europe. Although France was the first 
country to face this matter, as of 2014, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands are 
experiencing the same problems. Together with NB promotion, PL maturity 
and a focus on quality contributed to decreasing the PL share. Promotion of 
NBs is concentrated in those categories in which penetration of PLs is 
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higher (e.g. frozen and fresh and chilled food), underlining how NBs are 
trying to counterattack the increasing importance of PLs. On the contrary, 
supermarkets reply with an assault on the former hegemony of NBs with 
respect to premium and niche categories. Consequently, differences 
between NB and PL prices are decreasing, with prices of PL growing and 
NBs reducing, thanks to promotions. In Italy PL has the highest price index, 
but the lowest unit share among European Countries. 
Eales (2014) states that recently, in Italy, consumers have become more 
sensitive towards money-for-value and promotions of private labels. 
Nevertheless, there was no significant change in private label value or unit 
share. 
 
1.4 Buyer Power and PL Problems 
Buyer power as a problem has been studied since the final years of the 20th 
century61. In the initial studies, in terms of cases in which there is a strong 
buyer and lots of suppliers, bargaining power was considered to be the 
problem.  
It is now considered limiting to keep considering this issue as a 
phenomenon separately related only to economic, managerial or law fields. 
According to Cuneo et al. (2012), the high retail concentration, limited 
number of brands and poor category depth, have all contributed to 
increasing PL power in Europe. 
 
1.4.1 Problems Deriving from Private Labels   
In the section in which vertical and horizontal mergers are examined, we 
shed the light on the double role played by retailers as both distributors 
and the direct competitors of producers. Bell et al. (1997) define the retailer 
as “a double agent”. 
Retail chains have the power, among others, to act as a gatekeeper against 
supplier products (Grimes, 2005). Dobson & Chakraborty (2015) define the 
relationship between retailers and producers as a “mixed vertical-
                                                             
61 Some of them were not exactly focused on the same themes as today, like Knox & 
White (1991) or Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981); others 
approximately deal with the same topics, e.g. (from national or international 
commissions) OECD (1981) and Office of Fair Trading (1985). 
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horizontal” thanks to the presence of PLs and its implications in affecting 
competition. They state, as we also pointed out in previous sections, that 
the presence of PL goods allows retailers to be horizontal (direct) 
competitors of suppliers, while they can still compete in a vertical, more 
“classical”, sense.  
Kim & Parker (1999) conducted a study on collusive conduct in PL markets. 
They discovered, through an analysis of some product categories, that 
retailer strategies might lead to collusive price settings both for NBs and 
PLs. However, retailers will always tend to adopt a strategy that will 
maximise their own profits (and then prices and quality), regardless of any 
other consideration (Dobson & Chakraborty, 2015) that might involve 
producer problems or societal benefits. 
One undesirable outcome stemming from the introduction of PLs and the 
excessive use of power by retailers is the decrease in the incentives for R&D 
investments by manufacturers. This is the case, as described by Doyle & 
Murgatroyd (2011), of decreases in producer profits that lead to the 
reduction of costs and therefore to cutting those that do not provide a 
short-term recoup of investments. However, they underlined that such 
undesirable situation only occurs in some circumstances. 
 
1.4.2 The Competition Authorities’ Approach to PL and 
Buyer Power Problems 
Starting from the first antitrust law promulgated in the USA during the 
thirties, the Robinson-Patman Act62, a robust body of literature has been 
produced. Nevertheless, the existing rules are still not fully adequate. Some 
antitrust laws were introduced in Europe at the end of the 20th century63. 
There has been much debate on this theme at international, national and 
regional levels. Governments and international institutions are now more 
aware of the implications that a worsening of this situation could lead to. 
We can start from a simple reasoning: nowadays even the largest retailers 
face competition from other big or new companies. The negative effects of 
buyer power might emerge when the number of retailers and, 
subsequently, competition decreases. 
                                                             
62 Presented as a milestone in Gallagher (1936); discussed more in detail in Elman 
(1966). 
63 As written by Dobson et al. (2001) the first remarkable debates are Vogel (1998) 
and Ratliff (1998) while “a comprehensive review” is in OECD (1998). 
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Some scholars believe that retailers are strategically reducing prices in 
order to lower competition in the long run. The underlying idea is that they 
will be able to set prices much higher than in a competitive market in the 
future. 
With this premise, it seems that existing policies are still unable to find the 
right way to hinder increasing buyer power malpractices. Of course, it is not 
necessarily easy to grasp the importance and the essence of the problem 
with its implications in its entirety; extensive knowledge of buyer power 
and related issues is needed. 
The UK Competition Commission was the first64 in Europe to study in depth 
the retail market since the major UK chains began exerting a considerable 
power over suppliers and producers, aiming to control both the upstream 
and the downstream markets. The first studies carried out by the UK 
Competition Commission started around the last two decades of the 20th 
century, and many others have followed focusing on specific issues that 
have arisen in the meanwhile. Indeed, the UK is one of the first countries in 
which supermarket buyer power has started to gain considerable 
importance, although it is not the only one; other European countries face 
a similar context, and in some of them the problem has already reached 
such a level of maturity65 that specific studies are needed. Unfortunately, 
only few of those countries have started to plan dedicated studies devoted 
to better understanding the present situation and to finding a solution to 
marginalise this power. Due to this deficiency of national authorities, the 
European Commission for Competition started to ask scholars to conduct 
research in this area in the final decades of the 20th century. 
As written in the introduction of this thesis, it is not realistic to assign the 
same degree of maturity to all the European countries, and in fact it would 
be hard to identify even only two or three sets with common 
characteristics. This is primarily due the fact that each country has its own 
peculiarities, although the different market penetration of big firms 
certainly also plays a role. 
Germany, France - and for some features also Belgium and The Netherlands 
- are among those countries that are facing serious problems that stem from 
oligopolies and supermarket buyer power. The first two countries are 
                                                             
64  Before we considered two pioneering works: Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (1981) and Office of Fair Trading (1985). 
65 In Stichele & Young (2009) were already presented some early discussions and 
problems in many different European Countries. 
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home to many big retailing companies that are leaders in Europe and even 
around the world (e.g. Carrefour66). For this reason, they can count on 
greater power thanks to their size, which is at times made even greater by 
malpractice. Other countries have not yet experienced the consequences of 
buyer power, perhaps due to peculiar characteristics of their domestic 
market or the absence of big companies. We think that those countries, 
especially the biggest ones, will have to deal with this phenomenon soon 
considering in particular the enlargement of national firms and the rising 
of other big foreign (yet still European) companies. Moreover, the growing 
importance of Buying Groups operating throughout Europe is accelerating 
this process. In terms of retail market maturation, Italy is among the least 
developed countries67. We would like to focus our attention on this specific 
and very peculiar market, in which the characteristics of Italian firms and 
the behaviour of consumers play a determinant role in defining the 
environment and the future of the market. 
As discussed above, we suggest analysing the present varied situation as a 
picture of buyer power evolution in Europe over the last twenty years. After 
the brief summary of the (USA and) UK case(s), we then present an example 
of Buyer power in the Italian retail industry. USA and UK competition 
policies on buyer power are considered quite advanced, both in terms of 
the development of supermarket power and the antitrust studies carried 
out on this phenomenon. Whereas in Italy, on the other hand, the whole 
phenomenon is still at the first stage. The example of the Italian 
Competition Authority, even if different and delayed from the ones of UK 
commission, represents an opportunity to understand the effect of 
European and British studies and, at the same time, contributes to provide 
a view from a different country. 
Moreover, the current UK situation might provide a preview, with the due 
differences, of what the Italian market could be in few years. Therefore, the 
different approach, and the different timing, will represent a significant 
opportunity to analyse the different results and effects. 
The Italian Antitrust Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato) has the great opportunity to learn from other countries’ 
                                                             
66 See Hurt (2002) for a history of the firm and Colla & Dupuis (2002) for a (global) 
comparison with Walmart (the other huge and well-known retailing company 
worldwide). 
67 This aspect can be inferred from the survey carried out by the Italian Competition 
Authority: Agcm-Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato (2013). 
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experiences (e.g. UK) to solve the negative effects that result from 
supermarket malpractices. The current Italian retail market is very peculiar 
when compared to other European ones. Like in other sectors of the 
economy, the Italian retail market historically consists of plenty of small 
and medium firms. Moreover, the biggest retailing companies have a 
preeminent presence only in some regions, while they do not exist in other 
parts of Italy. Finally, the biggest Italian supermarket chain is a cooperative 
company 68  and many other important players have the same type of 
business organization. Therefore, some differences with the UK’s market 
emerge even after just an approximate inquiry. However, we believe that 
the general procedures and solutions proposed by the UK competition 
commission can be taken as a primary guideline for an analysis of the 
Italian situation as well. Indeed, the most common malpractices seen in UK 
more than ten years ago are now also adopted by Italian supermarkets. 
As stated in the previous sections, the use of PLs has become massive in UK 
supermarkets, as well as in other European and American markets. It is 
obviously also present in Italian stores, and its importance is continuously 
increasing69. 
In the example found the following section, we illustrate all the problems 
linked with the exploitation of buyer power that derives from the use of 
PLs. The Italian Competition Authority mentions, in its statement, several 
malpractices and problems we discussed in the previous sections. This 
sheds light on the impacts of those problems in producer-retailer 
relationships and the possible consequences for the whole industry and, 
moreover, for final consumers. 
We must always remember, however, that even if some circumstances have 
led to negative outcomes, the utilisation of PLs, as described further in this 
chapter, is not per se a negative practice; PLs have also brought about 
significant positive impacts both in the upstream and downstream market. 
  
                                                             
68 According to Deloitte (2014), a survey of Global Powers of Retailing, the leader 
retailing firm in Italy is “Coop Italia”, followed by “Conad” and “Esselunga”: the first 
two are cooperative companies. 
69 See, among others: Nielsen (2005) and other reports by IRI and Nielsen through 
the years. 
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1.4.3 An Example of Buyer Power Deriving from PLs 
On December 22, 2015, the Italian Competition Authority (Agcm - Autorità 
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato) stated that Coop Italia S.c.a.r.l. 
(Coop Italia) and Centrale Adriatica S.c.a.r.l. (Centrale Adriatica) were 
charged with the offence provided for in Art. 62 Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 
2 letters a) and e) of Decree Law no. 1/201270 and Art. 2 Implementation 
Decree71. This represents the first case in which the Agcm took measures 
against the abuse of a dominant position72.  
First of all, we must define the players and the facts. There are three 
players: two from supermarket side and one supplier. Coop Italia (with a 
turnover of 256€ billion in 2014) is a consortium that includes retail 
cooperatives, limited liability consortiums and companies; nine of them 
have relevant dimension and one, Coop Adriatica, is directly involved. 
Centrale Adriatica is a consortium of cooperatives itself with a turnover of 
about 2.6€ billion in 2014. 
Coop Italia has the role of coordinating the main retail operations of the 
group: 
• Find and select the main suppliers 
• Manage the supply of private label products 
• Centralised management of private label products (COOP) 
sold in any associated cooperative 
Coop Adriatica is the operation centre for sales and marketing on behalf of 
all the cooperatives of the consortium. Coop Adriatica buys substantial 
amounts of goods for all its associates, also managing warehouses, depots 
and laboratories. 
                                                             
70Art. 62, Decree Law 24 January 2012, n. 1, about “Disposizioni urgenti per la 
concorrenza, lo sviluppo delle infrastrutture e la competitività”, turned, with 
modification, into law 24 March 2012 n. 27. 
71  Decree 19 October 2012, n. 199, by the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and 
Forestry Policies (Ministero delle Politiche Agricole Alimentari e Forestali): 
Implementing Regulation of Art. 62, Decree Law 24 January 2012, n. 1, about 
“Disposizioni urgenti per la concorrenza, lo sviluppo delle infrastrutture e la 
competitività”, turned, with modification, into law 24 March 2012 n. 27. 
72  Bollettino N.49 del 18 Gennaio 2016. AL14 - COOP ITALIA-CENTRALE 
ADRIATICA/CONDIZIONI CONTRATTUALI CON FORNITORI. Provvedimento n. 
25797 (Italian Competition Authority, Bulletin N49). 
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In order to become a supplier for Coop Italia, every firm must accept the 
regulatory agreement. This first step is compulsory if the vendor is also a 
private label producer; as previously mentioned, Coop Italia is the only one 
in charge of PL issues for any company within the Coop system. Therefore, 
Coop carries out a centralised bargaining, which does not end with the 
regulatory agreement, but rather many other contracts, both with Coop 
Italia and with its subsidiaries. Some of them are specific and serve to 
define particular issues, such as provisions and technical documents. 
Business conditions are defined in annual contracts, called “Nostre furniture 
a Vostre associate” (that means: Our supplies to your partners). Those 
contracts are formally proposed by the supplier, but are defined by Coop 
Italia. In the agreement “Nostre furniture a Vostre associate” there is a very 
detailed list of discounts and payments required from the supplier in favour 
of Coop. 
More importantly, the above contracts do not specify or guarantee any 
amount and do not indicate any price. Furthermore, nothing is written 
about the renewal, which is not mandatory. In other words, a supplier has 
no other choice than signing these agreements with Coop Italia to activate 
a relationship with the Coop system, but this does not imply that Coop 
partners will do business with him. If they do, then the agreed conditions 
will apply. 
If a firm also provides private label products, there is a “capitolato di 
fornitura” (technical document of supply) which constitutes an integral 
part of the regulatory agreement. In this contract, everything about product 
characteristics, standards, specifications, management of production 
process and quality controls are defined, in addition to much more 
information concerning the whole supply chain. Fees apply if regulations, 
or secrecy, are violated. 
On top of this, decentralised agreements might be added to the previous 
contracts. This would lead to additional discounts or benefits favourable to 
Coop partners. 
According to the Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49, contractual 
clauses written in “Nostre furniture a Vostre associate”, were not subject to 
bargaining between Celox 73  and Coop. Moreover additional “extra-
                                                             
73 Celox (Celox Trade S.r.l.) is a pear wholesaler operating in central Italy. Between 
the years of 1998 and 2014, Celox was the pear supplier for Coop Adriatica. Celox 
provided to Coop Adriatica, under NB and PL brands, both domestic and foreign 
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contractual” discounts were discussed by Coop Italia together with Coop 
Adriatica and then only communicated to Celox. Here are some examples of 
discounts and payments: 
• Logistical discounts (e.g. less than 1% for orders between 
5 and 20 pallets, 1-5% for orders over 20 pallets during 
the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. These are justified by the 
fact that supplier can amortise expenses selling higher 
amounts of goods) 
• Other unconditional discounts shown in the invoice (5-
10% for years 2012 and 2013) 
• “end of period unconditional discounts” not in the invoice, 
but solicited with a credit note emitted at the end of the 
quarter (5-10% year 2012 and 1-5% year 2013) 
• Fee for “co-marketing” expenses 
• “Compenso Centrale ortofrutta Coop Italia”, general three-
monthly payments for Coop Italia (less than 1%) 
• Fee for analysis expenses (0-2000€ per year) 
• Additional discounts (e.g. for members of the cooperative, 
weekly “flyer discounts”) planned any three of four 
months74 
In November 2012 pear suppliers, Celox included, asked Coop Italia to 
reduce discounts as the situation was no longer financially sustainable (“la 
situazione in cui stiamo operando non è sostenibile”)75. 
Prices were established by Coop and then communicated to Celox using a 
sales catalogue, with frequent, weekly or even daily, updates. 
There is one crucial aspect reported in the bulletin: neither Coop Italia nor 
Coop Adriatica committed to buy a definite quantity of products. This is 
                                                             
pears. Celox had a turnover of about 5 million euros in 2013 and 2 million euros in 
2014. 
74 Celox pointed out that during the years considered by Agcm, unwanted (by Celox) 
additional discounts reached 82,000€ with discounts between 10-15% and 20-
25%. Overall, also considering the ones agreed at a national level with Coop Italia 
(which applied anyway), there were discounts of about 30-35% of the value written 
in the sales catalogue. (Attachment to the Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin 
N49: n86 document 1.1). 
75 Attachment to the Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49: n13 document 
1.36. 
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explicitly written in some attachments 76  regarding messages from Coop 
Italia to Celox in June and November 2014: Coop reminds that 
commitments to purchase certain quantities were never made (“ricorda 
innanzitutto che non sono mai stati presi impegni circa le quantità da 
ordinare”) and contractual clauses about prices did not state any obligation 
towards the quantities supplied (“la conclusione degli accordi contrattuali 
sui prezzi non prevedevano alcun impegno circa le quantità oggetto della 
fornitura”). With these messages Coop sought to underline, once more, that 
Celox’s complaints about the cease of orders were unfounded because of 
specific contractual clauses. 
Even though the period taken into consideration by the Italian Competition 
Authority starts in October 2012, the partnership between Coop and Celox 
started in 1998 (23rd February 1998). Since then, yearly contracts had been 
always renewed until the decision at the heart of contention. Celox had to 
supply different qualities of pears, both with and without the Coop private 
label. Therefore, Celox had to stipulate many supply and sub-supply multi-
year contracts. 72% of Celox turnover in 2012, 56% in 2013, can be 
attributed to Coop. Additionally, Coop was the only customer operating in 
the large-scale retail trade and the only one buying products processed in 
its factories. The percentage of PL pears sold in Coop supermarkets 
between 2008 and 2013 is unclear: Celox says it was between 48% and 
55%, while Coop Italia and Centrale Adriatica assert it was about 20% of 
the total sales volume of pears at Coop77. While Celox was a significant pear 
supplier for Coop, on the other hand Coop was aware that Celox was 
extremely dependent on Coop Italia (Celox is expressly defined as “Coop-
dependent” in a document found in Coop Adriatica headquarters78). 
Since the beginning of 2014, orders from Coop to Celox drastically declined. 
This follows Celox’s refusal to endorse some changes in the supply contract 
(“lettera di ricognizione di contratto di fornitura”)79. Coop meditated one 
these contractual changes by trying to specifically circumvent Art. 62 
Decree Law no. 1/2012. Celox refused to sign the contract presuming it was 
                                                             
76 Attachments to the Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49: n89, n90, n91 
and n 94 document 1.1; n3 and n9 document 1.15. 
77 Attachments to the Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49: documents 1.37, 
2.50 and 2.51. 
78 Attachments to the Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49: n88, n90 and 
n92 document 1.1; n2, n4, n5, n7 and n11 (filename 5) document 1.5; n6 (filename 
31) document 1.7. 
79 Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49. 
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a method for declaring the existing and previous provisions the result of a 
fair bargain. Coop did not send any notice or rationale and this, in 
accordance with the bulletin 80 , prevented Celox from reorganising its 
supply. Therefore, without any possibility to find a substitute in the short 
term, Celox terminated its pear business. 
Coop appealed the Agcm’s decision because it considered the sentence 
passed by Antitrust Authority illegitimate. Coop’s dispute (according to 
them) mainly regarded severe imperfections in the pre-trial phase and the 
insufficient consideration by the defence of their openness and good faith 
during trade relationships 81 . These are the main reasons according to 
which Coop would like the judgment to be revisited, but there still has been 
no further news from the court or from either one of the parties. Many 
judgments might still be issued before a final sentence can be written. 
This case represents a noteworthy precedent. It was the first time in Italy 
that a dispute arose between a supplier and a retailer for abuse of buyer 
power. This not only serves as a guide for upcoming cases, but also 
indicates a new procedure for delving into this issue. 
 
1.4.4 Help Coming from Research Studies of Trade 
Associations 
As seen when considering problems arising for farmers, crucial assistance 
might come from studies ordered by specific associations that want to 
illustrate, for the benefit of their members, the consequences of 
malpractices. Despite being focused on particular cases, general notions 
and basic concepts expressed in those studies enrich the research under 
some new aspects. Sometimes those studies are useful for better 
understanding the difference between management and marketing that we 
described in the introduction: they reveal the direct effects of managerial 
decisions on suppliers or producers. When saying, for example, that 
“temporary forced discounts” might push small firms out of the market, a 
connection between a strategic two-task-decision (providing goods to 
customers at lower prices for a certain period and having at the same time 
                                                             
80 Italian Competition Authority’s bulletin N49. 
81 Source: 
 https://www.e-
coop.it/documents/10180/40034451/Coop+su+Provvedimento+Antitrust+-
19+gennaio+2016/69c481b4-66ed-4da9-8848-56c18466ad2d 
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the side effect of weakening the power of the supplier) and its side effect is 
clearly demonstrated. 
1.5 Private Label Opportunities and Strategies 
According to Eales (2014), there are several opportunities to benefit from 
PL adoption and development. 
First, manufacturers and retailers cooperate on a joint business plan. 
Together they will identify: prices, shelf positioning, promotions and 
assortment optimisation. This will tend to influence shopper decisions and 
growth of identified categories. 
Second, for retailers a strong brand loyalty is crucial to create a link with 
consumers. Ailawadi & Harlam (2004), among others82, underline that PLs 
help in augmenting store image and increasing store loyalty. 
Then, a valuable role is played by those Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
that measure price gaps and share trends. Consequently, if correlated with 
an analysis of shopper behaviour, manufacturers and retailers will have a 
clear idea of the category itself and its future trends. 
Finally, data collection, also via fidelity programs, (e.g. on sales and 
promotions, in addition to holidays and weather) helps in forecasting 
stocks, avoiding goods scarcity or oversupply. 
Consumers benefit from the presence of PLs through increased product 
assortment and more intense promotional activity, hence from consequent 
lower prices in two out of four categories (Pauwels & Srinivasan, 2004). 
Dobson & Chakraborty (2015) agree on the advantages for consumers 
deriving from the additional presence of products (i.e. introduction of PLs 
that do not replace existing brands) and the possible augmented producer 
competition. Moreover, they also state that PL introduction might enhance 
quality and lead to lower prices. Steiner (2004) affirms that social welfare 
is, generally, maximised by the competition between NBs and PLs. Inter-
brand competition among competitor retailers can also increase non-price 
competition (Doyle & Murgatroyd, 2011), for example by boosting the 
contest over quality between PLs of the same category (i.e. competition on 
quality between products of the same category but with competitor Private 
Label brands). 
                                                             
82 Meza & Sudhir (2010), Sudhir & Talukdar (2004). 
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According to Dawar & Stornelli (2013), the main retailer strategy is to 
increase earnings using PLs, thanks to their higher margins and through a 
differentiation from other retail chains. The authors also provide some 
hints on how manufacturers and retailers should act to fulfil this goal. 
Producers should cooperate with retailers (e.g. scheduling promotions 
such that NBs and PLs do not compete during the same period) and assist 
them, without damaging their own core brands. A smart solution for 
producers is also to introduce PLs into a category where they (i.e. 
producers) have no products. However, when NBs and PLs that are both 
produced by the same manufacturer are present, they both can benefit from 
cobranding (Dawar & Stornelli, 2013). Mutual benefits might also come, 
according to the authors, from the sharing of information. For example, 
manufacturers can receive inside knowledge on categories. 
The European Union itself sometimes recognises the positive outcomes of 
a PL presence in boosting innovation, like in the case of baby bottle 
warmers (Philips/Avent case) (Doyle & Murgatroyd, 2011). With the 
increased quality perception of PLs (Nielsen, 2014) and the introduction of 
premium PLs83 the maintenance of quality and innovation becomes crucial 
(Dawar & Stornelli, 2013). 
Another strategy that helps retailers to increase PL market penetration 
and, at the same time, has a positive benefit for producers as well, is 
ingredient branding (Vaidyanathan & Aggarwal 2000). Moreover, 
consumer perception will be improved as a result of NB ingredients in the 
given PL, especially if the latter is an unfamiliar product (the PL package 
should therefore clearly point out the branded ingredient). Ingredient 
branding is especially valuable (and represents a key factor) when 
introducing niche products (i.e. ethnic, organic, fair or environmental 
friendly), as indicated by Dawar & Stornelli (2013). 
 
1.6 PL Final Remarks 
A comprehensive study of retailer strategies, in which we scrutinised both 
direct, indirect and “hidden” aspects, led us to the hypothesis that they have 
more complex implications than proximate ones. We hypothesise that 
retailers frame and employ strategies that have multiple objectives. 
Frequently, relaters formulate strategies intended to increase their buyer 
power when dealing with suppliers and producers (i.e. the “upstream 
                                                             
83 See, among others, Geyskens (2010). 
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market”), rather than with the “downstream market”. This is true also for 
those strategies apparently addressed to final consumers. We hypothesise 
that, many times, among the different goals of an individual strategy, some 
aim to influence consumer behaviour and brand awareness, while others 
target competitors, suppliers and manufacturers. 
In conclusion, one question remains to be asked: should we gauge Private 
Labels as assets or liabilities for the whole market? 
This is indeed a challenging question. It would be helpful and interesting to 
analyse the issue further, never losing a comprehensive vision. Any attempt 
to answer this question will undoubtedly result in heated debate. Our first 
conclusions however lead to a perspective-driven answer. Circumscribed 
studies conducted with diverse focuses generate distinct results. 
From the consumer side, including a new label (i.e. PL) in a selection that 
already offers identical products, in terms of quality and characteristics, 
constitutes an immediate advantage. Particularly, when buying 
commodities, currently consumers certainly prefer the lowest price 
possible. Moreover, each consumer, being only an extremely small buyer, 
cannot affect the market with only her or his purchasing choices. As a single 
player, she/he has no power. Furthermore, a coordination between all 
consumers to influence the market is not achievable. This customer 
preference occurs and generates positive outcomes in the short term. 
Whereas in the long run, the abovementioned asset might turn into a 
negative issue. Consider a possible scenario in which the product offering 
is purposely reduced in order to create a price war. Henceforth, prices rise 
due to low competition and the label (i.e. PL) that formerly provided 
benefits becomes detrimental. In this hypothetical scenario, lack of 
innovation contributes to augment negative long-term outcomes of an 
extreme exploitation of retailer power coming from abuse of “malpractices” 
and PL strategies. A different behaviour or more forward-looking 
purchasing habits by consumers would not prevent this hypothesis from 
occurring. Whether market concentration becomes relevant, innovation 
declines, supply shrinks or other liabilities arise, it is certainly not a 
consequence of consumer behaviour. Therefore, any possible undesirable 
outcome of retailer strategies should be prevented or prohibited by public 
intervention. Nevertheless, many likely outcomes and opportunities arise 
from the introduction and development of PLs, and resulting collaboration 
with other players. Hence, the prohibition of a given PL or retailer 
strategies aimed at reinforcing their bargaining power, or their brand 
awareness and power, must not be determined a priori. Nonetheless, there 
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should be, in each category, a balanced combination of the retailers’ own 
labels84, major NB and other products under the Pareto efficiency criteria. 
Even if a wide variety of products increases competition between PLs and 
NBs, retailers would benefit from it through augmented sales and the 
attraction of more consumers. An excessive presence of PLs, in conjunction 
with an impaired NB supply, surely has a negative impact on customer 
behaviour and causes supermarkets to have inferior revenues. We would 
suggest a study on the possible equilibrium between PLs and NBs. An 
equilibrium would permit fair competition and ensure adequate product 
variety and quality, with benefits for producers, retailers and consumers. 
Hence, a study on this issue would be of undeniable interest for retailers, 
manufacturers and researchers alike. 
 
  
                                                             
84 Nielsen (2014) conducted a study on customer perception of retailer assortment. 
Many customers did not have a favourable opinion of supermarkets in which they 
perceived a disproportionate number of PL products in their assortment. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Private Label Promotion: 
a new defensive and 
supporting strategy? 
 
The present study proposes, through several empirical analyses, a new 
interpretation of promotional strategies of retail chains. To this end, we use 
an exclusive dataset. Although the original data, which came directly from 
a leading retail chain, was difficult to acquire and use, we were indeed 
successful in producing an original contribution.  Moreover, these data are 
representative of the sales made by retailers in several regions of central 
Italy. Hence, the resulting interpretations can be considered in a more 
generalised context. 
Supermarket strategies have changed over years. They have differentiated 
their own products through, for example, the introduction of more targeted 
(and higher priced) premium products. Among the three predominant 
Private Label (PL) classifications, which can be defined as economy, 
standard and premium (Geyskens, 2010), the last one is perceived by a 
wide number of experts as a tool for attracting those consumers who are 
still loyal to National Brands (NBs). 
The PL reached a state of maturity that forced retailers to shift from a 
promotion-based strategy to a new one, more oriented towards quality and 
value while still preserving comparatively low prices. 
In our research, we investigate the changes in retailer strategies, starting 
from the analysis of the promotional strategy of the past fifteen years. 
Despite being initially perceived as the dominant and cardinal strategy, 
extensively studied by scholars, PL promotion has supposedly lost its 
predominance and effectiveness. Although this is mainly true, it is helpful 
to further analyse the significant implications. 
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In our study, we demonstrate how PL promotional activity has moved from 
a purely offensive to a more complex and effective (according to the new 
trends) strategy. We can identify two different, yet connected, branches of 
this strategy. 
The first branch of this strategy aims to maintain the advantages, in terms 
of market share and brand power, gained in the last fifteen years. We define 
it as “defensive”. Not only does this transformation explain a number of 
changes in price strategies, but also it represents a sort of litmus test for 
new power relations between NB manufacturers and supermarkets. 
The second branch of the strategy also concerns market share and brand 
awareness, but focuses instead its effort on premium PLs. We identify it as 
the “supporting” strategy. The recently introduced premium PLs cannot be 
promoted as frequently and massively as standard PLs. Nevertheless, they 
need to gain market share and must come to take part consumer habits. 
Hence, instead of directly promoting premium PLs (i.e. an offensive 
strategy like the one of standard PLs in the first years of this century), 
retailers promote standard PLs in the same product category. Some 
standard PL promotions are thus set up as supporting strategies for 
premium (and same category) PL market penetration. 
In the first section of this chapter we present a descriptive analysis of the 
evolution of strategies and promotions over the last fifteen years. Trends 
and data from reports, as well as graphs and current academic knowledge, 
are adopted to underline the differences and the progression. 
In the second section we present the research question, while in the third 
section we describe the dataset. More specifically, we describe the chain 
and the different types of stores from where the data are collected. 
Moreover, we include descriptions of the goods that make up the dataset 
and their repetition over time, as well as a chart that illustrates the 
predominance of the food category over the non-food one. All these 
descriptions underline the uniqueness and the representativeness of the 
dataset. 
Then, in the fourth section, we illustrate the methodology we use to address 
the research question and we formally present the model. Descriptive 
tables are reported to provide statistical information on the data. We utilise 
different methodologies, hence we illustrate them in two different sections, 
with a descriptive analysis and a causal analysis. 
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The results are briefly shown in the fifth section which, as for the 
methodology, is divided in two subsections, according to the two types of 
analyses. Tables help in clearly showing the estimations. 
The final section is the conclusion, with a synthesis of the outcomes of this 
research. 
 
2.1 Literature Review and Theoretical 
Framework 
During the first decade of this century, manufactures decided to rise NB 
prices to maintain profits despite reductions in sales volumes. This was an 
effective strategy, for a certain period, in those countries where consumer 
willingness to pay higher prices for NB instead of PL goods was significant. 
Marketing and manufacturing factors, consistently with a perceived quality 
gap, caused NBs to enjoy high consideration during the development state 
of PLs (Steenkamp, 2010). Eventually, PL evolution led to the achievement 
of brand equity. In 2012 retail concentration in Europe was quite 
significant and, together with limited offerings and assortment, it 
strengthened PL power (Cuneo et al., 2012). It also gave brand legitimacy 
to retailers’ own labels and consolidated the recognition of value in 
consumer opinion. At that point, the PL maturity could be considered fully 
obtained and the perceived quality gap between NBs and PLs became 
considerably lower. Therefore, after the first decade, it became impossible 
for NBs to profit from perceived quality gap against PLs. Thus, correlation 
between NBs and PLs was significantly reshaped. It is noteworthy to 
remind that, according to Mela et al. (1997), promotions make both loyal 
and non-loyal consumers more price sensitive in the long run, with a more 
relevant effect on the latter. 
The awareness of quality regarding PL goods considerably contributed, 
approximately ten years ago, to a noteworthy transformation of the 
preceding trend. Furthermore, consumer perception identified quality PL 
products as effectively belonging to the premium segment. This represents 
a landmark in the relationship between PLs and NBs. Nenycz-Thiel (2009) 
asserts that perceived quality differential is essential towards determining 
consumer behaviour. Moreover, he proposes NB perception as the motive 
for the shift towards PL products: NBs were perceived too expensive in 
relation to the quality offered, contrary to PLs. This hypothesis seems fair 
when considering the previous increases in NB prices with no correlation 
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to quality. Moreover, only four types of products appeared within 
supermarket offerings: mainstream quality NBs, premium quality NBs, 
economy PLs and standard PLs (Geyskens, 2010). Therefore, if a shift from 
premium NBs goods occurred, it was necessarily towards premium PLs. In 
the subsequent years, customers stably recognised the quality of premium 
PLs, as remarked by Nielsen’s survey in 2014. Hence, the long-term retailer 
strategy, that began at the end of the first decade, eventually reached the 
desired goal. According to Nielsen (2014), in 2014 more than 70% of 
interviewees perceived an increase in PL quality over the previous years. 
Many customers are price-driven in their purchasing decisions, with a 
considerable proportion (69% of interviewees) assigning great importance 
to getting the best price. Moreover, a higher share (70%) expresses its 
preference of PLs to save money. Nevertheless, PLs were not only attractive 
due to price. PLs were also perceived as high quality products. Many 
interviewees (67%) chose PLs for their value for money, with a similar 
percentage (62%) perceiving themselves as smart shoppers for buying PL 
products (Nielsen, 2014). Nonetheless, there are other factors to ponder. 
One aspect in particular caught our attention, further compounded by the 
peculiar existing economic situation. The economic crisis of 2008 had two 
unfavourable outcomes: the rise of raw material prices and the desire of 
suppliers and retailers to recoup money lost due to the crisis (SymphonyIRI 
Group, 2012). Consequently, those products particularly affected by price 
increases had to be considerably discounted to maintain, let alone grow, 
volumes. Moreover, this was essential since the most affected products 
were basic necessities or popular goods. According to SymphonyIRI Group 
(2012), these products include: extra virgin oil, tomato sauce, olive oil, 
Italian wine, pasta and crescenza cheese. Under those circumstances, 
consumer shopping behaviour has been enduringly influenced and shaped 
(SymphonyIRI Group, 2012). Contrary to the strategy that set higher prices 
for better quality products, both retailers and manufacturers opted for a 
widespread use of promotions. As for popular items, promotions represent 
a successful technique for preserving volumes in any category. 
SymphonyIRI Group (2012) assesses at almost one third (29.8%) the share 
of goods that were discounted in 2012 across all categories. However, those 
deals register only mixed effects. Some scholars agree that some 
undesirable outcomes are derived from intense competition. Mela et al. 
(1997), among others, demonstrates how customers become more price 
and promotion sensitive as a result of powerful and persistent promotions. 
In the long run, promotions have negative effects (Jedidi et al., 1999): 
decreasing regular prices would be less viable yet discounts must be 
significant to obtain the same effect.  Although in the preceding section we 
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considered PL promotions, the amount of NB promotions was more 
relevant than the former between the end of the first decade and the 
beginning of the second in the present century. In Italy in 2012 (specifically, 
February) NB promotions counted for more than a quarter (26.9%) of value 
sales, with an increase of 1.6% over the previous year. By contrast, PL 
promotions recorded a decrease of -4% with respect to 2011, with a share 
of 22.5% of value sales (SymphonyIRI Group, 2012). Decline in PL 
promotion levels was conspicuous from the end of third quarter of 2011, as 
noted by SymphonyIRI Group (2012). Moreover, price promotions not only 
create long term undesirable consequences, but also diminish consumer 
willingness to pay for a NB in comparison to a PL (Steenkamp, 2010). 
Nonetheless, Steenkamp (2010) declares that in 2010 there was a budget 
switch from advertising to price promotions, contrary to authors’ 
recommendation. Furthermore, while PL promotions dwindled, NB ones 
grew tremendously over years. Subsequently, as 2014 approached, thanks 
to these two antithetical tendencies, PL value share started relent, as 
indicated in that year’s IRI Special Report. 
Therefore, conversely to the first years of 21st century, the price gap 
between NBs and PLs has been reducing significantly. Promotion sales 
volumes can be attributed in the measure of 80% to NBs while only 20% 
regards PLs (Eales, 2014a). 
As shown in the figures below (Figure 1 and Figure 2), PL promotional 
pressure in Italy in 2014 was about 23%, counting for less than 20% 
(18.9%) of total promotion share, perfectly in line with the European 
average. 
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Figure 1 PL Promotion Market Share 2014. PL promotion share (in %) in European 
countries and in the United States. 
Notes: Source: IRI InfoScan (hypermarkets and supermarkets) 
 
 
Figure 2 PL Promotion evolution, in points, 2014 versus 2013. 
Notes: Source: IRI InfoScan (hypermarkets and supermarkets) 
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Moreover, in terms of units, Italian PLs had the highest prices and the 
lowest market share among all European countries (Eales, 2014b): having 
set the average NB price at 1, PL prices had a value of 0.786, with an 
increase of 0.7 points with respect to 2013. Consequently, during the 
following year Italian supermarkets considered revising their price 
strategies to compete with NB promotions (Eales 2015, a). 
Considering the two trends briefly above mentioned, we can identify two 
distinct scenarios prior to the phase we examine. During the first decade of 
21st century, two tendencies influenced the balance between NBs and PLs. 
Increasing promotional pressure (Grandi, 2011) contributed to 
augmenting the existing price gap between manufacturers’ products and 
retailers’ goods. NBs exploited both this gap and their perceived increased 
quality by fixing higher prices (Steenkamp, 2010) to retain the same 
revenue level with lower volumes. Subsequently, a considerable 
discrepancy occurred, although this nonetheless did not represent a steady 
state. Differences made the exploitation of new opportunities possible, as 
for instance positioning, pricing and brand awareness. Increasing PL power 
(Cuneo et al., 2012) and quality obviously induced higher prices. These, 
together with diminished PLs and jointly augmented NB promotional 
pressure (Eales, 2014a), eroded the gap between PLs and NBs. It is 
noticeable how antithetical the two mentioned trends are. They have led to 
the existing status and the subsequent identification of new strategies. 
A number of global and local reports provide evidence for the decrease of 
PLs and increase of NB promotion balance. A noteworthy comparison was 
made in IRI Topline Report for H2/Q4 2015. The report considers both an 
average basket of goods and a full PL basket. For the former was valued at 
€29.99 and €30.08 in the last quarter of 2014 and 2015 respectively, while 
the latter was valued at €23.82 and €24.15. Moreover, while prices for the 
average and the full PL baskets were slightly increasing, those for a full NB 
basket were slightly decreasing: from €31.69€ in 2014 to €31.59 in 2015. 
Figure 3 shows the relative increase of a full PL basket in comparison to a 
full NB basket: setting the latter at 100, there is an increase of almost 1 
percentage point in the relative price index (from 74.7 to 75.6). 
Furthermore, Figure 3 also shows that a full PL basket is relatively more 
expensive in Italy than in all the other major European countries. 
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Figure 3 IRI Food Shopping Basket. Total NB Versus PL relative price index. In Q4 2014 
and Q4 2015, in Western Countries. 
Notes: Source: IRI Topline Report. 
The IRI report from October 2015 evidences how promotional levels 
offered in Italy until 2014 where unsustainable in a long-term perspective. 
Despite their successful application to boost short term sales, promotions 
could not be efficiently adopted as a long-term strategy. Price wars and 
additional promotions brought margins and revenues to a minimum, 
without a consequent increase in sales. 
Also, from a manufacturers’ point of view, the game was a losing one: 
significantly decreasing prices over long term periods led to even greater 
decreases in margins and revenues. On the other hand, it was risky to raise 
prices. NB producers might have considered heavy promotions as the only 
feasible way to stop losing market share in favour of PLs. However, the IRI 
report shows a slightly bigger decrease in NB promotions in comparison to 
PL ones for 2015. 
A change was nevertheless inevitable from different point of views. Even 
though, as from the discussion below, some research and reports have 
emphasised this change, a deeper empirical analysis was strongly needed. 
Hence, the aim of the present research is in fact to fill this gap. 
The IRI Topline Report underlines how, in 2015 in Italy, a positive trend 
was not linked to promotional pressure. Promotions in 2015 were lower 
than 2014 for any month except for December, where they were relevant. 
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Overall promotional pressure in 2015 was 27.9% against 28.4% for the 
previous year. However, it is worth highlighting that, despite an increase in 
promotional activity between 2010 and 2014, in 2014 promotional activity 
was already becoming less relevant than before. Retailer strategy was more 
oriented towards consistently low prices rather than temporary deals, such 
as heavy NB promotions (Eales, 2014.b). Nevertheless, according to an IRI 
analysis (2016) on the Italian market, promotional activity is overused in 
every category, particularly in the Food and Beverage one. The abuse of the 
sales promotion has led to a downward spiral of its very effectiveness 
(Galasso, 2015). 
New retailer policies, especially the “Every Day Low Price (EDLP)” strategy, 
has changed the concept of promotion into the long-term belief of 
convenience. This is a crucial aspect affecting not only promotions but also 
the overall retailer strategy and, consequently, the manufacturers’ one. The 
2015 IRI report (Eales, 2015) already pointed out a trend that was 
significant from that and the previous year. Coop, the main retailer in Italy, 
and other a number of chains (e.g. Conad), formulated a strategy similar to 
the EDLP one, modifying however the concept and the aim of promotion 
from a short-term increase in sales to something envisioned to build strong 
consumer loyalty. 
Promotional activity with the goal of boosting sales is less effective and less 
adopted than in the past. Coupons and flyers are common in Italian 
supermarkets (IRI 2015 and 2016), even though their effectiveness is 
uncertain. 
As also said by Steve Matthesen, former President of Global Retail at 
Nielsen, a change in consumer expectation has been observed, namely that 
the majority consumers perceive that low prices should be the norm 
(Nielsen, June 2016) thanks to the strong promotional activity of PLs and 
NBs. 
Nevertheless some consumers consider paying a higher price worth it for 
obtaining a better quality good. This gives retailers the possibility to 
transition from an aggressive promotional competition, which we 
considered no longer sustainable, towards an offering in which products 
have higher perceived benefits. Hence, building customer loyalty is 
possible, because consumers will be more satisfied and then more prone to 
come back again. 
Nonetheless, we must keep in mind that no promotional strategy could be 
considered the winning one for any category present in supermarket 
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offerings. Well contemplated and planned promotions represent the key to 
success. It is better having less yet well designed and targeted promotions 
rather than bigger but non-focused ones. 
What we have argued so far depicts the evolution of promotional pressure 
over the last few years and underlines a change in trends. It also gives some 
hints regarding promotional activity of NBs. However, no interpretation is 
given for either the hidden new PL promotional strategy nor for the 
previous rise in NB discounts. As new promotional PL strategy is a 
consequence, we shall start with analysing the rise in NB discounts. 
First, we need to change perspectives and start by revaluating some key 
points from the previous sections. 
During the last several years, PL products have gained market share thanks 
to a big boost of some effective promotional campaigns together with other 
marketing strategies. NB producers were then forced to stop this trend to 
bring their customers back. An immediate, effective and easy strategy 
might have been to diminish the gap between their products and PLs: 
promotions seems to have been the right tool for this purpose.  
The appropriate counter strategy from supermarkets then was to 
reintroduce this gap by also offering their own products under promotion. 
This defensive strategy brings back, in the consumer’s mind, the perception 
of good quality at a lower price (i.e. a better value for money) in comparison 
to NBs. For PLs, the aforementioned consciousness represents a key 
component in the PL vs NB balance. Furthermore, as derived from the 
analysis of the Italian market, a defensive strategy is crucial since, until Q3 
of 2016, consumer behaviour was the same as in the period of crisis: 
despite a slow recovery of national economy and an increase in sales 
volumes, customers still prefer cheap goods and are significantly sensitive 
to promotions (Nielsen, November 2016). Hence an abrupt interruption of 
promotional activity would not only be ineffective, it would also 
undoubtedly be dangerous for the whole supermarket offering. Since 
Consumer Packaged Goods (CPG) are more sensitive to price fluctuation 
(Cuneo et al., 2012), maintenance of promotions is essential to boost or at 
least maintain market share, and thus customer loyalty. At any rate this 
cannot be considered the sole strategy for the future of the PL. Further aims 
of promotion maintenance include the PL perception defence and the 
support of the development of premium PL goods in those lines with a high 
level of differentiation, where the construction of higher levels of brand 
equity is also possible (Cuneo et al., 2012). 
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Retailers are not the only ones reconsidering their strategies. Although not 
the primary scope of this research, we want to briefly investigate the 
possible scenarios for NBs and manufacturers. Since intensive promotional 
activity is no longer sustainable for NBs as well, proceeding with 
differentiation seems to be the winning strategy for manufacturers too. 
Therefore, they should set a more defensive strategy and strengthen their 
brand equity. A potential approach could be to use a defensive strategy 
themselves, but from the consumer awareness perspective (Choi, 2017). 
While N B might have a longer tradition of walking this terrain, retailers 
have already started to attack wholeheartedly. For this forthcoming battle, 
retailers must have adequate additional tools that go well beyond those 
that come from their own premium labels. This will be the battlefield in 
which the future of the NB vs PL balance will be decided, where a positive 
result is essential for both players. Nonetheless, Choi (2017) hypothesises 
that there will be cooperation between retailers and manufacturers thanks 
to the latter’s new proposed strategy. He believes there will be no price 
competition. By not fighting and leaving NBs to increase their sales, he 
expects retailers will have bigger total revenues anyway. According to Choi, 
this should compensate, and even enhance, losses due to fewer PL sales, 
making manufacturers and retailers bettered off. 
We do not fully support Choi’s hypothesis. Even though we agree with him 
regarding the impossibility of keeping heavy promotions, and therefore 
with the proposed idea of defensive NB differentiation, we do not think 
there will be cooperation. Our view is that market shares and brand equity 
are much too strategically important for both players to let an opponent 
gain them without fighting. As demonstrated by the opposing strategies 
employed from 2000 until now, in the long run, cooperation may also 
represent a solution, especially if the fierce competition results in heavy 
losses for both. However, in the short term, a change in promotional activity 
aiming to neutralise the one of NBs leads us to think that NB strategy will 
be adjusted without resulting in cooperation. Furthermore, the only 
implication will be the implementation of a supporting promotional tool to 
operate a sort of simultaneous double attack. 
We decided to conduct the present study to provide a more focused study 
based on unique data regarding the promotions of a leading retail chain in 
central Italy. The theoretical framework provides the basis from which we 
start our analyses. In the current literature there is, to the best of our 
knowledge, no study that investigates an exclusive dataset to show the new 
kind of promotional strategy employed by supermarkets. 
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2.2 Research Question 
Once having gained a certain market share and brand awareness for their 
standard PL products, retailers have an additional task: attract consumers 
with different and more demanding preferences. It is, of course, a matter of 
increasing market share without losing the current one, but with a special 
focus on the “horizontal” perspective (i.e. same category, different product 
characteristics), rather than on the “vertical” one (i.e. products of other 
categories). This is drawn, as seen in the previous section, from the 
intention of captivating more quality-oriented consumers. Nowadays, a 
slightly higher expense for a more valuable product is preferred to a cheap 
but standard good, according to consumer behaviour analysis. Hence, the 
strategies exploited until now, which were effective for massively 
penetrating the market, no longer appear to be adequate. As reported, 
however, in the literature and written in the introduction to this chapter, 
intense, but non-focused, promotional activity is no longer the winning 
retailer strategy. This is why there has been a relevant change in PL 
promotional activity. However, apart from a recent reduction in number 
and depth of promotions, it still represents a critical aspect of supermarket 
plans. We believe that a more accurate study on the factors that influence 
promotion and the effectiveness of promotional strategies on market 
outcomes is still lacking. The aim of this study is to investigate, through a 
descriptive and a causal analysis, this issue. 
The evolution of the concept of promotion started from the massive 
discount pull strategy made by retailers to achieve PL brand awareness and 
gain market share. Subsequently, as previously written, the obvious 
counteraction of NB producers was to offer their own goods at discount 
prices, too. Hence, we want to explain how, and why, promotions are 
currently adopted by retailers. In our study: 
1. We aim to descriptively understand what factors correlate with 
promotion. 
2. We perform a causal analysis of the effect of promotion on market 
outcomes (i.e. quantity and revenues). We also investigate and 
compare the effects for all products and (only) for promoted 
products on market outcomes. 
From the descriptive analysis, we qualitatively discuss the two features of 
the new promotional strategy. The first aspect of the new strategy regards 
the use of promotion as a tool for managing the price gap between PLs and 
NBs. Considering the explained recent promotional trends, in a sort of 
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reverse counterstrategy, promotion is nowadays exploited by retailers as a 
short-term defensive strategy against massive, first-inverse, NB 
promotional attack. The second aspect concerns the event of promotion as 
a support for letting PLs penetrate premium segments. This is consistent 
with the main new task of supermarket chains to enhance the market share 
of their premium PLs. Since some consumers use price to infer product 
quality (Lichtenstein et al., 1993), direct price reductions are risky (Lybeck 
et al., 2006), especially for newly introduced premium products. The 
solution is represented by a promotional activity that is not directly set for 
premium PLs, but for standard PLs in the same product category. In this 
way retailers try to boost premium PL sales without having the undesirable 
outcome of a perceived decreased quality. 
From the causal analysis, we inspect whether promotion is effective with 
respect to quantity and revenues. 
We must point out that the new promotional strategy we investigate does 
not interfere with the recent “Every Day Low Price” (EDLP) approach 
regarding a sort of “long term promotional idea”. In fact, the strategy behind 
EDLP is completely different and they are able to utilize two distinct types 
of leverage: perception of constant convenience for PL goods meant for 
everyday usage versus support of premium products or defence against NB 
goods under promotion. 
 
2.3 Dataset 
Our research uses an exclusive dataset, with observations recorded directly 
by the retailer in from stores throughout the chain. 
The dataset is composed of repeated multi-dimensional data (panel) 
observations on 121 different PL food products of a big Italian retailer chain 
operating in Italy. More specifically, our dataset comes from about 340 
stores (supermarkets, hypermarkets and convenience stores) owned by 
the company in Centre Italy (the number of stores of two major competitors 
is, jointly, roughly 300). In western central Italy, the retailer has a market 
share that goes from about 16% until almost 25%, depending on the region 
we consider, and is the leader in some areas (while major competitors have 
shares going from roughly 20% up to 33%). It has around 10,000 
employees, with a turnover of over 2 billion Euros. Furthermore, it counts 
approximately 1.5 million loyalty card members. The retailer belongs to a 
major European buying alliance and, in the domestic market, it is member 
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of a leading Italian association of retailers. Approximately one out of every 
three products sold by the retailer is a PL good. 
The panel is composed by quarterly product observations from January 
2013 up until September 2015. All products have full records for these 
periods. Both revenues and quantity sold during each quarter are available 
for all product we analyse, as well as the quantity sold and the revenues 
earned under promotion, if any, during a specific period. The dataset is 
strongly balanced and complete; every product has 11 time periods of data. 
Since our research is more oriented towards understanding what 
influences promotions, the values of the products are less relevant for our 
study. This is why we aggregate the information regarding presence or 
absence of promotional activity in a given quarter into a dummy 
(dichotomic) variable (1 if present, 0 if absent).  
The dataset is composed by all the PL goods (of the selected items) sold in 
any supermarket, hypermarket or convenience store owned by the 
company in central Italy, during the analysed period. Many of them belong 
to standard quality product lines, however there are also goods that belong 
to premium or organic segments. All goods belong to food categories. We 
believe that this does not limit the analysis, yet it helps in keeping our 
analysis coherent and significant. As shown in Figure 4, food is largely 
predominant among product categories, which are divided into food or 
non-food. 
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Figure 4 Mass Market Retailer Turnover (€ Billions), per Product Category: Food or 
Non-Food. 
Notes: Source: gdo report. dgm consulting 2016 (data from federdistribuzione). 
 
As shown in Figure 4, food represents more than 80% of the turnover for 
the mass-market retailers making this the largely predominant one. 
Therefore, it is also the most strategic in terms of importance and market 
share acquisition. Hence, the restriction to food products only permits us to 
be more pertinent with respect to the Italian market and less dependent on 
data heterogeneity problems, with no loss in significance. 
Time also plays an important role in our analysis.  With 11 different fully 
defined periods, we decided to analyse not only the yearly trend, but also 
the behaviour in terms of seasons. Details about time variables are 
provided in appendix A. 
The size of the database, the dimension of the area in which the retailer 
operates, the prominence of the retailer itself (both in terms of volumes and 
in terms of awareness), the different type of stores from which data are 
collected, the importance of the food sector, the number of periods, the 
differences in considered products and the information about promotions 
and premium/niche products make the studied dataset representative of 
Italian retail sales.  
60 
 
2.4 Methodology and Model 
We employ different methodologies corresponding to our different 
research questions, as outlined in the previous section. We illustrate them 
in sequence. We first execute a descriptive analysis (i.e. random effect logit) 
and, second, a casual analysis of promotions (i.e. exact matching). 
For the first part, we perform a logit regression with the aim of describing 
the new promotional strategies of supermarkets. 
For the second part, we execute Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) estimations of promotions 
on market outcomes. 
For both analyses we include an increasing number of relevant variables. 
Among the set of factors we have identified, the most relevant to our 
analysis are: time, product categories, revenues, quantity, and several other 
elements which play a significant role in influencing promotions. 
The following subsections present the analyses and then provide further 
details on the method employed. 
The first subsection also includes the discussion on the considered 
variables and their characteristics (some descriptive statistics are shown in 
two tables, too). Since they are the same for both analyses, we present a 
more detailed discussion in the first subsection and we just mention it in 
the second one. 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Analysis: Random Effects Logit 
We use a logit model to analyse the factors which influence the probability 
of a product to be under promotion. 
The descriptive analysis of the interactions of the selected variables with 
the presence, or not, of promotional activity allows for the understanding 
of what we call the “underlying strategy”: how retailers face NB competition 
and how PL promotion helps in expanding premium PL market share and 
brand awareness (i.e. the effects of the new promotional strategy). To this 
end, an extended discussion on the importance of the considered variables 
is necessary. Moreover, the discussion of the results needs to debate all of 
the underlying marketing (and managerial) strategies. This also means 
comparing categories and the characteristics of their products, to discuss 
the differences between the two promotional strategies and their effects. 
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We present below our longitudinal logit model (Equation 1). 
 
Equation 1 Longitudinal Logit Model 
𝑦 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜) = log(
𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜
1−𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜
) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
𝛽3 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
We exploit a varying set of explanatory variables, which are critical towards 
determining the presence or absence of promotion. We first discuss all the 
considered variables and then we show the model. 
As reported in Equation 1, we have 121 products (𝑖 = 1, 2, … … , 121) with 
observations over 11 quarters (𝑡 = 1, 2, … … , 11, i.e. periods). The random 
variable 𝛼 represents a group-specific time invariant effect. It is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with observed group covariates, hence they are 
independent across groups. Moreover, the disturbance term, represented 
by 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , is assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals and uncorrelated 
over time for an individual. 𝛼  and 𝜀  might be thought as, respectively, a 
group level and an individual level error term. We assume that distribution 
of 𝛼 is normal - 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑖
2) - and 𝜀 is independent of 𝛼. We employ random 
effects to account for unobservable individuals. 
We model as our dependent dummy variable the introduction/presence of 
promotion in a specific period for a certain product. The dependent 
variable assumes value 1 if there is introduction/presence of promotion in 
that period for the considered product, 0 otherwise. In Equation 1, the 
probability that promotion occurs is represented using the notation 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜 . 
We can accordingly analyse how an increase of one unit in the independent 
variable revenues influences the probability that a specific product is under 
promotion; this probability is expressed through the value of the coefficient 
which provides a result in log-odds term. Analogous logic applies to all the 
independent variables. For example, if an independent dummy variable is 
1 (hence if the condition is verified) and the P-value is statistically 
significant, the variable influences whether a promotion occurs or not. The 
probability is shown by the value of the coefficient, which is expressed in 
log-odds units, too. From these coefficients, we can compute the Odds Ratio 
(OR)85. 
                                                             
85 The OR is equal to 𝑒𝑏, where 𝑏 is the coefficient itself. 
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Now we describe the variables included in the model. 
In our analyses, the promotional or non-promotional status of a PL good is 
related to time, category and dummy specifying variables. Time is 
expressed both in terms of year(s) and season(s). One limitation of using 
random effect is the lack of control for omitted variables. Nonetheless, in 
our model, due to the dataset we have, this is not a limitation. 
Now we discuss more in detail each variable. The four main factors which 
influence promotion are: 
• Categories to whom each product of the dataset belongs  
• Revenues 
• Some relevant information (that might influence promotion)  
• Time 
From these factors, we have chosen our relevant independent variables. 
As we are more interested in analysing changes in revenues, we consider 
the independent variable revenues in our models. Revenues provide useful 
information to our discussion. Even if someone might say that quantity is 
directly connected to the introduction of promotion (i.e. that an 
introduction of promotion for a certain product will lead to a significant 
increase in volumes of quantity), we cannot state the same, without any 
doubt, in case of revenues. According to Srinivasan et al. (2004), price 
promotion effects of retailer revenues are mixed. Moreover, many different 
kinds of price reductions can be identified (among others: new product 
introduction and the clearance of goods due to physical factors, seasonality 
and technical obsolescence or perishability)86 . Hence, it is important to 
investigate how revenues are related to the presence of promotion. 
We decided to use year(s) and season(s) as time explanatory variables. Year 
and season are individual-invariant categories, thus they have a between 
variation equal to zero. Even though raw data are recorded by quarters, it 
is more efficient for our analysis to consider yearly evolution and seasonal 
behaviour. More details on time variables are written in Appendix A: Time. 
The first independent variable written in our model is year. Our dataset has 
observations from three years: 2013, 2014 and 2015. Year independent 
variable helps in studying time trends. 
                                                             
86  Among others, see: Walters (1991), Bobinski et al. (1996), Smith & Achabal 
(1998), Voss & Seiders (2003), Levy et al. (2007), Wang & Webster (2009), 
Hemalatha & Sridevi (2013) and Choi et al. (2014). 
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As specified in the previous paragraph, we also built season(s) out of the 
information of the original dataset. Each season includes the corresponding 
trimester of every year. This variable allows for the understanding of 
whether there is a specific period during which the probability of 
promotions increases.  It is helpful to understand retailer strategy. Are 
promotions more probable in peak or calm seasons? 
The third independent variable is category. We have fifteen categories of 
products. Categories are useful to underline the different characteristics of 
products (i.e. differences between common elements of products in a 
category and common elements of goods in a distinct one) and thus the 
consequent different promotional behaviours. They significantly help in 
understanding the new kind of promotional strategy implemented by 
supermarkets and to identify the two branches. This study analyses 
singular products or entire categories, depending on what we want to 
stress. For the products of the relevant categories (Seasonings, Marinated 
Vegetables and Pickles - Condimenti, Sottoli e Sottaceti; Pasta and Rice - 
Pasta e Riso; Breakfast Products, Patisserie - Prima Colazione e Pasticceria; 
Chocolate - Cioccolato) and for some further descriptive statistics of 
categories, please refer to Appendix B: Categories.  
We also have several dummy variables for studying additional features 
(both regarding specific dataset characteristics and general ones coming 
from Nielsen reports87). Dummy explanatory variables are built to answer 
specific questions and to understand crucial issues in our logic. We 
individuated the topic that might most influence promotions (for more 
details on this issue see the discussion on CIA in the following section), in 
order to understand whether their impact in augmenting the probability of 
a product of being under promotion is significant and to what extent. To 
have more coherent results, we specifically designed these dummy 
variables according to the characteristic of our dataset. These dummy 
variables are useful to consider crucial information in our discussion. Both 
these dummy variables and category are time-invariant variables, hence 
their within variation is zero. There are two rationales behind the 
construction of these explanatory dummy variables. The first type of 
variable relates to the presence of interdependent or similar products 
within the dataset. Hence, they are built accurately analysing our data and 
then it is decided if a product has a complementary or a substitutive inside 
the dataset: 
                                                             
87 http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports.html 
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• Complementary indicates if in the dataset there is an 
interdependent product concerning the analysed one (1, yes, 0 no); 
• Substitutive whether there is another product that might replace 
the selling of this one in the consumer’s mind (1, yes, 0 no); 
For the second set of dummies, about product variety (assortment), 
incidence or convenience(lessconvenient), we consider whether the 
category (and therefore the products in that category) assigned to the 
specific product is among those indicated by Nielsen in 2013, 2014 and 
2015 reports: 
• Assortment if the product, according to the Nielsen analyses of 
years 2013,2014 and 2015, belongs to a category considered to 
have a comparatively high PL variety (1, yes, 0 no); 
• Incidence once again considering the Nielsen analysis, is 1 if the 
product belongs, during the years we analyse, to a category with 
high incidence. 0 otherwise; 
• LESSconvenient still considering Nielsen analyses, if it is in a 
category where PLs are less convenient (1, yes, 0 no). 
The main statistics on all the variables included in our model are 
summarised in Table 1. Revenues and quantity (which is considered in the 
causal analysis) are expressed in thousands of unit/euros. 
Moreover, Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables. There are 
few relevant correlations, like the one between assortment and incidence 
and that between revenues and assortment. 
Let us now move towards the second subsection about causal effects of 
promotions. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the examined variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max N obs. 
introPROMO 0.753 0.432 0 1 1,331 
Year 1.909 0.793 1 3 1,331 
Season 2.364 1.068 1 4 1,331 
Complementary 0.512 0.500 0 1 1,331 
Substitutive 0.636 0.481 0 1 1,331 
Assortment 0.248 0.432 0 1 1,331 
Incidence 0.141 0.348 0 1 1,331 
LESSconvenient 0.066 0.249 0 1 1,331 
Revenues 179,507 25,6213.6 0 2,177,840 1,331 
 
 
 
Table 2 Correlation matrix 
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IntroPROMO 1.000     
Year 0.132 1.000    
Season 0.026 -0.176 1.000   
Category 0.032 -0.000 0.000 1.000  
Complementary 0.030 -0.000 -0.000 0.065 1.000 
Substitutive 0.201 -0.000 -0.000 0.110 0.088 
Assortment 0.131 0.000 -0.000 0.251 0.177 
Incidence 0.192 0.000 -0.000 -0.193 0.204 
LESSconvenient 0.097 -0.000 -0.000 -0.138 -0.140 
Revenues 0.273 0.052 0.015 -0.110 -0.131 
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Substitutive 1.000     
Assortment 0.156 1.000    
Incidence 0.058 0.594 1.000   
LESSconvenient -0.006 0.078 0.084 1.000  
Revenues 0.173 0.318 0.090 0.294 1.000 
 
2.4.2 Causal Effects of Promotions: Matching 
We want to examine the effect of promotions on revenues and quantity. To 
this end, we estimate ATE (Average Treatment Effect) and ATT (Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated) parameters by performing exact 
matching on the set of discrete categories and dummy variables that we can 
obtain in the data. 
The variables on which we perform exact matching are the same discussed 
in the previous section: 
• Category 
• Substitutive 
• LESSconvenient 
• Complementary 
• Incidence 
• Assortment 
• Season 
• Year 
We use ATE and ATT because the former measures the promotion impact 
on the expected outcome (revenues/quantity), while the latter measures 
promotion impact on the expected outcome (revenues/quantity) of 
products under promotion. The different approach of ATE and ATT 
stimulate discussion of the different kind of effects. ATE helps in 
understanding whether, on average, a policy (i.e. promotional strategy) is 
beneficial for all products, while ATT is useful to discuss whether a policy 
(i.e. promotional strategy) is beneficial for actually promoted products. 
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Theoretical predictions on the effect of promotion on revenues are 
ambiguous. However, this is not the case of quantity that is expected to 
increase under promotion so long as the goods promoted are normal. The 
possibility to compare outcomes relative to both market outcomes (and 
also to compare ATE and ATT outcomes on both variables) provides a 
significant value added for our discussion of the strategies. 
Parameter estimates of ATE and ATT based on exact matching on the 
mentioned list of variables are consistent estimates of the corresponding 
papulation parameters so long as the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA) holds in this context. CIA assumes that the choice, 
whether an individual gets treated or not, is not correlated to possible 
outcomes. 
We consider whether a product has interdependent goods, or if another 
product exists that can substitute the considered one. At the same time, we 
also consider variables that take into account the major factors and trends 
studied in Nielsen yearly reports. 
Walters (1991) underlines the existence of an important link between 
substitution (i.e. substitutive), complementary and promotions. Whereas an 
empirical study conducted by Voss & Seiders (2003) demonstrates the 
existence of a link between assortment and price variation. Pauwels et al. 
(2002) observe a strict connection between promotion and some factors of 
brand sales they identify with: brand choice (that we name with 
assortment), and category incidence. The last one is also tied with 
promotions for Mela et al. (1998), too. Relative-benefits in terms of price 
and the consequent “smart shopper self-perception” (which is defined as 
an ego-related variable) represent the issues with a connection with 
promotion and consumer behaviour (Garretson et al., 2002; Liu & Wang, 
2008; Nederkoorn, 2014). We identified these factors with the variable 
lessconvenient. 
All of these considered, and according to the possible promotional 
strategies we presented in the literature review, we can conclude that all 
the relevant product characteristics that influence promotions are taken 
into account. Moreover, since we also consider different seasons and years 
and the main food categories, we include in our analysis all the relevant 
issues which influence promotions and their effects. 
By exact matching we associate each unit under promotion with an 
observation that does not go under promotion and, symmetrically, we 
associate with each observation not in promotion a corresponding one that 
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does go under promotion. Observations for which exact matching cannot 
be identified are removed from estimation. We match with replacement. 
By defining matched variables ?̂?𝑖(𝐷) as follows: 
?̂?𝑖(𝐷) {
𝑦𝑖    𝑖𝑓 𝐷 = 𝐷𝑖
?̂?𝑖(𝐷)   𝑖𝑓 𝐷 = 1 − 𝐷𝑖
 
We estimate the ATE and ATT parameters as: 
𝐴𝑇?̂? =
1
Ν
 ∑ (?̂?𝑖(1) − ?̂?𝑖(0))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐴𝑇?̂? =
1
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑖
 ∑ (?̂?𝑖(1) − ?̂?𝑖(0))
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑖  
Where 𝐷 ∈ {0,1}.88 
We calculate Abadie-Imbens standard errors (Abadie & Imbens, 2006; 
Abadie & Imbens, 2008). 
Even though we focus our attention on revenues when performing the 
logistic regressions, for the estimations of ATE and ATT, we also consider 
the variable quantity. 
 
2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 3 shows the empirical results of all the descriptive analyses 
performed with product promotion as dependent variable. The first (1) is a 
pooled logit estimation, which ignores variation among products and treats 
all observations as independent. We report the following for the sake of 
completeness, however we do not believe it represents the best model for 
our purposes. From the second (2) until the last (5), we perform 
longitudinal logit models. However, we start by considering only the 
explanatory dummy variables (i.e. complementary, substitutive, assortment, 
incidence and lessconvenient) in (2), and then we add categories (3), year 
(4) and season (5). 
                                                             
88  If 𝐷 = 1  the product is under promotion, if 𝐷 = 0  the product is not under 
promotion. 
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We cannot observe, for models from (2) to (5), a significant difference in 
either magnitude of the coefficients or in significance 
This is particularly true if we consider the models from (3) to (5). These 
regressions, including an increasing number of variables, allow a more 
complete and extensive discussion of strategical changes in promotional 
activity. This means that, even though each time we control for more 
variables, results are robust to alternative specification, and therefore 
stable. Most of the independent variables are significant in all the relevant 
models (from 2 to 5). Below we briefly mention them. However, a detailed 
discussion, which considers also the strategies involved, is provided in the 
next section. 
If a product has a substitutive good in the dataset, then there is a significant 
probability that this will affect its promotional activity. Moreover, the 
belonging to a category where there is high incidence of PL augments the 
probability a product will be under promotion. Whereas high product 
variety (i.e. assortment) has a negative effect on the probability of being 
under promotion. Among the group category, we can identify some 
statistically significant (or highly statistically significant) categories, 
considering Basic Ingredients (Ingredienti di Base) as the base category: 
• Seasonings, Marinated Vegetables and Pickles (Condimenti, 
Sottoli e Sottaceti) 
• Pasta and Rice (Pasta e Riso) 
• Breakfast Products and Patisserie (Prima Colazione e 
Pasticceria) 
• Chocolate (Cioccolato) 
• Spread Creams (Creme Spalmabili) 
• Ready meals (Preparati). 
All of them have a relevant impact on increasing the probability for a 
product included in their own offering of being under promotion.  
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Table 3 Empirical Results. Dependent variable: Product Promotion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Complementary 0.290 0.930* 0.661 0.601 0.592 
 (0.151) (0.469) (0.555) (0.571) (0.576) 
      
Substitutive 0.834 † 1.192* 1.429** 1.492** 1.513** 
 (0.163) (0.547) (0.511) (0.522) (0.529) 
      
Assortment -0.894** -1.311 -1.784* -1.755* -1.765* 
 (0.286) (0.986) (0.889) (0.859) (0.852) 
      
Incidence 2.416 † 3.302* 2.549* 2.682* 2.722* 
 (0.479) (1.441) (1.122) (1.112) (1.103) 
      
LESSconvenient 1.126** 1.453 1.419 1.362 1.345 
 (0.418) (1.053) (1.176) (1.158) (1.165) 
      
Revenues 0.0106 † 0.0208 † 0.0195 † 0.0189 † 0.0188 † 
 (0.00161) (0.00569) (0.00483) (0.00448) (0.00446) 
      
Breakfast 
and Patisserie 
  3.542 † 3.581 † 3.601 † 
  (0.960) (0.990) (0.997) 
      
Cakes and 
Snacks 
  2.020 2.160 2.212 
  (1.235) (1.270) (1.286) 
      
Chocolate   2.449* 2.489* 2.500* 
   (0.975) (1.014) (1.021) 
      
Coffee and 
Infusions 
  2.156* 2.201* 2.211* 
  (0.888) (0.929) (0.931) 
      
Fish   1.241 1.256 1.286 
   (1.134) (1.174) (1.181) 
      
Legume and 
Side Dishes 
  -0.189 -0.280 -0.282 
  (1.026) (1.071) (1.076) 
      
Oils and 
Vinegars 
  2.353 2.520 2.605 
  (1.404) (1.416) (1.420) 
      
Other 
Ingredients 
  -0.133 -0.114 -0.0894 
  (1.260) (1.283) (1.288) 
      
Pasta and Rice   3.528** 3.569** 3.600** 
   (1.094) (1.134) (1.141) 
      
Purees and 
Sauces 
  1.922 1.900 1.897 
  (1.084) (1.115) (1.113) 
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Ready meals   2.154* 2.193* 2.201* 
   (0.975) (1.026) (1.036) 
      
Salt Baked 
Products 
  1.732 1.844* 1.880* 
  (0.904) (0.940) (0.950) 
      
Seasonings, 
Marinated  
and Pickles 
  5.144 † 5.220 † 5.290 † 
  (1.143) (1.189) (1.205) 
      
Spread Creams   2.177* 2.167* 2.174* 
   (1.012) (1.046) (1.052) 
      
Year = 2014    0.378* 0.387* 
    (0.182) (0.185) 
      
Year= 2015    1.326 † 1.363 † 
    (0.271) (0.279) 
      
Season= Spring     0.524 
     (0.276) 
      
Season= 
Summer 
    0.620* 
    (0.275) 
      
Season= 
Autumn 
    0.438* 
    (0.205) 
      
Constant -0.635 † -1.564** -3.363** -3.799 † -4.210 † 
 (0.156) (0.525) (1.059) (1.098) (1.127) 
ln (𝜎𝑢
2)      
Constant  1.340 † 0.694* 0.723* 0.731* 
  (0.275) (0.300) (0.294) (0.293) 
Observations 1331 1331 1331 1331 1331 
AIC 1181.9 1008.5 996.1 967.4 965.6 
Log lik. -583.9 -496.3 -476.1 -459.7 -455.8 
Chi-squared 146.1 49.11 76.43 102.2 107.2 
𝜌  0.537 0.378 0.385 0.387 
𝜎𝑢  1.955 1.414 1.436 1.441 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, † p < 0.001. 
 
Within the same period, an increase in revenues augments the probability 
of the considered product to be under promotion. This is due to the 
immediate effect of the defensive promotional strategy. Promotions are not 
set to have a long-term effect (i.e. to boost sales in the subsequent period), 
but are an effective immediate counter strategy against NB price reduction 
attacks. Moreover, the modest effect underlined by the value in log-odds of 
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the coefficient underlines that the promotional strategy is not primary 
oriented in boosting incomes, even though this represents a positive effect 
indeed. This is coherent with a defensive/supporting approach. 
A considerably significant explanatory dummy variable is incidence. Not 
only it is extremely significant in all the considered models, but it also has 
remarkable OR values: between 11 and 27 (approximately) for all the 
models. Considering the logic of the new promotional strategy it is coherent 
that products belonging to a category with high incidence significantly 
augment the probability of being under promotion. In fact, those are the 
crucial categories which determine the power balance between NBs and 
PLs and it is fundamental to defend, and expand where possible, the market 
share and the brand awareness through a defensive (or supporting in case 
of premium expansion) strategy. 
If a product’s value for assortment independent dummy variable is 1, then 
the product belongs to a category that has (on average and according to 
Nielsen reports for 2013, 2014 and 2015) a comparative high variety of PL. 
This affects the probability of being under promotion in a negative way. 
This underlines that massive generical, i.e. non-specific, promotions are no 
more strategical for supermarkets. As such more focused strategies, like a 
defensive or supporting one, are nowadays preferred by retailers. 
A strong confirmation for the supporting strategy comes from the 
significance of substitutive. When a product has a substitutive PL in the same 
supermarket offering, there is a higher probability that the former is under 
promotion. Hence, promotions on one PL can boost the selling of another 
PL product (which has similar characteristics to the former one) of the 
same category. 
Setting basic ingredients as the base category makes it possible to compare 
the other categories with products considered by consumers to be 
extremely fundamental, essential and perceived as commodities. 
In general, we expected a significant impact from Oils, especially olive oil. 
However, by analysing in detail our dataset, the non-significance of this 
category makes sense. Moreover, another surprising aspect to be noticed is 
that breakfast Products and patisserie have a noteworthy impact. However, 
with a deeper analysis, the results provide a remarkable cause for 
reflection. 
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Olive oil (as stated also by Unaprol89 using IRI-Infoscan studies) is usually 
subjected to intense promotion. However, this is true for standard olive oil 
and its overall effects might be mitigated by biological or premium products 
(here composed by Geographical Indications) and by other products in the 
same category, e.g. vinegar. In our dataset, the category oils and vinegars 
(olii ed aceti) is composed by olive oil, seed oil and two kinds of niche or 
premium PL oils. As in the report of Unaprol, but also in other reports and 
studies reviewed in the first part of this paper, there is a remarkable 
difference between promotional activity for standard goods and that for 
premium, bio or niche’s ones. Premium and bio olive oils are sold at a 
consistently higher price compared to the standard one and, most 
important, they do not follow their intense discount activity. Therefore, 
promotions are not the right tool for some products of this category, leading 
to a distortion in quality perception. Moreover, due to low presence of 
standard PL products in the analysed dataset, a supporting strategy cannot 
exist in this specific category. 
An unexpectedly high influence is exerted by breakfast products and 
patisserie. It is unexpected mainly because, prior to the analysis, it was not 
classified by analysts (IRI and Nielsen, among others 90 ) among those 
categories awaiting promotions. Products in this category are: biscuits, 
cereals, zwiebacks and honey. 
Considering the characteristics of the products in this category, both 
branches of the new promotional strategy (i.e. defensive and supporting) 
might apply. 
As in Eales (2014, a), confectionery is one of those sectors where PL 
presence is low, in that it is a category with strong loyalty to NBs, and PL 
prices are increasing to confront NB presence. 
According to our hypothesis, the explanation is that, despite the main 
strategy of offering higher quality products, supermarkets need to defend 
their products’ market share and try to expand premium PL awareness and 
market share. This is even more relevant in those categories where PL has 
an inferior position. The OR for this category are particularly high (in 
comparison with the other categories, apart from seasonings, marinated 
vegetables and pickles): roughly between 34 and 36. 
                                                             
89 Unione Nazionale tra le Associazioni di produttori di olive (National Union between 
Olive Producers Associations). 
90 http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports.html 
and https://www.iriworldwide.com/en-US/Results/Home. 
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To emphasise the differences between categories, we can compare two of 
them: breakfast products and patisserie and chocolate. 
In his study, Afoakwa (2016) underlines the shift towards premium 
products in the Western chocolate market. Moreover, there has been an 
increasing demand for quality and taste (among others) as well as for 
sustainability, traceability, and ethical and other issues. Hence, prices are 
higher, even for PLs, and the category does not face intense promotional 
activity. Additionally, a considerable (40%) increase in the price of cocoa 
was registered by the World Bank between July 2013 and July 201491. Then, 
raw ingredients for a chocolate product are quite costly for manufacturers 
as well, therefore an economy price might not be set at any level. Both for 
manufacturers and retailers, it would be nonsense to offer at low price a 
product that, due to high cost of its ingredients, is costly by definition. 
Moreover, there is the need for retailers to build the idea in consumers’ 
mind that premium PL chocolate has an extremely good quality since it 
might be that consumers are more quality oriented when buying a bar of 
chocolate in comparison to food commodities like basic ingredients. 
In the case of breakfast products and patisserie, we have both branches of 
the new promotional strategy: defensive and supporting. For the chocolate 
category, we cannot identify a defensive strategy because of the peculiar 
characteristic of its products. Even though several different types of 
chocolates (e.g. bars, praline, etc.) are sold in the category, it is not possible 
to identify a pure standard PL since all goods have their own peculiar 
characteristics, which thereby classify it as a non-standard product. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to recognise a pure supporting strategy, 
again due to a lack of standard products that can be massively promoted 
only for boosting premium PLs. The difference between breakfast products 
and patisserie and chocolate categories can be stressed from an analysis of 
the difference between products composing the two categories. In a 
nutshell, the former category has both standard PLs, which need to 
maintain their market share, and premium PLs, which must take care of the 
side effects of price reduction (i.e. quality downgrading in consumers’ 
mind). For standard PL market share maintenance a defensive strategy 
operates, while for increasing brand awareness and market share of 
premium PLs, a supporting strategy applies. In the case of chocolate 
category, because of all the aforementioned characteristics, it is not 
possible to exploit a defensive strategy in an effective way, and a supporting 
strategy would not lead to a positive result either. 
                                                             
91 http://www.borsaitaliana.it/notizie/food-finance/materie-prime/cacao.htm 
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Promotion is no longer a penetration strategy; it is transformed into a 
defensive and supporting strategy. 
Having some key PL products under promotion faces, on one side, 
competition from manufacturers’ goods and, on the other side, helps 
premium (or bio, or other segments in the same category) PL goods in 
following the strategy which led them to be considered good quality 
products capable of meeting even the highest standard. In this way, 
premium (or bio, etc.) PL products are not forced to be under pressure yet 
consumers still maintain their link with the PL, while receiving the message 
that PLs can also be considered just as good as premium, or niche, NBs. 
We compare two more categories which show significant results in our 
analysis: seasonings, marinated vegetables and pickles (condimenti, sottoli e 
sottaceti), spread creams (creme spalmabili) and ready meals (preparati). 
From an analysis of the products present in those categories, it is possible 
to evidence an important difference (see Appendix B: Categories for more 
details): seasonings, marinated vegetables and pickles (condimenti, sottoli e 
sottaceti) and spread creams (creme spalmabili) present a good balance of 
standard and premium (or bio) products, while we find almost only 
standard products in ready meals (preparati). For the former we can 
identify a supporting strategy: standard PLs are promoted to boost sales of 
the corresponding premium product in the same category’s offering. It is 
easy to note how (apart from mayonnaise), every standard product has its 
own equivalent premium. If we compute the Odds Ratio, we obtain values 
from approximately 170 up to over 200. Hence, the probability for a 
product of this category to shift from 0 (non-promotion) to 1 (promotion), 
is extremely high. This is due to the existence of a supporting and defensive 
strategy, combined with the characteristics of the products in this category. 
On the contrary, in the other category (ready meals - preparati) there is a 
large majority of standard PLs (with only two exceptions). Here the 
defensive branch of the strategy applies. Standard PLs are not promoted to 
boost premium PL expansion (we cannot see any connection between 
pastille and candies promotions and increase in premium olive sales), while 
the strategy is to preserve their own quota. 
Now, we can analyse a category which is extremely relevant in representing 
Italian consumer habits: pasta and rice (pasta e riso). The OR of all the 
models for this category have a value of approximately 35 (which is quite 
relevant in comparison to other categories, apart from seasonings, 
marinated vegetables and pickles). This underlines the considerable 
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increase in probability of being under promotion if a product belongs to this 
category. As explained below, this is also caused by the importance and the 
characteristics of this category in Italy. 
Pasta is considered one of the most important ingredients in Italian cuisine. 
Pasta consumption in Italy is very high and, also considering local 
producers, competition between brands is quite relevant (Cersosimo, 
2011). A focus on PL pasta and rice offering, based on Nielsen data (Nielsen 
Trade*Mis –Iper + Super + Libero Servizio – about categories with an impact 
vs Grocery >0,1%), highlights a significant presence of PL goods in Pasta 
and Rice category. Pasta and rice assortment of PLs have been increasing 
over recent years. Assortment variation for pasta in 2013 and 2014 saw an 
increase of 1.2 and 0.6, respectively. Moreover, the average number of 
goods rose from 23.5 in 2013 to 24.3 in 2014. Rice had an average number 
of goods in 2013, 2014 and 2015 of 6.2, 6.5 and 6.6 respectively, with a 
weighted distribution of 95.9, 97.1 and 97.5 respectively. Cacchiarelli & 
Sorrentino (2016) state that competition is not relevant in their study 
about the main pasta competitors in the whole Italian retail market. 
However, they specify that in central Italy, where our data come from, there 
is higher competition. Most important for our analysis, they state that for 
NB promotional average impact goes from almost 17% to 30% and it is 
more evident in premium products. Furthermore, they underline how PL 
goods have a regular price lower than NBs, even if their dataset points out 
a low promotional impact. On this last point, we need to clarify that their 
dataset does not consider recent years and it just takes into consideration 
premium or niche (e.g. bio) PL products. Moreover, other studies about the 
same years, state that there is high promotion in the pasta category: over 
48% of sales are under promotion (Ceri 2014). Consumers, due to high 
promotional competition, are more price sensitive and they continuously 
look for better quality/price deals (Troiani, 2010). As in Arkios report of 
2013, in Italy there are many producers (94 in 2013), both small and big, 
even though acquisitions have led to a more concentrated market when 
considering relevant groups (See Appendix C: The Pasta  for more details 
about Italian pasta producers history and trends). As seen before, the 
number of different goods in the offering of each brand, especially for PLs, 
is quite high. Differences in type of wheat, shape and other features lead a 
kind of pasta to be sold in standard, niche, premium, organic (or other) 
market segments. 
From this analysis of pasta industry and consumer habits, the result of our 
analysis seems reasonable, if not expected. In this category, we have both a 
huge competition between PLs and NBs and the need to introduce further 
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PL products with different quality, types, aspects and several other 
characteristics. Thus, in pasta and rice category, we can observe both 
branches of the defending and supporting strategy operate at the same 
time. In our dataset, we have a good balance of standard and premium/bio 
PLs, reflecting the tendency of the whole industry. Promotions on standard 
PLs both aim to defend their own market share and brand awareness and, 
at the same time, to support the penetration (and market share expansion, 
etc.) of new premium (or organic or other niche one) PL products. 
Most of the variables are robust to alternative specification. However, there 
is one explanatory dummy variable that is significant only for the first 
model. In this model we just consider the five dummy variables and 
revenues. Particularly, lessconvenient is significant for (1), but not for the 
regressions which include more variables. This is a dummy variable based 
on the Nielsen analyses (for the year 2013, 2014 and 2015), which 
generally consider a standard supermarket and the characteristics related 
to the general trends in the whole country (i.e. Italy). In our model, the 
variable lessconvenient assumes value 1 if the considered product’s 
category offers, from an analysis of the whole Italian retail industry, PLs 
which are less convenient than in other categories. Therefore, the 
characteristics linked with this variable are not intrinsic to the analysed 
dataset. It might be that, in our dataset, the category considered “less 
convenient” by Nielsen (from a general analysis of the Italian retail 
industry) does not have such characteristics in comparison to the other 
ones included in our data. Hence, when we include in our analysis the 
categories, this variable is not significant anymore. Furthermore, in the first 
model all the observations are treated as independent, while the 
connections with other goods is an essential aspect when considering, e.g., 
the product variety within a category. 
In models (4) and (5) there is a growing trend over time, with the third year 
(2015) highly statistically significant, with an OR of approximately 4. 
While the growing trend over time might merely signify a more vigorous 
promotion with time passing, it might also point to a different strategic 
approach regarding promotions starting from 2015. According to retail 
channel reports (among others, see: IRI Topline, 2015; IRI, July 2015; IRI, 
September 2016; Nielsen, 2014; Nielsen, June 2016; Nielsen, November 
2016), a growing trend could be due to a new approach in PL promotional 
strategies. The defensive and supporting strategy we presented in the 
previous sections led to a linear increment in the probability of having 
promotions in the latest year of our dataset. 
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If we consider corresponding trimesters of each year (i.e. season), in model 
(5), relevant outcomes can be observed for “Season 3” (i.e. from July to 
September) and “Season 4” (i.e. from October to December). We can define 
the former period as summer, since it approximately reflects that period of 
the year (details in Appendix A: Time), while the latter can be defined as 
autumn. We discuss this result in the next section, since a related and more 
significant result comes out from causal analysis. 
 
2.5.2 Causal Analysis 
Table 4 shows the ATE (Average Treatment Effect) and the ATT (Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated) estimations of promotions on revenues. 
Table 5 reports the ATE and ATT estimations of promotions on quantities. 
ATE concerns the treatment effect for the overall target population in the 
study (i.e. treated and untreated together). ATE investigates therefore the 
effect of promotions if products were under promotion versus all the 
products. 
ATT concerns the treatment effect only for the treated. ATT investigates, 
thus, the effect of promotion on the products under promotion. ATT differs 
from ATE because it is only for treated (i.e. under promotion, in our 
analysis) individuals. 
We start considering only revenues (or quantity) and categories (1). Then, 
regressions from (2) to (5) include more variables that significantly 
influence promotions: substitutive and lessconvenient (2), complementary 
(3), incidence (4) and assortment (5). In (6) and (7), we also add season and 
year, to consider time variables, too. We can then accordingly understand 
the change in revenues/quantity when in promotion (in comparison to 
when not in Promo) and the impact of the considered variables. 
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Table 4 ATE and ATT estimations of Promotion on Revenues 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
ATE 
(1 vs 0) 
162.75† 
(16.21) 
125.30† 
(13.14) 
120.15† 
(13.93) 
109.98† 
(14.46) 
77.66† 
(8.52) 
82.97† 
(9.20) 
95.85† 
(10.18) 
        
        
ATT 
(1 vs 0) 
168.64† 
(18.94) 
129.95† 
(15.07) 
130.39† 
(15.97) 
125.04† 
(16.89) 
87.97† 
(10.32) 
90.98† 
(11.14) 
96.33† 
(11.84) 
        
        
Category ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Substitutive & 
LESSconvenient 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Complementary   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Incidence    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Assortment     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Season      ✓ ✓ 
        
Year       ✓ 
        
Observations 1331 1155 1089 1045 1012 863 553 
Notes: ATE and ATT are based on exact matching on the categorical variables listed for each model. Each 
observation is matched to one nearest neighbours with replacement. Observations for which exact matches 
are not available are removed from the sample. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
† p < 0.001. 
 
 
Table 5 ATE and ATT estimations of Promotion on Quantity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
ATE 
(1 vs 0) 
107.02† 
(11.04) 
83.49† 
(9.13) 
78.66† 
(9.63) 
72.82† 
(9.94) 
57.06† 
(8.40) 
60.70† 
(9.19) 
71.96† 
(11.34) 
        
        
ATT 
(1 vs 0) 
110.13† 
(12.80) 
88.46† 
(10.30) 
88.11† 
(10.97) 
85.23† 
(11.53) 
66.63† 
(9.87) 
67.32† 
(10.69) 
72.51† 
(12.84) 
        
        
Category ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Substitutive & 
LESSconvenient 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Complementary   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Incidence    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Assortment     ✓ ✓ ✓ 
        
Season      ✓ ✓ 
        
Year       ✓ 
        
Observations 1328 1155 1089 1045 1012 863 553 
Notes: ATE and ATT are based on exact matching on the categorical variables listed for each model. Each 
observation is matched to one nearest neighbours with replacement. Observations for which exact matches 
are not available are removed from the sample. Abadie-Imbens standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
† p < 0.001. 
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Exact matching, as shown in the last lines of the tables, reduce the number 
of observations. Specifically, from 1331 to 553 for Table 4 (revenues), while 
from 1328 to 553 for Table 5 (quantity). 
For all the estimations, the beneficial effect of promotion decreases when 
we add more variables to be matched, from (1) to (5). However, the effect 
slightly increases when adding time variables (i.e. season, 6, and year, 7). 
Table 4 indicates that for revenues the effect is higher if we restrict the 
analysis of the impact of promotions only to products under promotions 
(i.e. ATT). Differences between ATE and ATT coefficients are rather stable. 
For ATE the coefficient goes from approximately 163 in (1) to roughly 78 
in (5), while it is almost 90 adding time variables (6) and (7). For ATT the 
value of coefficient goes from nearly 169 (1) to about 88 (5), increasing 
again to about 94 adding time variables (6) and (7). 
The same behaviour of coefficients is shown when studying the exact 
matching ATE and ATT estimations of promotion on quantity. ATE 
coefficient decreases from 107 (1) to 57 (5) and increases to approximately 
66 adding time variables (season, 6, and year, 7). However, ATT coefficient 
values are about 110 (1) then diminishes to almost 67 (5) and is roughly 69 
with time variables (6) and (7). 
When we add more variables to be matched, the coefficients decrease. This 
is caused by the fact that we are controlling for factors which are related to 
promotional activity. From the literature examined in the methodology 
section of exact matching, it is stressed that the variables we consider are 
linked by promotion. 
Having such results for ATE and ATT estimations of promotion on revenues 
and quantity, we can state that no considerable differences occur when 
analysing the beneficial increasing effects of promotional activity among 
revenues and quantity. 
The reason why the coefficients slightly augment when including time 
variables is linked with the results on year and season of the descriptive 
analysis. 
In the descriptive analysis, there is a relevant consideration affecting the 
significance of summer, as well as its positive influence in pushing a product 
under promotion. We expected that December, and therefore autumn in our 
dataset, could be the period during which there is the highest promotional 
pressure, due to Christmas and New Years’ Eve celebrations. However, in 
the light of a defensive strategy, it is reasonable to also have a positive 
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significant impact of summer as a season augmenting the probability of 
having promotions. Retailers want to avoid any possible slowdown in sales. 
A higher promotional activity represents, as previously seen, a basic 
strategy to avoid decreases. Hence, in this case promotions are set to 
maintain the market share in those periods where sales of non-seasonal 
products do not receive any boost92. This is supported by the fact that in 
both ATE and ATT estimations, the coefficients augment if we add season 
and year. Moreover, the retention of sales in “depressed” periods is 
perfectly coherent with the defensive aspect of the new retailer strategy. 
We want to understand the impact of the new promotional strategy on 
quantity and revenues. This helps fill the current gap on understanding a 
new type of promotional strategy. 
Even if these results are highly expected for quantity, this is not the same 
for revenues. In any case, since in our analysis we consider all the relevant 
categorical variables that can influence promotions, our results underline 
the existence of an increase in quantity and revenues in the presence of 
promotional activity. In the methodology section, we discussed the role and 
the importance of the considered variables in promotional activities of 
supermarkets. 
Before interpreting the differences between ATE and ATT results, we study 
the impact of promotion on quantity and revenues accordingly to the 
underlying strategies, and we also interpret the connected results.  
It is straightforward that the presence of promotion would provide a 
significant positive impact in augmenting quantity sold by supermarkets. If 
we decrease the price of a product, more people will be willing to buy it93.  
This positive relation (lower price-higher quantity sold) is independent 
from the underlying strategy of the promotion. 
From the literature, we know of the existence of several types of 
promotions, (e.g. clearance promo or new product introduction, among 
others) and we discussed the new defensive or offensive strategy in the 
previous section. For any of those promotional strategies, it is extremely 
                                                             
92 For some seasonal trends see, among others: IRI, October 2016. 
93 For a study on price elasticity on food categories see, among others, Andreyeva et 
al. (2010). For general effect of price reduction on demand see, among others, 
Varian (1992). 
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likely that quantity sold will rise94. On the other hand, this is not the case of 
revenues. 
The effects of promotion on revenues significantly varies accordingly to the 
underlying strategy. 
In case the underlying strategy is due to the clearance of seasonal products 
or to a below-cost selling for advertising purposes, very little, if any, effect 
is expected for revenues. However, if we analyse the results of ATE and ATT 
estimation of promotion on revenues, we can exclude the possibility that the 
background strategy tends to augment the quantity without any effect on 
revenues. Hence, we can state that the underlying strategy is not a clearance 
selling, or something with similar purposes. 
If we interpret the value of the coefficients, we can affirm that they support 
our hypothesis that promotional strategy is no more offensive, but has 
rather become a defensive and supporting one. This is due to the fact that 
an offensive promotional strategy would significantly decrease the gap 
between PLs and NBs, with consequent notable contraction in revenues, as 
reported by the literature analysed in the previous sections. However, the 
coefficients of revenues do not illustrate such behaviour. 
Furthermore, the results for ATE and ATT estimations are similar. This 
underlines the existence of two branches in the new promotional strategy. 
If there has been a bigger difference between ATE and ATT coefficients, this 
would have suggested the existence of only one, predominant, strategy. In 
case of higher ATE values, this would underline the presence of a strategy 
aimed to support the non-promoted products. Higher ATT values however 
would emphasise more significant benefits exclusively for promoted goods. 
Since this is not the case, the new promotional strategy is therefore 
composed by two branches. 
First of all, as explained in the previous sections, offensive strategies are no 
more effective, hence the maintenance of an existing quota is possible only 
through a defensive strategy. The ATT coefficients reported in the tables 
support the relevant beneficial effect of promotions on products in promo. 
From a strategical point of view, in the short term, the only effective 
weapon retailers can count on is promotion. NBs try to exploit the 
                                                             
94 For the different kinds of price reductions (e.g. seasonal, physical or obsolescence 
perishability) see, among others: Walters (1991), Bobinski et al. (1996), Smith & 
Achabal (1998), Voss & Seiders (2003), Levy et al. (2007), Wang & Webster (2009), 
Hemalatha & Sridevi (2013) and Choi et al. (2014). 
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advantage derived from an increase in PL price which reduces the gap, 
further decreasing their price using promotion. As such the price difference 
between them is negligible and consumer preference will most likely go 
towards NB products. Against this attack, retailers must react as fast, and 
effective, as possible. Given the time and investments spent for gaining a 
relevant market share, it is worthy to adopt countermeasures which might 
slightly contrast with the current strategy. In the very short period, no 
strategies aimed at improving consumer behaviour or perception are 
effective: the only adequate response is to maintain a decent price gap using 
exactly the same tool. 
Secondly, we can detect a supporting strategy for the premium PLs. Given 
high prices, consumers would be more sensitive to quality and to premium 
goods. Moreover, premium PLs usually avoid direct promotional activity. 
Therefore, in this category promotions will be set for standard PL products 
with the aim of boosting premium PL purchases. 
Similar coefficients of both ATE and ATT estimations highlight that there 
are benefits both for treated (under promo) and non-treated (not in promo) 
products. This means that the new promotional strategy has two branches. 
It is both a defensive and a supporting promotional strategy. 
The following question must therefore be asked: when is it good to fight, in 
terms of defensive promotion, to maintain PLs market share against NBs 
and when, instead, is it better to adopt another strategy where promotion 
plays a supporting role? 
To answer this question, we analyse the results explaining the different 
rationale behind the two branches of the new promotional strategy. 
It is true that consumer perception on quality is extremely important for 
moving forward in PL penetration in the market. This is fully acknowledged 
by scholars (among others, see: Lichtenstein et al., 1993; Lybeck et al., 
2006) and retailers, too. Price reduction was an effective strategy during 
the first decade of this century, but now the only winning strategy is to 
differentiate the offering, both vertically and horizontally, with the latter 
being the preferred. This means higher quality products, namely premium 
PL goods, organic PLs and many other niche products in the same category. 
In many cases, the introduction of premium goods, as written in IRI and 
Nielsen reports, results in higher quality products sold at higher prices for 
more demanding consumers. A higher price is the direct consequence of 
this logic. As illustrated in the previous paragraphs, higher prices further 
reduce the already low existing gap between PLs and NBs, making the latter 
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more attractive for consumers (since they are, on average, more likely to 
choose a NB). Also, in case of persistent and high promotional activity from 
NBs, the only effective and immediate reply is to offer PL goods under 
promotion, too. However, this is not the only logic retailers should define 
against NB promotional strategy. Supermarkets should support the 
introduction and the acquiring of market share of premium (or biological, 
or other niche private brands) PL products, too. Even if a defensive strategy 
is successful for the tasks of standard PLs, a strategy merely based on 
counter promotional activity is not effective for premium PL penetration. 
On the contrary, a smarter promotional activity is powerful. What might a 
“smarter promotional activity” consist in? It should be a strategy that not 
only defends PL from NB attacks, but that also supports the main task 
concerning premium segments, and “niche” ones (e.g. organic), too. 
Therefore, promotions must be adopted in those cases where they are 
useful as defensive and/or as supportive for another product of the same 
product category. 
Summarizing, PL promotional activity has two purposes. On one hand, it 
combats NB promotion to keep the price gap constant, and to maintain 
market share and customer loyalty. On the other hand, it has the effect of a 
flywheel for non-promoted PLs in the same category. In both cases, 
promotional activity is set for standard PLs. However, with respect to the 
former, the aim is to generate positive outcomes for standard PLs 
themselves, while in the latter, premium (or bio, or other niche) PLs will 
benefit from the promotional activity. Our results also sustain this logic.  
Moreover, beneficial effects of promotion on both quantity and revenues 
demonstrate that the retailer is able to reach several tasks. First of all, the 
retailer manages to maintain the existent market share. Then, he is able to 
not depress revenues. Finally, there is the possibility for premium PLs to 
penetrate in new segments and, at the same time, to receive benefits from 
both branches (i.e. defensive and supporting) of the new promotional 
strategy. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Promotional activity has been, for years, the most frequently adopted 
strategy for PL penetration. Intense promotion has then been a strategy of 
NBs, too. However, since margins have become extremely narrow, the price 
war was no longer sustainable and change in this trend was required. 
Recently, reports have pointed out several new behaviours that suggest big 
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changes in strategies. Hence, a study on real and unique data from a leading 
Italian retailer regarding new promotional strategies was strongly needed. 
 The task of this study is to analyse the promotional activity of PLs in order 
to explain the new promotional strategy, with respect to both its 
motivations and its effects. In doing so we study the effect of categories, the 
characteristics of relevant products and categories, revenues and time on 
promotions. We implement several estimations on logit and longitudinal 
logit models, refining the analysis and comparing, when present, the 
differences between the models to understand the background 
motivations. Moreover, we perform exact matching (on the considered 
categorical variables) ATE and ATT estimations of promotion on revenues 
and quantity. 
The analyses we propose demonstrate the existence of a new promotional 
strategy which operates in two ways (that might be carried out together or 
singularly): defensive and supporting. Promotions are usually set for 
standard PLs in any case, but, in accordance with which between the two 
tasks retailers want to achieve, standard PLs themselves (defensive) or 
premium PLs (supporting) will benefit from them. 
Promotions over standard PLs, are now adopted by retailers as a defensive 
strategy against NB discounts which in turn are set to reduce the price-gap. 
Therefore, defensive promotions represent a sort of reverse price-
reduction. Contrary to the preceding years, promotions are now exploited, 
by standard PLs, as an instant and effective short-term response when 
intense promotion is set by NBs. In this way, retailers try to maintain the 
market share they have previously gained. Furthermore, promotions might 
lead to reductions in margins, hence to profit losses, which then represent 
a long-term investment in terms of market share maintenance. This new 
retailer behaviour is particularly clear studying the results of our analysis. 
Furthermore, our research identifies another branch of new retailer 
promotional strategy. According to this, promotion is now also exploited as 
supporting strategy. Retailers have introduced, in the last 10 years, 
premium (and organic, vegetarian and several others) PL products to 
satisfy the need for quality, and sometimes niche, products as expressed by 
consumers. Premium PLs offer better quality at higher prices and consumer 
behaviour towards them is different with respect to that of standard PLs. 
Until few years ago, PLs were about standard goods sold at very convenient 
prices. Moreover, many times promotions made PLs even more convenient. 
With the change in consumer behaviour and the introduction of new PLs, 
retailers must give the idea to consumers that PLs can also include good 
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quality products in their offering. It is a demanding issue to penetrate a 
market where consumers care about quality, ingredients, package and 
many other aspects apart from price. Furthermore, competing in price (as 
it has been extensively done for standard PLs penetration) is in this case 
not only inefficient, but also counter-productive. Hence, retailers devised a 
method aimed at attracting consumers with indirect offerings: discounts 
were made over standard products in the same category as premium ones. 
Not able to directly promote premium PLs, the new supporting strategy 
sets promotions for standard PLs in the same category in order to boost the 
purchases for similar premium PLs. The results of the seasonings, 
marinated vegetables and pickles (condimenti, sottoli e sottaceti) category 
provide, among other significant results, a rationale of supporting strategy. 
There are also some categories, like for example pasta and rice (pasta e riso) 
in which both branches of the new strategy take action. 
Through exact matching on categorical variables ATE and ATT estimations, 
we study the impact of promotion on quantity and revenues. These 
estimations support the existence of a strategy aimed at having beneficial 
effects, both in terms of quantity volumes and revenues, for promoted and 
non-promoted goods. The results supported our hypothesis of a new 
strategy with both defensive and supporting tasks. 
The new defensive and supporting strategy of promotions is relevant since 
it identifies the new battlefield between retailers and NB manufacturers. 
This is valuable both from managerial and theoretical perspectives. Since 
both retail and manufacturer managers have to make decisions according 
to marketing strategies, it is crucial for all of them to understand the 
background motivations and mechanisms. Theoretically, it is valuable to 
have a study which, through a unique dataset, demonstrates the existence 
of the new defensive and supporting strategy and depicts a clear analysis 
of all the strategies and motivations involved. 
Nevertheless, this research has some limits. The biggest one is the 
geographical limitation of the dataset. Although it is a unique dataset, it only 
reports data of western central Italy for 11 trimesters (over the years 2013, 
2014 and 2015). Hence, we suggest replicating this analysis using a bigger 
geographical area and considering more years. It would also be of extreme 
value to have the possibility to conduct the study using two datasets from 
two different leading retailing chains from that enlarged geographical area. 
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Chapter 3 
3. The role of Geographical 
Indications and Countries’ 
“Made-In” Power in Global 
Trade of Wild Edible 
Mushrooms and Truffles  
 
This chapter analyses the Geographical Indications95 (GIs) as standardised 
labels to guarantee quality and origin. Moreover, we study the power of 
some countries’ “Made-in” labels (i.e. the worldwide recognised 
importance of some countries in terms of products and/or the ability to 
process them). 
Quality labels represent a competitive advantage for firms that sell 
particularly excellent and high-quality products, especially when fruit of a 
firm’s specialised knowledge or long-standing tradition in producing the 
good with respect to other players in the market96. Despite representing a 
                                                             
95  Article 22 of TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 
Agreement defines GI as “… indications which identify a good as originating in the 
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.” Source: WTO - World Trade Organization. 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04b_e.htm. 
96 About firm resources and sustained competitive advantage see, among others: 
Barney (1991), Peng (2001), Lockett et al. (2009) and Kozlenkova et al. (2014). For 
competitive advantage of local quality products and GIs, see Fotopoulos & Krystallis 
(2003) and Presenza et al. (2010). About GIs and their link with quality, 
geographical areas and other aspects, see, among others: Evans (2010), Moschini et 
al. (2008), Becker & Staus (2009), Profeta et al. (2010), Menapace & Moschini 
(2012). 
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crucial resource for companies, their importance is still not fully 
recognised, hence a study on this aspect and other related issues is much 
needed. 
Using a mixed-method approach (Molina-Azonir, 2012; Bam, 1992; 
Creswell & Clark, 2007; Harrison & Reilly, 2011), specifically the initiation 
design (Davis et al., 2011), we study GIs and “Made-in” power starting from 
a quantitative analysis and then moving towards a more specific analysis of 
Italy and the case study. 
For achieving these tasks, we carefully chose the type of products with the 
best characteristics to emphasize the crucial aspects. This is possible 
through the analysis of a peculiar, yet representative, market: edible wild 
mushrooms and truffles (we examine two internationally recognised 
categories: fresh/chilled and dried/powdered, details are provided later in 
the chapter). 
There are two principle characteristics that make wild mushrooms and 
truffles suitable for our research. 
The first one is perishability. This is particularly true for the fresh/chilled 
category. It is not possible to store the analysed products for long time; a 
mushroom’s shelf life, stored at room temperature, is about two days 
(Boyer & McKinney, 2013). Moreover, they need to be preserved in a 
specific way. According to Singh et al. (2010), temperature and relative 
humidity must be carefully balanced to preserve mushroom quality. 
However, in the case of dried mushrooms too, there are specific techniques 
and preservation methods to be observed (Fernandes et al., 2014). 
The second one is the absence of a specific added value. This is certainly 
true for fresh wild mushrooms and truffles. However, if we exclude the 
preservation processes (e.g. drying or chilling), no further significant value 
is added to the product during the postharvest chain. 
Below we present the structure of this research, which, according to 
Molina-Azonir (2012) and Davis et al. (2011), is divided into two main 
parts. 
In the first part of this study, we initially use networks to depict the global 
trade of wild mushrooms and truffles, thus illustrating its main 
characteristics. Then, we investigate the most important nodes of the 
networks, which represent the worldwide hubs for import/export flows of 
wild mushrooms and truffles. We highlight the distinction between the two 
categories, and consequently the differences in trade behaviours, as well as 
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the existence of anomalies. We also provide a method to detect the 
existence of a possible kind of arbitrage in the countries with significant 
“Made-in” power and favourable export/import price differences. 
Then we move to the second part of the chapter. 
To go deeper in the analysis and to proceed towards the study of GIs, we 
chose the Fungo di Borgotaro case study. After a general analysis of global 
trade, we narrow our focus to the Italian market. The Fungo di Borgotaro 
was the first, and only, wild product of the “Class 1.6. Fruit, vegetables and 
cereals fresh or processed”97 to receive a PGI label in 1996 and, in 2016, a 
quality certification from a certification and inspection company (CSQA)98. 
Therefore, the Borgotaro can be taken as an example of the introduction of 
a GI label into a market where the guarantee of quality and origin is strongly 
needed. 
Since the Fungo di Borgotaro represents a noteworthy case study, following 
the mixed-method approach, we begin with a focus on Italy and then we 
present more in detail the specific example (i.e. the Fungo di Borgotaro PGI 
label). Here we propose a connection with the anomalies that emerge from 
an analysis of worldwide trade. A trustworthy explanation of them comes 
from seizures made by Italian law enforcement agencies. They prove the 
existence of a process of fraudulent labelling which exploits the “Made in 
Italy” power in the agri-food industry. 
From the depiction of the Italian market and the proven frauds, the 
importance of guaranteeing the origin and quality of products adopting 
internationally recognised standards is evident. Therefore, as a conclusion 
of the refining process of this research, we propose the Fungo di Borgotaro 
as an example to replicate where similar circumstances occur. 
It is noteworthy to highlight that also truffles, which belong to the same 
analysed categories of wild mushrooms, present identical issues 
emphasised in the Fungo di Borgotaro example. A recent article underlines 
the request of the town council of Alba (Cuneo) (an Italian town that is 
famous for its quality truffles) to defend the local truffle label 99 . This 
                                                             
97  Source: European Commission, Agriculture and Rural Development, DOOR. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominatio
nId=320 
98  Source: Qualivita Foundation. http://www.qualivita.it/news/il-fungo-di-
borgotaro-igp-diventa-lunico-certificato-in-europa/ 
99 Source: Ansa. 
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represents only one additional example of the increasing importance of 
protecting the quality and origin of products. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
From the last decade of the 20th century, focus has shifted from quantity to 
quality in many sectors. Food is indeed one of them, and as such the 
introduction and protection of GIs, as well as other certifications or 
assurance schemes, has become crucial for the EU (Becker & Staus, 2009; 
Hooley, 1988; Evans, 2010; Profeta et al., 2010). Moschini et al. (2008) state 
that GIs can competitively guarantee quality with beneficial outcomes, in 
terms of welfare, mainly for consumers and, in some cases, also for 
producers. GI labels augment the effect of reputation in a process for 
assuring quality linked to specific characteristics of local territories 
(Menapace & Moschini, 2012; Evans, 2010). Quality labels, according to 
Fotopoulos & Krystallis (2003), give a company a competitive advantage. 
Moreover, these labels can reinvigorate local economies and can help in 
coping with trade liberalisation (Suh & MacPherson, 2007). These are the 
reasons why we want to provide a method to depict, analyse and then 
investigate the characteristics and the behaviour of GIs and “Made-in” 
labels and, more in general, quality-recognised products. 
The kind of “resource” (Barney, 1991) we use to achieve our results is 
composed of wild edible mushrooms and truffles (both fresh/chilled and 
dried/powdered ones). Before proceeding to the next section, a biological 
framework is needed to better understand the kind of resource we are 
going to use in our analysis. 
Wild edible mushrooms, including truffles, are an essential component of 
culture and traditional cuisine of many countries around the world, 
especially in Europe, North America and Eastern Asia where many edible 
species have long been harvested by rural populations for self-
consumption and commercial activities (Boa, 2004; Arora, 2008; Sitta & 
Floriani, 2008; Feng et al. 2012; Sitta & Davoli, 2012). Wild edible 
mushrooms are economically considered one of the most important non-
timber forest products. Nowadays more than 2000 fungal species that are 
classified as edible are harvested, consumed and sold in more than 85 
                                                             
http://www.ansa.it/canale_terraegusto/notizie/prodotti_tipici/2017/04/22/tart
ufo-albano-a-generiche-denominazioni-bianco-e-nero_4b242ff7-add6-4824-9358-
7c0581953330.html 
91 
 
countries around the world (Boa, 2004; Ortega- Martínez & Martínez-Peña, 
2008; Sitta & Davoli, 2012). Current estimations assign a global market 
value to edible mushrooms of at least 2 billion US dollars more than the 
market value timber (Boa, 2004; Cai et al. 2011; Ágreda et al. 2014). 
Over the last decades, the globalization of trade, the expansion of markets 
for specialty products, the decreasing of wood prices and the restrictions 
placed on logging has made the economics of mushrooms more attractive 
for the forest sector (Cai et al. 2011). The interest in commercial harvesting 
of wild edible mushrooms has considerably increased in many regions in 
the world. So far, several mushrooms species are picked in more areas than 
ever before, especially in remote forested regions of developing countries 
(e.g. Africa, Nepal) where the opportunities to make money are quite scarce 
and the collection of wild edible mushrooms represents an important 
source of income (Arora, 2001, 2008; Christensen et al. 2008; Sitta & Davoli, 
2012). 
Several studies explicitly pointed out that the collection and consumption 
of wild edible mushrooms is a profitable task for both developed and 
developing countries. De Romàn & Boa (2006), Voces et al. (2012) and Diaz-
Balterio et al. (2013) examined the marketing demand for wild edible 
mushrooms in North-Eastern Spain with a special focus on the Saffron milk 
cap (Lacatius deliciosus Fr.), a popular and greatly appreciated species in 
Spain. Using econometric methods, the authors have found that price 
increase had a negative effect on demand. Pettenella & Klhoehn (2007), 
Sitta & Floriani (2008), Sitta & Davoli (2012) analysed the Italian market 
trends with a special emphasis on Porcini (Boletus edulis Bull. and allied 
species) and Truffles (Tuber spp.). According to these studies, Italy has 
emerged as focal point of a global market for several mushrooms species, 
in particular Porcini. They also emphasized that the declining production of 
some prized mushrooms species is well documented in different countries 
around the world; new strategies to increase production and to preserve 
important natural growing areas are needed in the medium- and long-
terms.  
The commercial harvest of edible mushroom from forests of the pacific 
northwest United States has been extensively documented (Pilz et al. 1996; 
Pilz & Molina, 2001; Pilz et al. 2004; Arora & Dunham, 2008). A large 
commercial crop of Morels (Morchella species) and Chanterelles 
(Cantharellus spp.) are annually harvested from these mountainous areas. 
Schlosser (1995) and Watling (1997) estimated the worldwide income of 
Morel and Chanterelle production at 1.67 and 5.2 billion US $, respectively.  
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More recently, Feng et al. 2012 stated the export values of Porcini and 
Matsutake mushrooms (Tricholoma matsutake (S. Ito & S. Imai) Singer) 
from the Yunnan Province in southwestern China. They estimate that in 
2010 10,572 tons of fresh boletes were exported from China to Europe for 
an equivalent of 71.83 million US $. This amount exceeded the 47.35 million 
US $ produced by the greatly appreciated Matsutake in Asia in terms of 
export (Feng et al. 2012). 
On the contrary, very little information is available from other countries 
that have a role in the commercial exploitation of mushrooms. Cai et al. 
(2011) documented that only recently in some northern European 
countries (e.g. Finland) mushrooms harvesting has become a significant 
source of income for rural dwellers. 
What emerges from the above-mentioned studies is that the quantitative 
estimates are often quite variable and country-specific. It is well known that 
the primary use of collected production is related to self-consumption and 
that intermediate links within the value chain are not regulated (Voces et 
al. 2012). The scarcity of data highlights that mushrooms are collected for 
free and mainly sold on local markets. It also shows that quantities and 
prices are unknown, especially in terms of truffle species (Pettenella & 
Klhoehn, 2007). Thus, making comparisons between the different countries 
is a hard task due to the lack of data. Available statistical data are often 
patchy, come from different data sources and do not account for collected 
volumes by privates (Cai et al. 2011; Turtiainen & Nuutinen, 2012).  
Since non-timber forest products, and especially wild edible mushrooms, 
are potential complementary or alternative sources of revenue to timber, 
there is a pressing need to monitor the market volume and values at a 
global scale. Most of the available information is often related to a given 
country and/or a time period (e.g. a single year). Thus, the effective global 
socio-economic relevance of wild edible mushrooms is largely unexplored. 
 
3.2 Objectives and Rationale 
This study individuates the competitive advantage for local and quality-
oriented firms in the exploiting of quality labels. More specifically, we 
analyse the use of GIs and, in certain cases (i.e. some specific products in 
certain specific countries) of “Made-in” label power. 
In order to stress the importance of GIs and the “Made-in” concept we 
individuate a specific market: wild mushrooms and truffles. Using a mixed-
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method approach100  we first conduct a quantitative descriptive analysis 
and then we analyse a more specific market and a case study, connecting 
the results in the first part with the discussion in the second one. 
This research depicts the global trade of wild mushrooms and truffles with 
the aim of describing and understanding the current relationships between 
all the players. However, the main objective is to uncover the occurrence of 
irregularities and not and to propose a possible solution through the use of 
labelling. 
Additional goals of this study include the depiction of a decennial evolution 
(2003-2012) of this trade and the detection of the countries which play a 
central role, either globally or locally. The identification of central countries 
in this trade is useful to infer the market power and the existence of a 
potential arbitrage. Do anomalies encourage these practices?  
Furthermore, in the interest of complementing the above analysis, we 
further explore the role and the dynamics of major Western countries. In 
the first part of the chapter (i.e. in the quantitative descriptive analysis) we 
recognise the countries (i.e. nodes in the global network) that play a central 
role in worldwide trade. This investigation leads us to focus our attention 
on one of the major Western countries in particular, Italy, which we 
examine it in detail accordingly. 
The last analysis carried out in the first part of this study investigates 
whether the individuation of countries with relevant “Made-in” power 
(using BC values) and their combined analysis with export and import 
prices allow for the unearthing or the suggestion of the existence of a 
potential arbitrage. 
In the second part of this study, we analyse in detail the Italian market and 
the case study of the Fungo di Borgotaro IGP, using both the results of the 
first part and integrating some further descriptive analyses. 
Given that GIs and “Made-in” labels are valuable resources that represent 
competitive advantages for firms, we also investigate whether it is possible 
or not to guarantee and protect the quality and origin of valuable (wild) 
products. 
Could GIs be a solution for guaranteeing quality and local (rural) area 
development? Could the Fungo di Borgotaro represent a potentially 
replicable example? 
                                                             
100 Davis et al (2011) and Molina-Azonir (2012). 
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We synthetize the concepts above in two main research questions. Since we 
can use the approach and the methods of this study for several food 
products, we present our research questions in a more generalised way. 
However, for the sake of clarity, we then concentrate our analysis 
specifically on the products we consider. Nevertheless, the main resulting 
theories do not vary even if the product in question is changed. 
1. How does the global trade of some valuable resources (i.e. 
products) behave with respect to: central nodes, opaque practices 
and trends? 
2. Could GIs and “Made-in” labels not only give a competitive 
advantage, but also represent a solution to assure origin and/or 
quality? Would GIs support local development? 
To answer the first question, we model the worldwide trade of wild 
mushrooms and truffles as networks. Our desire to study and understand 
both the general features and the hidden characteristics of mushroom and 
truffle global trade represents the rationale behind the choice of a network 
modelling 
The first point to address within the framework of a deeper analysis is the 
identification of the countries involved. The available literature may list the 
countries where mushrooms and truffles grow, but we are interested in 
understanding where such countries export (including exports towards 
apparently less relevant markets). 
Understanding which countries are the most influential constitutes the 
second point. The existing literature underlines some major countries in 
wild mushrooms and truffles trade, however this study provides a network-
based explanation and, in addition, underlines the interconnections among 
countries. 
To answer the first research question there is a third point to be addressed: 
the identification of the countries that act as “hubs”. Some countries, even 
those without a relevant production, or a production that is not as big as 
the volumes traded, might play the role of “hub”. Huge volumes of 
mushrooms and truffles, imported from producing countries, pass through 
the “hub” countries to then be traded once again to other countries (i.e. re-
exports of the same products). 
The fourth point examines the evolution of global trade. The analysis of 
several years allows for the examination of time evolution and circumvents 
yearly production problems biases. Furthermore, it provides information 
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about entrance, or exit, of new players in the market, but also about 
variations (increases or decreases) in the market share. 
With respect to the fifth point, we pose the following question: does the 
importance of trade and a given country vary according to product 
characteristics? We analyse the same products, wild mushrooms and 
truffles, traded in two different ways: fresh or chilled and dried or in 
powder (whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder). This gives an idea of trade 
behaviour in terms of different objective characteristics. We expect that 
fresh or chilled goods are less likely to be traded over long distances; it 
might be unprofitable to ship them to geographically distant locales. If 
fresh, they should be transported quickly, which is costly. If chilled, they 
must be shipped at low temperatures, which is also expensive. On the other 
hand, dried or powdered wild mushrooms and truffles do not need special 
care. Moreover, dried or powdered goods are lighter and occupy less 
volume, which also helps in saving shipping costs. These factors make dried 
wild mushrooms and truffles easier to ship worldwide. 
Finally, do export/import price differences and concurrent “Made-in” 
power make the exploitation of some advantages possible? Are there 
anomalies or any kind of arbitrage? 
We start by showing all the networks for the considered years, both in 
terms of 070959 (fresh/chilled) and 071239 (dried/powdered), and then, 
through the analysis of the points written above, we move towards the 
answer to the second research question. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
3.3.1 Data Source 
All the datasets are acquired from the "United Nations Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database" (UN Comtrade) which collects the official statistics data 
on global trade. UN Comtrade is a repository of official international trade 
statistics and relevant analytical tables and offers a wide variety of 
commodity lists, derived from both countries and national statistic 
agencies. Using the same data-source it is possible to make comparisons 
between countries, in terms of the exported products volumes, and 
consider the interconnections they have. 
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Specifically, from the UN Comtrade database we have selected all the 
available datasets related to “mushrooms and allied” (e.g. vegetables) 
among which we have selected two categories (identified with an 
international code), as detailed below: 
• 070959 "Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers // 
Other vegetables, fresh or chilled. // - Mushrooms and truffles : // -- 
Other": including wild mushrooms (excepted Agaricus) and 
Truffles that might be both fresh or chilled; 
 
• 071239 “Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers // 
Dried vegetables, whole, cut, sliced, broken or in powder, but not 
further prepared. // - Mushrooms, wood ears (Auricularia spp.), jelly 
fungi (Tremella spp.) and truffles : // -- Other”: that comprise dried 
wild mushrooms (excepted Agaricus, Jelly fungi (Tremella spp.), 
Wood ears (Auricularia spp.)) and Truffles. 
It is useful to underline that edible mushrooms can be classified into two 
different types: wild and cultivated. The former group comprises species 
that grow naturally and that can be picked in the natural ecosystems in 
which they grow, for instance forests. The latter, instead, refers to species 
that can be also yielded by cultivation. Cultivated mushrooms include 
species belonging the genera Agaricus (i.e. the famous “champignon”), 
Pleurotus and Lentinus.  
Generally, the designation of “mushroom” distinguishes species which 
cannot be easily cultivated since most of them live as symbionts (Kirk et al. 
2008), for instance by ectomycorrhizal symbiosis, with other organisms, 
such as plants. The growth of ectomycorrhizal fungi is strictly dependent 
on this natural, sometimes specific, association and for this reason it is 
difficult (e.g. Boletus edulis), sometimes impossible (e.g. Tuber magnatum) 
to produce any of these species by artificial means (e.g. by industry) 
(Mueller, 2004; Deacon, 2006). 
Most of the mushrooms represent the major precious species in the world, 
such as: Porcini (Boletus edulis Bull. and allied species), Matsukate 
(Tricholoma matsukate (S. Ito & S. Imai), Canterelles (Cantharellus cibarius 
Fr.), Saffron milk caps (Lactarius deliciosus (L.) Gray), Caesar’s mushroom 
(Amanita caesarea (Scop.) Pers), Truffles (e.g. Tuber magnatum Pico, T. 
melanosporum Vittad., T. melanosporum Vittad., T. brumale Vittad., T. 
aestivum Vittad., and T. uncinatum Chatin) and many others with a lower 
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market value (Boa 2004; Arora 2001; Sitta & Davoli 2012). It should be 
noted that the aforementioned wild species are all ectomycorrhizal. An 
exception must be made for the Tuber melanosporum and the group of 
“Black Truffles”, because it is possible to cultivate these species (Zambonelli 
& Bonito, 2012). 
Wild and cultivated mushrooms differ in terms of global distribution, 
consumption, commercial demand and market prices. In this study, we only 
considered wild edible mushrooms and truffles, both fresh/chilled and 
dried/powdered, selected from UN Comtrade repositories. 
An analysis of wild mushrooms and truffles might present some data 
problems. As stated by ISPRA (2009) those products deal with activities 
that are not possible to be considered in official statistics: auto 
consumption, “informal” economic activities and extremely niche markets. 
However, data from ISTAT, UN Comtrade and ISPRA (the data we use in this 
analysis) can be considered accurate and trustworthy. 
For each category described above (070959 and 071239), we use the 
volumes exported from any country in the world during the years 2003, 
2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015. We start considering our observations from 
2003 because that year yielded a particularly large crop (Sitta & Floriani, 
2008), for which we consider it to be a sort of “year zero”. Then we take 
observations every three years, until 2015, to have a good proxy of trade 
evolution. 
Even though we have both quantities in Kilograms and value in US 
dollars101, we use the latter information since it better quantifies the size 
and the kind of trade for each country. Moreover, dealing with a dataset 
where several kinds of mushrooms and truffles are both present, money 
value helps in trying to approximately understand which good is traded. 
We also use the relation between quantities and values for the major 
countries. 
The focus on Italian trade introduces the final part of our research, the one 
dealing with the Fungo di Borgotaro, GIs and “Made-in” power. In this part, 
                                                             
101  As declared in the UN Trade Statistics website: “All commodity values are 
converted from national currency into US dollars using exchange rates supplied by 
the reporter countries, or derived from monthly market rates and volume of trade. 
Quantities, when provided with the reporter country data and when possible, are 
converted into metric units” 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/What-is-UN-COMTRADE). 
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we use UN Comtrade data, incorporating important data from ISTAT, the 
Italian National Institute of Statistics, and Italian regional datasets. 
 
3.3.2 Data Analysis 
A network represents the natural tool to display countries as nodes and 
their connections as paths, especially useful towards understanding 
dynamics and trends.  
For the main analysis, all the data are processed using a simple python code. 
We are particularly interested in networks of worldwide exports and in 
specific plots concerning peculiar trade aspects. 
Scatter plots (see Appendix G: Graphs: BC / OD and Appendix H: Graphs BC 
/ OD (log) for details about BC/OD graphs) and tables provide useful 
insights for answering definite questions. More specifically we correlate 
Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Out-degree (OD). 
A Network, or Graph, is a set of edges and nodes connected together by a set 
of lines or arrows. 
It is defined as an ordered pair 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) , where 𝑉 is a set of vertices or 
nodes{𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛}  (it is the basic element) and 𝐸 is a set of edges (set of 
unordered pairs of elements of 𝑉. It is represented as a line connecting two 
nodes, called endpoints or end vertices) (Aldous & Wilson, 2003; 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
If {𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗}   is in 𝐸 , then 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑣𝑗  are adjacent. Thus, (Biggs, 1993), the 
adjacent matrix of 𝐺  is the 𝑛×𝑛  matrix 𝐴 = 𝐴(𝐺)  whose entries 𝑎𝑖𝑗  are 
given by 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
1, if 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑣𝑗 are adjacent;
0, otherwise.                          
 
 
We draw a Directed Weighted Graph, connecting each exporter with the 
importer country. A directed graph is a graph where all the edges are 
directed from one vertex, the tail, to another, the endpoint called head. A 
directed graph is defined as an ordered pair of sets 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐴) , where 𝑉 is 
a set of nodes and 𝐴 is a set of ordered (directed) pairs (called edges or 
links) of 𝑉 (Nykamp). A weighted graph (edge-weighted graph) is a graph 
where edges have weights or values. Each edge 𝑒 of G has a numeric label 
𝑤(𝑒), called weight, which can be an integer, a rational number or a real 
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number (Bondy, 1976; Gross & Yellen, 2005). A directed weighted graph 
merges all the characteristics of the networks described in the notes above. 
We use weighted Betweenness Centrality (BC) instead of connectivity 
because the latter does not give the importance of a node in the network. 
BC allows us to explore the influence of each country in the market through 
its exports. By simply analysing connectivity, we miss information about 
the role of a node in a broader scenario: connectivity is a local quantity. As 
explained by Barthelemy (2004), the node v in Figure 5 seems irrelevant in 
terms of connectivity, having only two neighbours. However, its removal 
would be critical since it links two different parts of the network, making it 
a “cut-vertex”. BC measures the importance of a node in bridging relevant 
regions of the network and stresses the existence of paths between any two 
given nodes in the network. 
 
 
Figure 5 Example of a cut-vertex. 
Notes: Source: our elaboration from Barthelemy (2004). 
BC counts the fraction of shortest paths that go through a given node. This 
is expressed by the formula: 
𝐵𝐶(𝑣) =   Σ𝑠≠𝑡≠𝑖
𝑆𝑣(𝑠, 𝑡)
𝑆(𝑠, 𝑡)
 
Where:  
𝑆(𝑠, 𝑡) is the total number of shortest paths from 𝑠 to 𝑡   
𝑆𝑣(𝑠, 𝑡) is the number of paths that pass through 𝑣. 
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𝑠 , 𝑡  and 𝑣 are nodes of the network: 𝑣 is the node considered (the 
one for whom we compute the BC), while 𝑠 and 𝑡  are two generic 
nodes connected to each other. 
The Out-degree (OD) of a node, in a directed graph, is defined as the number 
of outward directed graph edges with that node as the source. Its 
denotation is: 𝑑𝑒𝑔+(𝑣) , where 𝑣  is the node of the network we are 
considering. For a directed graph, the degree sum formula is: 
∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑔+(𝑣)𝑣∈𝑉 = ∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑔
−(𝑣)𝑣∈𝑉 = |𝐴|. 
We use it as a proxy to understand the role of a specific country in terms of 
trade exportation. 
We consider all the countries resulting from the query in the UN Comtrade 
database on exportation of wild truffles and mushrooms (dried/powdered, 
071239, or fresh/chilled, 070959) in the examined years. Data regards 150 
countries, corresponding to those officially participating in the worldwide 
trade of this market. Not all of them are always present in yearly datasets, 
yet data for major countries are complete (all years, any category). Having 
constant information about the most influential countries is crucial for our 
analysis since this allows for the tracking of the evolution of their trade in 
time and for comparing it to dried/powdered (071239) and fresh/chilled 
(070959). On the other hand, the presence/absence of some countries 
depending on time or category gives an idea of market evolution and 
characteristics (due to differences between dried/powdered, 071239, and 
fresh/chilled ones, 070959). We do not consider exports towards aggregate 
entities and special categories: 
• “World”, which collects all the export trades of each country (i.e. a 
redundant information, for our purpose); 
• “Areas NES (not elsewhere specified)”, which may reference low 
value trade or unknown partner designation, or if an error was 
made in the partner assignment; 
• "Free Zones", geographical and economic territory belonging to a 
country but not to its customs territory; 
• "Bunkers", ship stores and aircraft supplies. 
The last two are not useful for our analysis in that they do not provide any 
information on the global network. Since their only effect is to alter our final 
result without providing any additional helpful information, we have 
deleted them. However, to fully keep track of all the data cleaning activities 
(deletions in particular) we have registered the major fallouts and they are 
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described in Appendix E: Effect of “Areas NES (not elsewhere specified)” 
and "Bunkers" elimination. 
Together with the network analysis, we compute the values of both BC and 
OD and we show the results of the top 22 countries in tables. Scatter plots 
are provided in specific appendices (Appendix G: Graphs: BC / OD and 
Appendix H: Graphs BC / OD (log)). All these outcomes are derived from 
the network analysis. 
Networks and BC and OD values indicate the countries playing the most 
important roles in worldwide trade of wild mushrooms and truffles. For 
these countries, we compute average prices (expressed in US $ per Kg) of 
each considered year. To better compare them we show the results in tables 
(Table 8 and Table 10). We also highlight the existence of possible 
arbitrages when a country has high BC values (i.e. with high “Made-in” 
power) and positive import/export price differences. 
Then, we analyse Italian trade considering import, export and production 
volumes. These data are shown using tables (Table 14 and Table 15) and 
figures (Figure 12 and Figure 13). This underlines some anomalies in the 
Italian trade of wild mushrooms and truffles. Therefore, we depict a review 
of the frauds and counterfeits from recent years considering official data 
from law enforcement agencies. This pushes the research to a further 
analysis of the Fungo di Borgotaro case study. We therefore propose (also 
considering the data shown in Table 16) this as an example of the correct 
use of GIs to solve quality and product origin issues. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
The first part of this section shows the networks, for both categories 
(dried/powdered, 071239 and fresh/chilled, 070959), of 2003 and 2012, 
the first and the latest significant year respectively. Moreover, the main 
results are illustrated. 
The networks for the other years we have considered (2006, 2009 and 
2015) are reported in Appendix D: Networks for the Years 2006, 2009 and 
2015. 
This section focuses on the most important, sometimes self-evident, 
outcomes, while details will be discussed in the next sections. 
In the second part, the section shows the results of BC and OD 
computations. From these, it is possible to identify the major countries. The 
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third part of the section provides some tables (Table 8 and Table 10) on 
yearly average prices of wild mushrooms and truffles traded by the chosen 
major countries. 
Even though we compute both networks, BC and OD for 2015, we do not 
consider them in the main discussion (and therefore we present 2012 as 
the latest significant year when showing the networks), instead they are 
reported in the appendices. The reason is that a lack of some records in the 
2015 dataset is presumed. This might be due to some gaps in the time and 
ways of communication of official data for some countries. Analysing the 
whole dataset, both for 070959 (fresh/chilled) and 071239 
(dried/powdered), there is an “anomalous” absence of records for counties 
that should have also been active in 2015. This is also evident from network 
analysis. To avoid jeopardising our analysis we do not consider BC and OD 
for the year 2015. However, as the analysis from 2003 to 2012 is still 
representative of the dynamics of worldwide trade of this specific market, 
this does not negatively affect our outcomes. Nevertheless, for the sake of 
completeness, BC and OD values of 2015 are shown in Appendix F: 
Betweenness Centrality and Out Degree Table 2015. 
 
3.4.1 Networks 
The results obtained by the python computation of networks, based on the 
total export values in US dollars, are displayed in figures below. 
Networks highlight the existing interactions among all the countries in the 
world. Specifically, Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the global networks of fresh 
and/or chilled wild mushrooms and truffles (070959) for the years 2003 
and 2012; while Figure 8 and Figure 9 display the global networks of dried 
and/or powdered wild mushrooms and truffles (071239) for the years 
2003 and 2012. 
Networks of both categories for the years 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015 
are shown in Appendix D: Networks for the Years 2006, 2009 and 2015. 
By studying all the networks, it is possible to identify the major countries, 
which are represented by the nodes with the biggest size and highest 
number of edges. However, a more detailed discussion about this topic is 
presented in the following section using BC and OD.
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Figure 6 Global network of fresh/chilled wild mushroom and truffle trade (070959) 
referred to 2003.  
Notes: each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Figure 7 Global network of fresh/chilled wild mushroom and truffle trade (070959) 
referred to 2012. 
Notes: each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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From Figure 6 and Figure 7 it is possible to observe that some European 
countries, China and the United States of America represent the major 
stakeholders in global trade. 
Among European countries, the outstanding ones are Italy, France and the 
Netherlands, followed by Germany. A significant, even though not globally 
impressive, role is played by Romania and Bulgaria. Their exportation of 
fresh/chilled (070959) wild mushrooms and truffles are mainly towards 
other European Countries, especially Western ones. Intra-Europe trade is a 
significant characteristic of the European market. The main difference 
among European major players is that, while the Western ones are 
important players worldwide, Bulgaria and Romania are limited to the EU. 
If we consider China, the big edges directed to Japan and Korea and the link 
with the USA are evident. 
There are no significant time differences (i.e. across years) when 
considering both the major players and the trade globally. The only 
remarkable difference to be underlined is the growing importance of 
Thailand starting from 2009 (please look at the appendix D.1 Fresh/Chilled 
(070959) Networks for more details). 
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Figure 8 Global network of “dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken or in powder […]” 
mushroom and truffle trade (071239) referred to 2003. 
Notes: each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Figure 9 Global network of “dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken or in powder […]”  
mushroom and truffle trade (071239) referred to 2012. 
Notes: each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Global trade of dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms and truffles 
(Figure 8 and Figure 9) has different peculiarities from the fresh/chilled 
(070959) one. We easily notice the growth in importance of far Asian 
countries, which here become the major exporters. China is still a crucial 
country, again with strong connections with Japan and Korea. What is 
unexpected, at a first sight, it is the values of exports towards small, and 
particular, countries: Hong Kong and Singapore. They cannot be considered 
“classical” countries (like, e.g., France, Germany, Japan, China, etc.) neither 
in terms of population nor in terms of local production. However, they are 
big importers from China and, at the same time, they also export significant 
volumes towards other countries worldwide. 
A further analysis of Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s international trades is 
shown later in this work. Furthermore, they represent a key for 
understanding wild mushroom and truffle trade anomalies. 
In this category, Thailand plays a significant role for all the considered 
years, showing many outbound edges. 
Japan presents significant exportations of dried/powdered (071239) wild 
mushrooms and truffles, highlighting the transition from only being an 
importer to being an exporter as well. 
Relevant countries in the dried/powdered (071239) networks are still 
important: the USA and some European countries continue to play a 
relevant role in worldwide trade. However, their importance decreases 
because of the growth in importance of Asian countries. Among European 
countries, France and Italy are still the major players with Germany and 
The Netherlands that switched their own roles. Eastern, “peripheral”, 
countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania lose their importance in the 
dried/powdered (071239) category. They probably play the same “role” as 
for the fresh/chilled (070959) category, but Asian competition is now 
stronger than before. Bulgaria is still among the top countries worldwide, 
while Romania seems to lose positions in terms of global importance. 
Please look at the appendix D.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) Networks for 
more details. 
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3.4.2 Betweenness Centrality and Out Degree 
After a visual analysis of the networks, a more detailed and specific study 
of crucial aspect is needed. Therefore, we compute, from the previous 
networks outcomes, the values of OD and directed weighted BC of each 
country. In this section, we analyse the main results of this analysis. This is 
useful to understand the connections and the importance in terms of export 
for each country. 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the outcomes of the most important countries: 
out of about 150 countries, we choose 22 of them, based on their relevance 
in terms of BC and OD. Of course, all those mentioned in the previous 
section are considered. Tables are ordered by a descending OD value. 
It is also useful to consider the correlation between OD and BC: specific 
scatter plots are provided in Appendix G: Graphs: BC / OD in and Appendix 
H: Graphs BC / OD (log). This analysis emphasizes the “export value” and 
the centrality of major players. At the same time, we show which countries 
have the biggest role not only in terms of connections but also in terms of 
“hub importance” in the international trade of wild mushrooms and 
truffles. Moreover, it stresses the main differences between the two 
markets (fresh/chilled, 070959, and dried/powdered, 071239). 
Furthermore, this analysis points out some crucial aspects for further 
studies. 
For fresh/chilled (070959) wild mushrooms and truffles (Table 6), major 
European countries (i.e. The Netherlands, Italy, France and Germany) show 
the highest number of partner countries (outbound links). Quite relevant it 
is also the role of some Asiatic countries (e.g. China) and the USA. As 
expected by the networks’ results, Bulgaria and Romania have a significant 
OD value. The same is true for Thailand. Even though OD is a good proxy for 
understanding connections of a country, we need to analyse another aspect 
to enlighten its importance in the worldwide trade: BC. In fact, BC outcomes 
point out whether a country is just a good exporter or plays a role as a 
“hub”. We can notice substantial differences between the considered 
European countries. While The Netherlands, Italy, Germany and 
particularly France have significant BC values, Bulgaria and Romania have 
low BC values yet still maintain considerable OD values between 11 and 19. 
These differences will help us in understanding some crucial aspects when 
trying to explain the worldwide trade. China has low BC values, if compared 
with top EU countries. Low BC values and quite high OD values make, for 
fresh/chilled (070959) market, China the player with many characteristics 
in common with Bulgaria and Romania. BC values of top EU countries goes 
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from about 0.03 up to approximately 0.2, with Italy having among the 
highest values (around 0.2). Only the United States have a BC value in line 
with top EU average. As resulting from the networks, there are some 
differences when dealing with dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms 
and truffles (Table 7). China is the leader of this market, having the highest 
OD values for all the years considered (between 68 and 86). European 
countries, preeminent players in fresh/chilled (070959) market, are still 
relevant even though they must face the raising importance of Asian ones. 
France, Italy and Germany maintain, approximately, the same number of 
outgoing links as in 070959 (fresh/chilled). However, some differences 
occur when considering BC values of Germany, which increases its BC 
values. On the other hand, The Netherlands are losing their importance 
especially in terms of OD. 
Together with China, Far East countries gain importance in the global trade 
scenario. Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and Thailand have significant OD 
values. Average outbound links are: China 77, Hong Kong 43, Singapore 23, 
Japan 20 and Thailand 32. Average outbound links of European countries 
are: Germany 47, France 57, Italy 50, The Netherlands 26. Finally, the USA 
have 20 average outbound links. 
The momentous difference comes with BC. By examining the average 
values of main Western and Far East countries, we obtain these results: The 
Netherlands 0.1305; France 0.0734; Italy 0.0684; Germany 0.0674; China 
0.0539; Singapore 0.0491; Hong Kong 0.0488; USA 0.0448 and Japan 
0.0238. We can notice two main trends. Western countries have lower 
outgoing links, but higher (or at least same) BC values, making them 
important trade hubs. It is worthy to underline also the high values reached 
by Hong Kong and Singapore, especially considering their size. Italy, as well 
as other major Western countries, can be defined as an important funnel. It 
imports enormous quantities of wild mushrooms and truffles from several 
countries and it also exports large volumes worldwide. Conversely, there is 
an almost-close economy: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.  
While Italy can be considered an archetype for describing the role of major 
European or Asian countries (and the USA, too), the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea represents a particular case of exiguous trade with some 
selected foreign countries. Moreover, data from the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea only concern imports, without any export for both 
categories during all the examined years. 
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Table 6 Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Out Degree (OD) results referred to 
fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles (070959).  
 
2003 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
NLD  0.111270 35 
ITA  0.086345 29 
FRA  0.039177 29 
CHN  0.027549 26 
USA  0.103220 21 
EST  0.025224 20 
BEL  0.108825 19 
DEU  0.035003 18 
IND  0.038163 18 
ESP  0.027549 17 
BGR  0.001312 15 
AUS  0.028861 13 
RUS  0.014132 13 
PRT  0.038879 13 
HUN  0.020036 13 
ZAF  0.006738 12 
CAN  0.033274 12 
KOR  0.050566 11 
AUT  0.036613 11 
ROU  0.010555 11 
NZL  0.035242 10 
SGP  0.028265 9 
2006 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
NLD  0.175583 41 
ITA  0.114134 39 
FRA  0.097062 36 
CHN  0.014742 29 
DEU  0.037335 24 
POL  0.037842 23 
BEL  0.085258 21 
IND  0.037639 20 
LTU  0.006231 20 
TUR  0.003597 19 
BGR  0.006130 19 
ZAF  0.074316 18 
ESP  0.046049 17 
RUS  0.022290 16 
KOR  0.004762 16 
USA  0.075481 15 
LVA  0.022087 15 
AUT  0.059169 14 
SGP  0.086373 13 
ROU  0.009473 13 
AUS  0.032979 12 
HUN  0.003698 12 
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2009 
Country 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
ITA  0.208634 54 
FRA  0.088407 52 
THA  0.081183 44 
NLD  0.027090 41 
BEL  0.068240 31 
USA  0.075851 30 
DEU  0.037582 30 
KOR  0.028552 29 
CHN  0.110079 29 
POL  0.048719 28 
ZAF  0.075120 26 
TUR  0.007955 20 
LTU  0.013287 18 
BGR  0.003139 17 
AUS  0.019952 16 
ESP  0.019178 16 
SRB  0.068369 16 
AUT  0.027434 15 
LKA  0.003397 14 
CAN  0.022575 13 
ROU  0.037281 13 
CAN  0.022575 13 
 
2012 
Country 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
ITA  0.034080 61 
NLD  0.148153 57 
FRA  0.123860 55 
DEU  0.092256 36 
THA  0.177123 34 
POL  0.019654 29 
ESP  0.085613 28 
KOR  0.009827 27 
CHN  0.016942 27 
ZAF  0.043986 23 
USA  0.057075 21 
AUS  0.056171 20 
LTU  0.000354 20 
BEL  0.009552 19 
LKA  0.023270 18 
TUR  0.005778 18 
SGP  0.098349 17 
ROU  0.048310 17 
NZL  0.019654 15 
IND  0.041274 14 
BGR  0.016942 14 
SRB  0.008766 14 
Notes: the most important 22 countries are ordered by OD values. Colours help in 
recognizing countries within charts and among tables. 
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Table 7 Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Out Degree (OD) results referred to “dried, 
whole/cut/sliced/broken or in powder […]”) (071239) wild mushrooms and truffles.  
 
2003 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
CHN  0.069499 71 
HKG  0.105283 52 
ITA  0.089978 46 
FRA  0.042974 44 
DEU  0.077233 43 
SGP  0.042320 23 
JPN  0.024237 22 
THA  0.009586 19 
NLD  0.176634 18 
USA  0.056155 17 
KOR  0.034314 16 
RUS  0.105501 15 
CHL  0.007462 14 
AUT  0.029684 13 
BGR  0.009314 13 
LTU  0.028813 12 
ROU  0.000108 11 
CHE  0.001035 10 
AUS  0.103268 10 
CAN  0.009804 9 
BEL  0.025109 8 
GBR  0.042157 8 
2006 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
CHN  0.035905 68 
FRA  0.114124 53 
ITA  0.091079 48 
HKG  0.058654 43 
DEU  0.037136 38 
THA  0.126432 35 
POL  0.048723 29 
JPN  0.036499 24 
NLD  0.118623 22 
SGP  0.036075 21 
GBR  0.120109 15 
KOR  0.009931 15 
USA  0.024489 14 
CHL  0.007342 14 
AUT  0.043714 14 
SRB  0.041338 14 
BEL  0.028563 13 
VNM  0.029454 13 
ZAF  0.036330 12 
BGR  0.000297 12 
RUS  0.010823 12 
IND  0.049826 11 
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2009 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
CHN  0.084331 85 
FRA  0.051863 56 
ITA  0.042951 54 
DEU  0.095238 47 
HKG  0.018589 37 
THA  0.204694 35 
POL  0.064935 28 
NLD  0.033019 25 
JPN  0.019947 23 
USA  0.054537 22 
SGP  0.021475 21 
MYS  0.192344 15 
AUT  0.067566 14 
SRB  0.022112 14 
LBN  0.020329 13 
KOR  0.004244 13 
ESP  0.114294 12 
GBR  0.061328 12 
IND  0.011289 12 
CHL  0.000571 12 
BGR  0.001216 11 
BEL  0.051948 10 
 
2012 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
CHN  0.025874 86 
FRA  0.084746 75 
DEU  0.061380 59 
ITA  0.049956 52 
HKG  0.012937 40 
NLD  0.194013 39 
THA  0.019147 38 
USA  0.044224 28 
SGP  0.096768 28 
POL  0.032919 24 
ESP  0.041080 21 
VNM  0.049877 20 
DNK  0.069899 16 
BGR  0.028182 16 
CHL  0.006449 15 
GBR  0.146485 14 
KOR  0.002548 14 
AUT  0.032601 13 
SVN  0.088011 13 
BIH  0.006250 13 
JPN  0.014728 12 
RUS  0.006687 12 
 
Notes: the most important 22 countries are ordered by OD values. Colours help in 
recognizing countries within charts and among tables. 
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3.4.3 Average Prices 
This section analyses average prices of the products traded by major 
countries. We design two tables: one for 070959 (fresh/chilled) (Table 8) 
and one for 071239 (dried/powdered) (Table 10). They show the average 
prices, in US dollars, for each year for the major countries: China, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Germany, USA, 
Bulgaria and Romania. We do not consider Thailand since it is not relevant 
for our analysis, being a relevant exporter but not an important global trade 
hub. In the previous section, we underlined the relevance of the major 
exporters, through the analysis of their outbound export flow values. Here, 
using yearly average prices, we point out the differences between countries 
in terms of high or low product values. 
We also show the median price (yearly values of the major countries: China, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Germany, USA, 
Bulgaria and Romania) in Table 9 and Table 11. This is a crucial help for 
understanding and then regulating some anomalies in the dataset. 
Anomalies might concern suspiciously high average prices or “strange” one 
(or two) kilo(s) purchases in an entire year. 
From the analysis of both average and median prices, we can decide when 
it is worthy to remove peculiar data that cause distortion. As such we can 
provide a clearer, therefore better, result. It could be said that excluding 
some data could lead to an inferior, and less trustable, analysis. However, 
we strongly believe that an accurate evaluation of the results shown in the 
tables below and then, if necessary, a thorough investigation of raw data, 
provide a more precise idea of trade phenomena. In case of anomalies like 
the ones explained before, the exclusion of specific records prevents a 
biased analysis. Therefore from the dataset we remove adulterations from 
recording errors or niche products (i.e. very few transactions, 1 or 2, made 
in one year from a specific country about extremely costly products). In fact, 
we believe that there might be some recording errors due to the 
peculiarities of UN Comtrade system. Abnormal data are pointed out and 
new results are provided. Moreover, although we care about expensive 
truffles and mushrooms, we are more interested in the analysis of general 
trends, without high price product distortion. 
 
116 
 
3.4.3.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) Average Prices 
Table 8  Average Prices of fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles in US $ per Kg.  
Country 
Year (Average Price: US$ per 
Kg) 
Reporter 
Reporter 
ISO 
2003 2006 2009 2012 
China CHN 3.17 2.45 8.30 10.46 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
HKG 2.66 2.33 275.93 13.94 
Japan JPN 7.51 4.26 5.25 8.80 
Singapore SGP 3.21 5.75 5.57 9.83 
France FRA 15.30 14.56 36.69 137.14 
Italy ITA 6.26 46.68 130.37 94.08 
Netherlands NLD 6.23 7.98 7.54 14.27 
Germany DEU 9.67 9.33 12.98 459.72 
USA USA 23.59 16.78 13.57 19.58 
Bulgaria BGR 10.21 8.49 12.55 16.81 
Romania ROU 10.63 9.07 8.14 46.39 
Notes: we consider only the major countries. In red, the values subjected to changes. Source: 
our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset. 
 
Table 9 Median Prices of fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles in US $ per Kg.  
Country 
Year (Median Price: US$ per 
Kg) 
Reporter 
Reporter 
ISO 
2003 2006 2009 2012 
China CHN 1.60 2.14 3.99 3.99 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
HKG 0.81 2.59 10.91 5.88 
Japan JPN 5.76 4.79 5.82 7.48 
Singapore SGP 2.15 5.71 3.99 6.35 
France FRA 8.98 9.68 14.47 43.70 
Italy ITA 3.25 6.33 24.32 32.86 
Netherlands NLD 3.50 5.41 7.54 7.51 
Germany DEU 8.51 7.41 8.17 11.10 
USA USA 12.78 9.60 11.84 15.44 
Bulgaria BGR 10.92 8.51 11.56 15.91 
Romania ROU 7.03 8.68 7.70 10.41 
Notes: we consider only the major countries. Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset.  
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Average price (AP) of Japanese exports of fresh/chilled (070959) 
mushrooms is around 5 or 7 US dollars per Kg. A similar AP value is 
registered for Singapore. 
China’s average prices have been growing from 2 or 3 US$/Kg up to more 
than 10 US dollars per kilo. However, the median for 2003 is 1.58 US$/Kg. 
This, together with a lower average price in 2006, lead us to compute a new 
average price without a, probable anomalous, maximum price of 30 
US$/Kg. Therefore, the new average is 2.1 US$/Kg. Applying the same 
method to 2009 and 2012, where the medians are 3.94 US$/Kg and 3.72 
US$/Kg and maxima of 47.25 US$/Kg and 99 US$/Kg, respectively, we 
obtain new average prices: 6.73 US$/Kg in 2009 and 7.05 US$/Kg in 2012. 
Then we can state that China’s average price growth from 2 to 7 US dollars 
per kilo from 2003 and 2012. 
Hong Kong has an AP of about 2.5 US$/Kg in 2003 and 2006, which seems 
plausible both considering median prices, single records and expected 
results. However, outputs of 2009 and 2012 seem quite unusual and are 
probably vitiated by some anomalies. Median prices for 2009 and 2012 are, 
respectively: 8.20 US$/Kg and 3.76 US$/Kg. Maxima are: 1,608 US$/Kg in 
2009 and 56.69 US$/Kg in 2012. By computing the new average without 
the maxima, we obtain the more reasonable values equal to 9.52 US$/Kg in 
2009 and to 5.39 US$/Kg in 2012. We can consider Hong Kong’s average 
export prices to be about 2.5 US$/Kg in 2003 and 2006 and 9.5 US$/Kg in 
2009 while about 5 US$/Kg in 2012. 
Considering European countries, average prices go from about 6 US$/Kg 
for The Netherlands in 2003 to an anomalous 459.72 US$/Kg in Germany 
for 2012.  First of all, as well as Asian countries or even more, there are 
some required adjustments to be done. The Netherlands have the lowest 
average prices (all expressed in US$/Kg): 6.23 (2003); 7.98 (2006); 7.54 
(2009); 14.27 (2012). Since median price is 7.31 US$/Kg, with a maximum 
of 318 US$/Kg, can compute a new average price for 2012: 8.94 US dollars 
per Kilo. Therefore, The Netherlands have an export average price of about 
8 US$/Kg. 
France has an average price coherent with the other countries for 2003 and 
2006 (15.30 US$/Kg and 14.56 US$ /Kg in 2003 and 2006, respectively), 
while it rises very much in 2009 and even more in 2012. From a price equal 
to 36.69 US dollars per kilo in 2009, then we register a significantly high 
average price in 2012: 137.14 US$/Kg. Median is 42.55 US$/Kg, but even if 
we take the maximum (1,215.9 US$/Kg) off from our analysis, we still have 
an average price of 117.52 US$/Kg. 
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Also in the case of Germany, there is a significant increase in average prices 
from around 10 US$/Kg to an anomalous 460 US$/Kg. There are two 
adjustments that can be made for Germany’s average prices. One for 2009: 
removing the maximum (100 US$/Kg) we obtain an AP equal to 9.98 
US$/Kg, which is closer to the median of 8 US$/Kg. Considering 2012, for 
reaching a more reasonable average price we should cut off until the fourth 
from last highest price. Maximum prices are (all expressed in US$/Kg): 
6,571; 5,226.67; 2,472.99; 835.5. Median goes from 11 US$/Kg to 10.7 
US$/Kg. Consequently, we can obtain an average price of about 57.6 US 
dollars per kilo. Please note that when we refer to a price as anomalous, we 
also might allude to a value interfering with our general reasoning by 
adulterating too much the average price we are interested in. It might be 
that, as mentioned before, some transactions involve exquisite or rare 
products. However, this analysis concentrates on the most precise and 
focused average price possible, hence peaks and rarities are not considered. 
As for the process made in the case of Germany, we can clear the data 
concerning Italian trade. A first computation of the average prices shows 
these results (all expressed in US$/Kg): 6.26; 46.68; 380.83; 445.11. 
In 2003, average prices are similar for all the European countries. There are 
just few differences, i.e. the slightly higher AP of France and the quite low 
APs of Italy and The Netherlands. In the case of Italy, from 2006 to 2012, 
there are some anomalies due to costly transactions involving only one or 
two kilos a year. Even though we cannot state without doubt that those 
results as incorrectly registered, reasonably they do not represent a 
single(dual)-kilo transaction of exquisite wild mushrooms or truffles. As 
expressed above, our analysis does not take into consideration such cases, 
being more interested in a more general oriented result. Then, taking off 
those partner countries having only one or two kilos, we obtain different 
average prices. In 2006, if we do not consider Kazakhstan (one kilo, sold at 
797 US$) and Nigeria (2 Kg with AP of 597 US$/Kg), we have a new AP of 
11,53 US$/Kg, with a median of 6.22 US$/Kg (from 6.33). For 2009, we cut: 
Indonesia (2 kilos), AP 3,215.5 US$/Kg; China (1 Kg) AP 2,189 US$/Kg; 
Macao (1 Kg) AP 1,825 US$/Kg and Iceland (1 kilo) and few other trades, 
with a resulting AP of 130.37 US$/Kg. Some values are even higher that the 
considered one, but we did not want to lose more information that might 
provide insights on the truffle trade. The median in 2009 goes from 85.45 
US$/Kg to 24.32 US$/Kg. In 2012, we cut, among others: Peru (2 kilos at 
very high price) AP 7,070 US$/Kg, Curacao (1 Kg) AP 4,814 US$/Kg and 
Macao (1 Kg) 2,928 US$/Kg. At the end of the whole process, we obtain a 
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new average price of 94.08 US$/Kg, with a median of 32.86 (from 68.95) 
US$/Kg. 
With respect to the USA we have a revised average price in 2003 (not 
considering the maximum of 242.53 US$/Kg, having a new median of 8.45 
US$/Kg, instead of 12.78 US$/Kg) of 12.64 US$/Kg. In 2006 and 2009 we 
do not adjust the first output. Hence, we have AP: 16.78 US$/Kg and 13.57 
US$/Kg. For 2012, the new AP is 19.58 (instead of 39.68) US dollars per kilo 
(not considering the 441.61 US$/Kg maximum AP), with a median of 15.44 
US$/Kg (15.46 US$/Kg being the original one). 
Finally, we have the two Eastern European countries: Bulgaria and 
Romania. The former has the following average prices (all expressed in 
US$/Kg): 10.21 (2003); 8.49 (2006); 12.55 (2009); 16.81 (2012). The 
latter’s APs are: 10.63 US$/Kg (2003); 9.07 US$/Kg (2006); 8.14 US$/Kg 
(2009). For 2012, the original AP was 46.39 US$/Kg, but without the record 
of Finland (only one kilo sold at 630 US$) we obtain a new AP of 9.91 
US$/Kg (median from 10.41 to 10.33 US$/Kg). 
 
3.4.3.2 Dried/ Powdered (071239) Average Prices 
Table 10 Average Prices of dried/ powdered wild mushrooms and truffles (“whole, cut, 
sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared” - 071239) in US $ per Kg. 
Country 
Year (Average Price: US$ per 
Kg) 
Reporter 
Reporter 
ISO 
2003 2006 2009 2012 
China CHN 5.76 10.28 13.29 15.90 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
HKG 11.09 14.58 10.60 17.17 
Japan JPN 38.51 34.59 47.24 78.90 
Singapore SGP 5.54 8.74 13.05 17.33 
France FRA 30.62 34.21 43.87 68.90 
Italy ITA 35.92 29.10 41.80 40.24 
Netherlands NLD 27.15 18.67 27.97 26.44 
Germany DEU 24.22 28.12 32.03 30.35 
USA USA 30.07 20.45 15.31 14.10 
Bulgaria BGR 22.73 25.41 42.84 28.53 
Romania ROU 18.70 16.49 31.08 23.54 
 Notes:  we consider only the major countries. In red, the values subjected to changes. 
Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset.  
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Table 11 Median Prices of dried/ powdered wild mushrooms and truffles (“whole, cut, 
sliced, broken or in powder, but not further prepared” - 071239) in US $ per Kg. 
Country 
Year (Median Price: US$ per 
Kg) 
Reporter 
Reporter 
ISO 
2003 2006 2009 2012 
China CHN 5.54 9.47 12.33 14.80 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
HKG 6.84 10.11 9.00 12.42 
Japan JPN 34.98 26.82 40.32 54.14 
Singapore SGP 4.60 8.61 7.92 10.14 
France FRA 25.45 25.11 33.86 38.79 
Italy ITA 26.04 28.17 39.73 35.54 
Netherlands NLD 13.29 11.82 27.99 17.50 
Germany DEU 22.31 24.89 29.00 25.68 
USA USA 18.26 11.75 8.73 10.08 
Bulgaria BGR 17.33 23.15 42.48 24.00 
Romania ROU 16.80 15.97 30.92 24.56 
Notes: we consider only the major countries. Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade 
dataset. 
Asian countries, Japan excluded, have Average Prices values from around 
5,50 US$/Kg to about 17 US dollars per kilo. China’s, Hong Kong’s and 
Singapore’s APs slightly increase in value over time. 
China goes from an AP value of 5.76 US$/Kg in 2003, to almost 16 US$/Kg 
in 2012. Hong Kong has AP values around 11 US$/Kg in 2003 and 2009, 
raising more than 17 US dollars per kilo in 2012. 
Singapore’s export behaviour is similar to the one of China. There is a 
relatively low average price in 2003 (5.54 US$/Kg) and it rises to over 17 
US dollars per kilo in 2012. With respect to Singapore, we should point out 
that in 2009, excluding the maximum value (72.7 US$/Kg) from our 
computation, we have an adjusted AP of 10.06 US$/Kg (median goes from 
7.92 to 7.8 US$/Kg). 
Japan has average prices (expressed in US$/Kg) higher that the other top 
Asian countries: 38.51 US$/Kg in 2003, 34.59 US$/Kg in 2006, 47.24 
US$/Kg in 2009, 78.90 US$/Kg in 2012. 
Major European countries have significantly higher average prices with 
respect to Asian ones. AP of The Netherlands in 2006 is the lowest one 
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among Western EU countries: 18.67 (revised to 14.83) US$/Kg. Italy goes 
from roughly 30 US$/Kg in the first years, up to 40 US dollars per kilo in the 
latest ones. Germany has a somewhat constant increasing average price, 
from about 24 US$/Kg in 2003 until more than 30 US dollars per kilo in 
2012. The Netherlands do not have such a constant increasing rate. It starts 
with an AP of 27,15 US$/Kg in 2003, then decreases in 2006 to 14.83 
US$/Kg (after the removal of the maximum AP equal to 99.18 US$/Kg; 
originally being an AP of 18.67 US$/Kg, with the median going from 11.82 
US$/Kg to 11.52 US$/Kg). Later, in 2009, The Netherlands AP is nearly 28 
US$/Kg, but then in 2012 it decreases again to 21.54 US$/Kg due to an 
adjustment (we cut off the two maxima of 118.51 US$/Kg and 115.67 
US$/Kg. Median goes from 17.5 US$/Kg to 17 US$/Kg). 
An adjustment in 2012 average price of France is needed. We thought an 
exclusion of non-significant values would provide a better result for our 
analysis. A comprehensive list of the values we think it is better to exclude 
(to have a more trustable analysis) is provided in Appendix I: Adjustments 
of Average Prices. More specifically, details about France are shown in 
Table 20. Hence, we obtain an average price of 40.34 US$/Kg, while the 
median becomes 34.28 US$/Kg instead the original one of 38.79 US$ per 
kilo. Therefore, also France, like Italy, goes from a value of about 30 US$/Kg 
in 2003 until an AP of about 40 US dollars per Kilo in 2012. 
Unlike France, Italy and Germany, the United States of America faces a 
reduction of average prices. Even if APs are adjusted for the years 2003 and 
2006, the trend is declining. We remove two maxima in 2003 (104.72 
US$/Kg and 103.12 US$/Kg), obtaining a new AP of 20.22 US dollars per 
kilo and a new median of 14.7 US$/Kg, instead of the 18.26 US$/Kg original 
one. In 2006, the revised AP is equal to 14.53 US$/Kg (the original one is: 
20.45 US$/Kg), cutting off the maximum, 97.39 US$/Kg, and having a new 
median extremely close to the original one: 11.74 US$/Kg instead of 11.75 
US$/kg. The slightly increase in AP of 2009, 15.31 US$/Kg, is more an 
exception rather than a trend inversion, since in 2012 the average price is 
14.10 US$/Kg. 
As for the fresh/chilled (070959) category, we also consider Bulgaria and 
Romania. For the former, we adjust the value for 2003 and 2012. In 2003, 
excluding the maximum of 78 US$/Kg, we obtain, for Bulgaria, a new AP 
equal to 22.73 US$/Kg (median goes from 17.36 US$/Kg to 17.33 US$/Kg). 
For 2012, the original AP of 32.61 US$/Kg is changed into 28.53 US dollars 
per kilo, excluding the maximum 93.77 US$/Kg (median goes from 27.17 
US$/Kg to 24 US$/Kg). However, the maximum average price belongs to 
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2009: 42.84 $US/Kg. 2009 is the year during which the maximum average 
price is registered for Romania: 31.08 US$/Kg. Average price for Romanian 
export of wild mushrooms and truffles in 2003 is 18.70 US$/Kg, while it is 
16.49 US$/Kg in 2006. For 2012, we adjust the original Average Price 
(32.61 US$/Kg) since there are two anomalous exports: a trade of only 1 
kilo at 1 US$ towards USA, and an export of 4 kilograms at 18 US$ to UK. 
Not considering these two trades, the new AP is equal to 23.54 US$/Kg 
(median goes from 24.03 US$/Kg to 24.56 US$/Kg). 
 
3.4.4 Incentives in Labelling Arbitrage 
In this section, we go over the causes of exploiting import/export price gaps 
due to differences in “Made-in” perceptions by consumers. 
BC gives an idea of the “Made-in” power of each country. The higher the BC 
is, the biggest the recognised value of goods with that country’s “Made-in” 
label. Hence, BC represents a good proxy for “Made-in” power. 
We compute the differences between export prices and import prices of the 
major countries. This underlines the existence, or not, of a possible 
arbitrage. A positive difference between export prices and import prices 
(i.e. Pexp-Pimp), ΔP, gives the possibility to exploit this kind of arbitrage. 
Some traders of the countries with high BC values and positive ΔP, will 
likely import goods and then re-export them labelling, in an illicit way, the 
re-exported products with their own country’s “Made-in” label. This does 
not represent an imperfect imitation of a valuable resource which gives a 
competitive advantage. The traders that re-export these products, after 
labelling with an illegal “Made-in” label, understand, in a distort way, the 
competitive advantage that results from certain “Made-in” labels. However, 
it represents a fraudulent use of “Made-in” labels and therefore definitely 
not a fair (competitive) advantage. 
The method we propose underlines the existence of possible frauds and 
points out the countries where these phenomena can take place. Moreover, 
we believe that it can be replicated to detect the likely existence of illicit 
labelling practices in industries beyond the examined one. Indeed, it 
represents a technique to emphasise the alleged presence of arbitrages for 
some products and to connect them with some specific countries. 
By underlining these possible types of frauds, we want to illustrate the 
importance of a protection both for legal producers/traders and for 
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consumers. A wider and more controlled use of GIs and certificated “Made-
in” labels will reduce the possibility of illegal practices. 
As for all the sections above, we present (Table 12 and Table 13) the results 
from both categories (fresh/chilled, 070959, and dried/powdered, 071239) 
for the years 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.  
 
3.4.4.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) 
 
Table 12 Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Price Differences for Major Countries 
referred to fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles (070959) category. Years: 2003, 
2006, 2009 and 2012.  
Country 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Reporter 
I 
SO 
BC ΔP BC ΔP BC ΔP BC ΔP 
China 
C 
H 
N 
0.02
8 
$ -
0.50  
0.01
5 
$-
10.9
7  
0.11
0 
 $ 
1.45  
0.01
7 
 $ 2.51  
China, Hong 
Kong SAR 
H 
K 
G 
0.01
4 
$- 
0.56  
0.01
8 
$- 
1.42  
0.01
5 
 $ 
67.67  
0.00
0 
$- 
0.67  
Japan 
J 
P 
N 
0.01
2 
$- 
23.2
7  
0.01
8 
$- 
28.3
6  
0.01
6 
$- 
99.47  
0.00
3 
$- 
98.94  
Singapore 
S 
G 
P 
0.02
8 
 $ 
0.46  
0.08
6 
$- 
0.62  
0.03
1 
 $ 
1.97  
0.09
8 
 $ 0.68  
France 
F 
R 
A 
0.03
9 
 $ 
6.00  
0.09
7 
 $ 
4.68  
0.08
8 
 $ 
25.01  
0.12
4 
 $ 
122.0
6  
Italy 
I 
T 
A 
0.08
6 
$- 
0.97  
0.11
4 
 $ 
39.4
3  
0.20
9 
 $ 
117.9
9  
0.03
4 
 $ 
84.10  
Netherlands 
N 
L 
D 
0.11
1 
$- 
1.69  
0.17
6 
$- 
1.00  
0.02
7 
$- 
1.38  
0.14
8 
$ 2.33  
Germany 
D 
E 
U 
0.03
5 
$ 
2.05 
0.03
7 
 $ 
1.44  
0.03
8 
 $ 
2.71  
0.09
2 
 $ 
450.17  
USA 
U 
S 
A 
0.10
3 
$ 
11.6
9  
0.07
6 
$ 
4.19  
0.07
6 
$ 
5.51  
0.05
7 
$ 
13.01  
Bulgaria 
B 
G 
0.00
1 
$ 
9.11  
0.00
6 
$ 
5.14  
0.00
3 
$ 
8.13  
0.01
7 
$ 
10.26  
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R 
Romania 
R 
O
U 
0.01
1 
$ 
9.66  
0.01
0 
$ 
4.67  
0.03
7 
$ 
3.28  
0.04
8 
$ 
42.06  
Notes: Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset. 
For the fresh/chilled (070959) category European countries, as well as USA, 
show positive differences. However, not all of them report a significant BC 
value. This represents a considerable difference since only the countries 
that are appealing in terms of “Made-in” power might exploit the positive 
price gap.  
Italy, France, USA and Germany have positive ΔP values and, at the same 
time, are significant in terms of trade centrality (with Germany having 
lower BC values among this group of countries). This enlightens the 
possibility for companies of these countries to act in an illicit way by 
labelling products imported from other countries with their own country’s 
“Made-in” label. Romania and Bulgaria have positive ΔP values, however 
their centrality importance is low. They might exploit a favourable price 
difference, however, oppositely to major Western countries, they have a 
minor “Made-in” power. 
It is extremely significant that some countries, e.g. Italy, have significant 
values combined for BC and ΔP in the fresh/chilled (070959) category. This 
means that consumers worldwide are willing to pay higher prices for 
products coming from that specific country. Hence, this demonstrates the 
power of its “Made-in” label. 
Figure 10 shows a scatter plot using the data of Table 12 for the year 2009 
as an example of all the examined years.  The ITA label in the upper-right 
corner suggests that Italian fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles are 
attractive and therefore the “Made in Italy” label is powerful, for this 
category. 
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Figure 10 Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Price Differences scatter plot for the year 
2009.  
Notes: Major Countries referred to fresh/chilled wild mushrooms and truffles 
(070959) category. Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset. 
 
3.4.4.2 Dried/ Powdered (071239) 
 
Table 13 Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Price Differences for Major Countries 
referred to dried/ powdered wild mushrooms and truffles (“whole, cut, sliced, broken 
or in powder, but not further prepared” - 071239). Years: 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012.  
Country 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Reporter 
I 
S
O 
BC ΔP BC ΔP BC ΔP BC ΔP 
China 
C 
H 
N 
0.07
0 
$-
27.93 
0.03
6 
$- 
5.40  
0.08
4 
$- 
21.91  
0.02
6 
$- 
67.3
7  
China, Hong 
Kong SAR 
H 
K 
G 
0.10
5 
$ 
6.99  
0.05
9 
$ 
9.63  
0.01
9 
$ 
5.96  
0.01
3 
$ 
11.2
1  
Japan 
J 
P 
N 
0.02
4 
$ 
4.24  
0.03
7 
$-
13.79  
0.02
0 
$ 
1.73  
0.01
5 
$ 
30.0
2  
Singapore 
S 
G 
P 
0.04
2 
$- 
1.26  
0.03
6 
$-
3.54  
0.02
2 
$- 
1.68  
0.09
7 
$ 
5.11  
France 
F 
R 
A 
0.04
3 
$ 
1.38  
0.11
4 
$- 
11.9
2  
0.05
2 
$ 
3.12  
0.08
5 
$ 
11.1
7  
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Italy 
I 
T 
A 
0.09
0 
$ 
19.1
5  
0.09
1 
$ 
2.15  
0.04
3 
$ 
10.1
1  
0.05
0 
$ 
10.3
7  
Netherlands 
N 
L 
D 
0.17
7 
$ 
3.50  
0.11
9 
$- 
0.37  
0.03
3 
$ 
4.69  
0.19
4 
$ 
6.53  
Germany 
D 
E 
U 
0.07
7 
$ 
0.32  
0.03
7 
$ 
1.95  
0.09
5 
$ 
0.75  
0.06
1 
$ 
8.39  
USA 
U 
S 
A 
0.05
6 
$ 
6.16  
0.02
5 
$- 
0.43  
0.05
5 
$- 
6.14  
0.04
4 
$- 
19.8
6  
Bulgaria 
B 
G 
R 
0.00
9 
$ 
11.1
9  
0.00
0 
$ 
1.99  
0.00
1 
$ 
20.4
6  
0.02
8 
$ 
1.61  
Romania 
R 
O 
U 
0.00
0 
$- 
6.73  
0.00
1 
$ 
1.88  
0.00
1 
$- 
23.70  
0.08
5 
$- 
1.22  
Notes: Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset. 
In this category (dried/powdered, 071239) we can emphasise the relevant 
change in behaviour of two countries: The Netherlands and Hong Kong. The 
latter is particularly interesting because deals with the different 
characteristics of the two categories. In fact, the role played by the 
dried/powdered (071239) wild mushroom and truffle trade by this Asian 
country, is linked with the different perishability in comparison to 
fresh/chilled (070959) one. However, the “Made-in” power of Hong Kong is 
not relevant and this might suggest a further flow through more relevant 
BC countries. One of them might be Germany as well as Italy or France (and 
the formerly mentioned NLD, too). They show quite relevant BC values, 
even if not extremely significant for any period. However, on average, their 
BC and ΔP values express an importance in terms of “Made-in” power and 
likely existence of arbitrage. 
A scatter plot of the same year as for the fresh/chilled (070959) category, 
i.e. 2009, is shown in Figure 11. Among the countries with a positive price 
gap between export and import products, Western European ones present 
the better balances. In particular, France, The Netherlands and Italy have 
quite significant BC values (i.e. “Made-in” power) with joint positive ΔP, 
allowing arbitrages. The existence of labelling frauds is officially 
demonstrated, in the case of Italy, by law enforcement agencies (as 
discussed further in this chapter). Although Germany does not have a 
remarkable ΔP, its centrality in global trade of dried/powdered (071239) 
wild mushroom and truffle trade is very significant. Oppositely, Hong Kong 
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has a lower BC but a more favourable price gap. Bulgaria, as for the 
fresh/chilled (070959) category, might take advantage from price 
differences but cannot exploit any “Made-in” power. To exploit the “Made-
in” power, a further transition through a high-BC country is possible. Hence, 
the same product originated with a low Pexp flows through several 
countries, where each of them tries to gain or from a favourable ΔP or from 
a powerful “Made-in” label (i.e. high BC). 
 
 
Figure 11 Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Price Differences scatter plot for the year 
2009.  
Notes: Major Countries referred to fresh/chilled wild mushroom and truffle (070959) 
category. Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Although the data available for wild mushroom and truffle global trade do 
not fully provide scientific proof, they still identify interesting trade 
anomalies. Nevertheless, reports on law enforcement agencies’ 
interventions establish a reliable connection between those anomalies and 
criminal behaviour. This is highlighted by several scholars (among others: 
Sitta & Floriani, 2008) that emphasise anomalous import and re-export of 
fungi and truffles. 
Lack of a reliable scientific demonstration is due to many reasons. 
For the sake of simplicity, we list the main ones: 
• data incompleteness 
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• combined data (i.e. many species are jointly reported both in 
national and international databases) 
• non-traceability of a relevant amount of production (i.e. 
mushroom collection is often made by non-professional pickers, 
sometimes for personal consumption). 
This study has three main tasks. 
The first is to emphasise anomalies in both international and local trade of 
wild mushrooms and truffles. 
The second is a direct consequence of the previous one. After a study of the 
main issues of global wild mushrooms and truffles trade, this study finds a 
reliable source to legally support the hypothesis of anomalous imports and 
re-exports. Moreover, we provide a method for the detection of likely 
labelling arbitrage. 
Finally, this study proposes a solution through the description of a case 
study. This study suggests the replication of the analysed case study and 
the adoption of GIs to guarantee food product origin and quality as well as 
consumer safety. 
From a first analysis of the results, few differences between networks of 
071239 (dried/powdered) and 070959 (fresh/chilled) can be easily 
noticed. Differences arise because of the different intrinsic characteristics 
of the traded products. 
In 071239, mushrooms and truffles are “dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken/in 
powder but not further prepared”. Therefore, it is easy and cheap to ship 
them far away from the place where they are collected. Products from the 
category 070959 are “fresh or chilled”, making it more difficult to transfer 
them worldwide in an easy, and especially cheap, way. Therefore, a deeper 
analysis of mushrooms and truffles preservation is required. 
As stated by Boa (2004), the time before wild edible fungi rot or shrivel up 
is short. Boletus edulis, for example, is usually readily dried, since it 
enhances the flavour. Other mushrooms, i.e. Chanterelles and truffles have 
a longer durability and this allows a longer time for marketing them as 
fresh. Preserving mushrooms is therefore feasible, but costly. Drying is the 
preferred method from subsistence users, for example in Malawi dried 
fungi are stored in predisposed leaves of a native tree (Boa, 2004). 
Therefore, cheap shipment, which requires more time, is possible only for 
dried/powdered mushrooms (especially in the case of Boletus edulis). Fresh 
wild mushrooms shipments are feasible only for short distances, i.e. those 
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within one/two days by rail or road transports. This is the main reason 
why, both in terms of network graphs and of OD and BC values, we notice 
important differences between major European and Asian countries. This 
depends whether we consider fresh/chilled (070959) dried/powdered 
(071239) wild mushrooms and truffles. 
Visually, networks of fresh/chilled (070959) wild mushrooms and truffles 
have less nodes and links than the one representing chilled/powdered 
(071239) ones. Exports have a shorter radius and local trade is preferred to 
long distances. This is mainly due to the quick deterioration of fresh 
mushrooms (Sitta, 2008). 
For 070959 (fresh/chilled) wild mushrooms and truffles, China has strong 
paths towards Japan and Korea, while connections with Europe are less 
significant than for dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms and 
truffles. This lead us to consider that methods for preservation are crucial 
to determine the kind of export one country want to set up. Moreover, the 
species of fungi more suitable for some markets help in emphasising this 
issue. 
Western European countries are generally more interested in importing 
Boletus edulis from China, while in Japan consumers like Tricholoma 
matsutake. This last species of mushroom has a different taste when it is 
preserved (Yun et al., 1997) making fresh products preferred, and 
consequently causing higher prices. It is not possible to benefit from price 
gap when shipping fresh Boletus edulis from China to Europe due to 
extremely high costs. Thus, no relevant import occurs for fresh wild 
mushrooms from far Asian countries to Western ones. Being a sort of 
“arbitrage” the only reason why Western countries import Boletus edulis 
from China, it is unproductive to import them when shipping costs are 
considerable. This also means that no particularly relevant qualities, 
fragrances or tastes are acknowledged in Asian wild mushrooms and 
truffles (more precisely in wild mushrooms and truffles usually traded in 
Western countries) that would justify high expenses both for consumers 
and retailers and or importers. 
For fresh/ chilled (070959) products China, Romania, Bulgaria and all the 
countries which mainly export towards major European countries, have 
low BC values and somewhat significant OD amounts. However, in 
comparison to 071239 (dried/powdered), Romanian and Bulgarian 
fresh/chilled (070959) wild mushrooms and truffles show moderately 
higher values. Whereas, China has significantly higher values of BC and OD 
when considering the dried/powdered (071239) category. These results 
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are consistent with our hypothesis: major European countries exploit the 
arbitrage deriving from imported products at lower prices than the same 
domestic goods. Source countries for fresh/chilled (070959) products are 
Romania, Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries. On the other 
hand, cheap dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms and truffles come 
from Asian countries (e.g. China, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc.). 
France, Italy and The Netherlands have high values of OD, when 
considering the fresh/chilled (070959) category, especially in comparison 
to Chinese exports that assume less relevance in terms of connections. Even 
greater importance is given to European trade (especially from France, The 
Netherlands and Italy) when considering BC. This reveals the huge role 
played by European countries in the international trade of wild mushrooms 
and truffles. Conversely, China plays the role more of a “pure” exporter than 
that of hub node. Top European countries (i.e. The Netherlands, France and 
Italy) have more than tripled, each year, the value of China’s BC. 
The hypothesis strengthened discussing 070959 (fresh/chilled) trade of 
Asian and Eastern European countries, is reinforced when considering 
Western European countries. As also stated by other authors (Sitta & 
Floriani, 2008), major European countries import mushrooms and truffles 
from those places where average prices are lower, trying to gain money 
from the different value of their domestic product in comparison to the 
imported ones.  
Differences among fresh/chilled (070959) and dried/powdered (071239) 
wild mushrooms and truffles are underlined also by the networks about the 
071239 (dried/powdered) category. 
In the latter category, Asian countries grow their importance, especially 
through higher exportation towards Europe, which becomes one of the 
preferred markets. This does not imply that previous paths do not exist 
anymore. On the contrary, it actually underlines the higher importance 
acquired by more distant partners (i.e. Far Eastern countries). The analysis 
of BC and OD values emphasise the role of South-Eastern Asia. Here China 
has the biggest OD values for all the years considered, significantly leading 
the global market. It is worthy to underline the importance raised, in the 
dried/powdered (071239) market, by three more Asian countries: Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Japan. This reflects the relevance of Asian exporters 
when considering food goods with preservation methods more suitable for 
long shipping.  
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European countries still maintain their importance, with some exception, 
but at the same time they also face the competition of countries not relevant 
in the fresh/chilled (070959) category. Their power is much less compared 
to the fresh/chilled (070959) market. However, France and Italy are top 
exporters also in this category, while Germany replaces The Netherlands 
among European top three players. 
The analysis of BC values is still in favour of European countries. However, 
in the dried/powdered (071239) category, Asian countries start playing the 
role of central nodes of international trade. The gap in terms of BC values 
between China and the European top three is narrow, while Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Japan play an interesting role, at least locally to South-East 
Asia. 
The United States are also a top player in this market, but their role is not 
as significant as European and Asian countries. They slightly gain 
importance when considering BC values. This seems to be quite expected 
as a direct consequence of the existing commercial relations between the 
USA and many Central and South American countries. Given this, our idea 
of focusing our attention much more to European countries and Asian ones 
appears not only more interesting for our purpose but also consistent with 
the actual network of these markets. Among other countries, Thailand is a 
good exporter. Starting from 2006, it plays a big role both in term of OD and 
BC. 
Since the sold products do not significantly differ in terms of main 
characteristics (species are the same for both 070959 and 071239), it is the 
preservation method that, being the only different factor, heavily influences 
trade. In particular, transportation costs linked with the kind of product are 
the main criteria for choosing whether is worthy to import them or not. 
Moreover, as shown by network graphs, there are some peculiarities in 
global connections which reinforce the idea of “opaque” trades. BC, OD and 
average price analysis efficiently delineate this concept. 
Pursuing the logic expressed at the beginning of this section, it is interesting 
to underline how small countries with limited land can play a relevant role 
in worldwide trade. Southeast Asian countries, like Singapore, grow several 
species of fungi and have a long tradition both considering eating (Jones, 
1990) and medical purpose (Chang, 1999). However, as written in the 
result section, volumes of import and exports and supposed production 
lead us to think about possible re-export phenomena. Hong Kong, as well 
as other Asian countries or special regions such as Singapore and Macau, 
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play an important role as a hub to re-export Chinese products (Feenstra, 
2004). It is not possible, as for other goods, to prove that wild mushrooms 
and truffles are re-exported, because trustworthy information on product 
origin are extremely difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, BC and OD results 
corroborate the hub role that some Asian countries or regions (among 
others: Hong Kong, Singapore and Macau.) play in global trade. Their 
business in wild mushrooms and truffles industry is extremely particular 
and might affect their country of origin tracing. For sure, their behaviour 
affects other countries’ trade. The analysis of Romanian and Bulgarian 
flows and BC and OD values demonstrate the decline of importance in the 
dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms and truffles trade, if compared 
to the fresh/chilled (070959) one, because of Asian competition. Effects of 
Asian competition on European exports come from other countries too, for 
instance Japan and Thailand. 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, France and 
USA can be defined as funnels. 
China is both a funnel and a “pure” exporter: export volumes are extremely 
high and connections are relevant in both kinds of goods, making China a 
significant exporter. Nevertheless, its BC and OD values indicate its 
importance as a central node as well. 
The analysis of average prices drive towards deeper conclusions. As in 
Table 8 and Table 10, China trades mainly cheap products, in comparison 
with France, Italy and other European countries, both for fresh/chilled 
(070959) and dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms and truffles. This 
means that China’s export deals more with huge quantities of low price 
goods rather than with quite moderate amounts of expensive mushrooms 
and truffles. Moderate but expansive export characterise, for some items, 
Italy and France: these two countries have a higher average price for 
exported goods than the other countries considered in this study. 
Moreover, they are involved in the export of extremely high valued goods. 
Costly products might refer to truffles: Italy and France, for example, are 
big producers and famous exporters of these expensive products. They are 
usually sold fresh, to preserve flavour and characteristics. Huge costs for 
small quantities perfectly fit with the commercial characteristics of 
exquisite truffles, too. 
The differences among China and Italy or France are particularly relevant 
for this research because they might explain the existing differences 
between the fresh/chilled (070959) category and dried/powdered 
(071239) ones. Considering the considerable shipping costs for fresh 
133 
 
products and the risks linked with perishability, it is unfruitful for Chinese 
companies to trade those kinds of goods. Things change when mushrooms 
and truffles are dried or in powder or in any other way that is less bulky 
and less prone to deterioration. Hence, higher quantities can be relatively 
easily exported towards Europe and many other countries worldwide. 
Therefore, values, and quantities, for China are significantly higher in the 
071239 (dried/powdered) category than in the 070959 (fresh/chilled). Our 
dataset does not allow us to state the last sentence with a strong theoretical 
and empirical structure, but not only we can assess it with reasonable 
certainty, we can also prove it through reports on law enforcement agency 
interventions. Following this logic, and considering non-top-players of the 
European market, we can state that fresh/chilled (070959) wild 
mushrooms and truffles are usually imported from Eastern countries, such 
as Bulgaria and Romania. Networks support this statement by showing that 
Romanian trade is mainly, if not only, focused on Europe. Furthermore, the 
values of average prices are similar to the most famous mushrooms usually 
picked in Romania and then sold in Western European countries (i.e.  
Boletus edulis has an average price per Kilo of around 10 US$, roughly the 
same showed in Table 8 for fresh/chilled - 070959). Similar logic can be 
applied to Bulgarian trade. 
Together with China, other Asian countries raise importance in global trade 
when dealing with the 071239 (dried/powdered) category. China, 
Singapore and Hong Kong have similar average costs, with the first two 
closer to each other than the third one. Nevertheless, Hong Kong has a 
remarkable BC value. This is possible because Hong Kong plays a significant 
role in its local area as a hub to import (maybe from the big partner, i.e. 
China) and then to export the same goods. This could justify also the slightly 
higher prices. All these hypotheses are also supported by many other 
scholars (among others: Sitta & Floriani, 2008), even though nobody has 
provided a formal explanation to prove the phenomenon. 
Differences in price engender arbitrage. Some companies in Western 
countries exploit the price gap instead of adding a real value to products. 
In the next section, this study analyses in detail the Italian trade, in order to 
offer a practical and detailed case study supporting our theory. Moreover, 
studying arbitrage, the research discusses how weaknesses in the industry 
make this unfair practice possible. This also contributes to the debate on 
trustworthiness, quality and local development of rural areas. 
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3.6 Geographical Indications and “Made-in” 
Power: Italy and the Fungo di Borgotaro IGP Case 
Study 
Following the mixed-method approach102 we move to the second part of 
our research. We will now look specifically to GIs and the “Made-in” power, 
connecting the outcome of the quantitative analysis of the first part with 
the specific characteristic of the Italian market (the one defined as a global 
leader in the first part) and with the case study of the Fungo di Borgotaro. 
After the identification of the competitive advantage for quality food 
oriented firms, we focus our attention on the Italian case study. This is 
useful to understand the environment and the background where the 
analysed example (i.e. the Fungo di Borgotaro PGI) operates. Moreover, as 
stated in the introductory section of this chapter, in Italy there are 
evidences of the increasing need for quality labels. 
Barney (1991) and other scholars (Peng, 2001; Lockett et al., 2009; and 
Kozlenkova et al., 2014) try to identify the resources that can give firms a 
competitive advantage. In order to be “competitive”, resources must be 
rare. Defining “rare” resources is not an easy task, however Barney (1991) 
identifies uniqueness as that which is able to generate at least a competitive 
advantage if not a sustained competitive advantage.  Until the number of 
firms that possess a variable resource is lower than the one creating perfect 
competition, it is possible to establish a competitive advantage. Niche 
products, both in terms of limited production (either for geographical or 
intrinsic reasons) or related to quality excellence, are able to provide such 
competitive advantage. A more complete definition of valuable and rare 
resources made by the author deals with imperfect imitation. One of the 
three reasons that create an imperfectly imitable resource is linked with 
“unique historical conditions”. The definition of GI reports some of these 
concepts. It stresses the quality of a product and its connections with origin 
(i.e. specific link with a territory), reputation and unique characteristics103. 
Therefore, products awarded with the GI label have unique, imperfectly 
imitable characteristics. Hence, firms producing or trading a GI product 
                                                             
102 See Davis et al. (2011), Molina-Azonir (2012), Bam (1992), Creswell & Clark 
(2007), Harrison & Reilly (2011), among others. 
103  Article 22 of TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). 
Source: WTO - World Trade Organization. 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04b_e.htm. 
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possess a valuable resource, which gives them a competitive advantage. 
Following a similar reasoning, some authors individuate a competitive 
advantage in: quality labels (Fotopoulos & Krystallis, 2003), local 
resources, combination of tangible and intangible resources, renewed 
territories, mix of assets of the territory and competencies (Presenza et al., 
2010). The factors creating a competitive advantage individuated by 
Presenza et al. (2010) are the same that contribute to creating the “Made-
in” power. Therefore, we can state that both GIs and “Made-in” (i.e. the 
“Made-in” labels linked with certain products/countries which guarantee a 
certain power) give a competitive advantage to the firms. Several scholars 
(among others: Loureiro & McCluskey, 2000; Padilla et al., 2007; Loureiro 
& Umberger, 2003) find that consumers are willing to pay higher prices for 
GIs and country of origin labels. 
GIs and certain “Made-in” labels represent a key factor for the firms owing 
them. Nevertheless, we noticed that their importance as valuable resources 
providing a competitive advantage (or even sustained competitive 
advantage) is not well recognised. In this second part of our study we 
therefore want to stress this aspect to heighten entrepreneur, scholarly and 
political consciousness and to propose their replication in similar markets. 
 
3.6.1 Focus: Italy 
As shown by the previous results, Italy is one of the major European 
players. It has numerous connections and it is significant in terms of node 
importance. In addition to the previous results, this section analyses data 
on import, export and annual domestic production. This helps in enriching 
the mixed-method approach we have been using until now. However, in 
this part the discussion is more focused on reaching the conclusion and 
highlighting the results of the quantitative analysis in the first part of this 
chapter. 
We use official data from UN Comtrade, Coeweb-Istat and “Annuario dei dati 
ambientali – ISPRA”104 . Basic computations suggest whether production 
itself can cover export amount in terms of net weight expressed in kilos. 
Unfortunately, we cannot use consolidated production of mushrooms and 
truffles for all the years. These kinds of data are available only from 2004 
                                                             
104 Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale: is an Italian public 
authority for environmental research under the supervision of the Minister of the 
Environment and Protection of Land and Sea. 
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to 2007, while for 2003 and 2009 we only have wild mushroom production. 
Therefore, in this analysis we also consider years 2004, 2005 and 2007.  
Data for both wild mushroom and truffle production data in Italy are not 
available for 2012. 
Before introducing the additional dataset, a synthesis of theoretical 
knowledge of historic Italian import of the genus Boletus is useful for 
further discussion. Italy has always extensively imported mushrooms and 
truffles from many countries. In particular, Boletus edulis and related 
species have been imported from many years. According to Boa (2004), 
several countries export fungi (or truffles) to Italy. Among others, he 
indicates:  
• Albania: export is not on regular basis, but it mainly concerns 
Boletus edulis; 
• Belarus: small quantities of wild edible mushrooms; 
• Bulgaria: many exportations, mainly Boletus edulis; 
• Moldova: minor exports of Boletus edulis; 
• Romania: together with Bulgaria, it is the major exporter of fresh 
Boletus edulis on a regular basis; 
• Slovenia: bland export of Boletus edulis; 
• France; its exports towards Italy are relevant mainly in the case of 
truffles (Ainsworth, 1976); 
• Mozambique; its significant productions might reach Italy via 
South Africa; 
• Former Yugoslavian countries were once relevant exporters. 
Nowadays (from 2004-2005) China has surpassed all the 
combined exports from former Yugoslavian countries: Macedonia 
(The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro (exports toward 
Italy began in 1970s and significantly increased in 1990s) (Sitta & 
Floriani, 2008); 
• China; the main exporter of mushrooms and truffles towards Italy. 
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Table 14 Italian export, import and production of wild mushrooms and truffles: 
fresh/chilled and dried/powdered (071239 and 070959). 
Italy Total (071239+070959) 
Period Trade Flow 
Net Weight 
(kg) - trade 
Production – 
Export (Kg) 
(Production + 
Import) - Export 
(Kg) 
2003 
Export 2,178,618 
-     1,738,618 4,785,919 
Import 6,524,537 
Production 
(mushrooms 
only) 
440,000 
Production 
+Import 
6,964,537 
2004 
Export 2,133,077 
-        466,577 8,429,373 
Import 8,895,950 
Production 
(mushrooms + 
truffles) 
1,666,500 
Production 
+Import 
10,562,450 
2005 
Export 2,587,653 
1,012,847 9,293,941 
Import 8,281,094 
Production 
(mushrooms + 
truffles) 
3,600,500 
Production 
+Import 
11,881,594 
2006 
Export 2,425,164 
961,936 9,021,011 
Import 8,059,075 
Production 
(mushrooms + 
truffles) 
3,387,100 
Production 
+Import 
11,446,175 
2007 
Export 2,492,918 
-        910,618 7,220,025 
Import 8,130,643 
Production 
(mushrooms + 
truffles) 
1,582,300 
Production 
+Import 
9,712,943 
2009 
Export 2,719,270 
-     1,339,270 6,609,395 
Import 7,948,665 
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Production 
(mushrooms 
only) 
1,380,000 
Production 
+Import 
9,328,665 
2012 
Export 5,085,532 
- 5,719,609105 
Import 10,805,141 
Production n.a. 
Production 
+Import 
- 
Notes: Annual values and simple computations. Quantities expressed in Kilograms.  Source: 
our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset, “Annuario dei dati ambientali” - ISPRA and 
Coeweb - Istat data (“Prodotti forestali non legnosi”)106. 
 
 
Figure 12 Italian Market: export, import and production of wild mushrooms and 
truffles: fresh/chilled and dried/powdered (071239 and 070959). 
Notes: Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset, “Annuario dei dati 
ambientali” - ISPRA and Coeweb - Istat data (“Prodotti forestali non legnosi”)107. (Data 
about import and export have identical value both considering those of UN Comtrade 
and ISTAT). 
                                                             
105 Due to lack of production information, we only compute Import-Export. 
106 Data about import and export have identical value both considering those of UN 
Comtrade and ISTAT. 
107 Data about import and export have identical value both considering those of UN 
Comtrade and ISTAT 
139 
 
Table 15 Italian Production of wild mushrooms and truffles: fresh/chilled and 
dried/powdered (071239 and 070959) from 2003 to 2009.  
Year 
Mushrooms 
(Kg) 
Truffles (Kg) 
Mushrooms + 
Truffles (Kg) 
2003 440,000 n/a - 
2004 1,600,000 66,500 1,666,500 
2005 3,500,000 100,500 3,600,500 
2006 3,300,000 87,100 3,387,100 
2007 1,500,000 82,300 1,582,300 
2009 1,380,000 n/a - 
σ2 (2004/2007) 1.14917 x 1012 196.98 x 106 1.17366 x 1012 
Notes: Source: our elaboration from “Annuario dei dati ambientali” – ISPRA 
(http://annuario.isprambiente.it/ada/versioni) and ISTAT. 
Mushroom picking has been facing a decrease that started in the 70s, when 
it was up to 7,700,000 kilos. This is due to social factors: urbanisation and 
loss of local traditions (ISPRA, 2009). According to some authors (among 
others: Boa, 2004), historically the picking of fungi was important for the 
sustenance of many people in northern Italy. Nowadays, the collection is 
consistently less relevant for economic purposes (mainly confined to a few 
pickers who sell their products), even if there is still a general interest for 
personal consumption. 
As expected from the study of yearly reports, in 2003 there was a paucity 
of mushroom production, while in 2005 and 2006 an exceptional picking 
was registered. In 2004, 2007 and 2009 the yearly production was 
approximately 1,500 tons. Truffle production charted an identical inverted-
U shape behaviour: after an increase in 2005, a slight period of decline 
begins in 2006. Professional associations say that drought is the cause of 
lower production. The amount of imports and exports were somewhat 
constant during the period between 2003 and 2009. 
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Figure 13 Italian Production Vs Export of wild mushrooms and truffles: fresh/chilled 
and dried/powdered (071239 and 070959) from 2003 to 2009. 
Notes: Source: our elaboration from UN Comtrade dataset, “Annuario dei dati 
ambientali” - ISPRA and Coeweb - Istat data (“Prodotti forestali non legnosi”)108. 
                                                             
108 Data on import and export have identical value both considering those of UN 
Comtrade and ISTAT. 
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Truffles represent, as shown by the dataset, less than 5% of Italian annual 
wild mushrooms and truffles production. Therefore, the analysis can 
consider both years with mushroom and truffle records and, without any 
loss in significance, those with only mushroom data. Four out of the six 
analysed years manifest a domestic production that is insufficient to fulfil 
export demand. Moreover, for 2003 and 2009, the difference is so 
significant that even an assumed truffle production would not be sufficient 
to eliminate this gap.  
Only for the two years of exceptional wild mushrooms and truffle 
production does the domestic volume exceeds export demand. 
Table 14 and Table 15 exhibit anomalies in production and exportation 
volumes. Table 14 also presents the differences between the sum of 
production and import and export values. Obviously, all the results are 
positive by a significant amount. 
We can try to assume that all exports come from domestic production. This 
would assure that all the mushrooms and truffles (i.e. the species 
considered in 070959 and 071239) sold by Italy are 100% Italian. It might 
be true for 2005 and 2006. However, it is not feasible for 2003, 2004, 2007 
and 2009. We do not consider domestic consumption of Italian mushrooms 
and truffles, since it is not relevant for our logic. Adding this complexity 
might invalidate the results of 2005 and 2006 (in case domestic 
consumption of Italian products exceeds the positive difference), although 
this does not change the outcome for the other years. Despite adding 
complexity, nevertheless, considering domestic consumption does not 
provide any further help. Thus, the main questions are: where do those 
products come from? Is there a way to exploit a type of arbitrage? 
We start with a clarification of the data, which might be considered poorly 
representative, as well as data concerning picking and commerce of 
mushrooms (especially wild mushrooms) and truffles. This represents the 
main limitation for any research concerning non-timber forest products. 
Even if when due caution is necessary in using this kind of data, we cannot 
ascribe the disparities to collection errors. However, our data come from 
the most reliable Institute in Italy (i.e. ISTAT). Hence, there are evidences 
of some anomalies in mushroom and truffle trade. Nevertheless, those 
evidences do not validate the existence of a type of arbitrage or any other 
fraudulence. We can only infer that, at least, the amount of export demand 
that is unfulfilled by domestic production comes from import. But this per 
se does not represent an offence. It is worthy to analyse further. 
142 
 
The only reliable data able to connect those evidences to specific frauds 
come from law enforcement agencies. Seizures of wild mushrooms and 
truffles in Italy chiefly involve product origins violations. What does 
“origin” mean? European Commission (2016) defines “origin” in the 
Customs Code (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92), specifically Articles 
22, 23 and 24, and in the Code's implementing provisions (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93). There are two basic concepts to determine 
the origin of goods: the “wholly obtained” products and the “last substantial 
transformation” concepts. The former applies if the production takes place 
in only one country. This generally is true for products obtained in their 
natural state. The “last substantial transformation” occurs when two or 
more countries are involved in the production process. It is essential to 
determine which of them confers the origin to the final product. Hence, the 
“last substantial transformation” concept is applied. It is possible to express 
this concept in three ways. First, if we consider the rule that requires a 
change in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
nomenclature109. The second way regards whether a list of manufacturing 
or processing operations confers to the goods the origin of the country 
where these operations happened. The third is based on the value-added 
rule, which considers the amount of ex-work price added in a specific 
country. If a product meets one of the explained requirements, it is possible 
to assign a country of origin. By contrast, if a country is not recognised as 
place of origin, but the product presents a label indicating that country, 
fraud can be considered. 
Law enforce agencies have special departments that try to prevent and 
detect frauds. Italian authorities have uncovered several frauds over years. 
Among others, seizures of wild mushrooms and truffles during the last 
seven years contribute the additional information needed to prove 
anomalies to this research. Specifically, they state the existence of 
noteworthy fraudulent misuse of Country of Origin (CoO) labels. Hence, 
they reveal the presence of a link between insufficient domestic production 
and the utilization of imports, in order to satisfy both export and domestic 
demand. Moreover, the exploiting of arbitrage is emphasised. Some 
companies capitalise on the price differences between imported goods and 
                                                             
109  The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System is governed by 
"The International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System", which was adopted in June 1983 and entered into force January 
1988. International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System (with annex), as amended by the Protocol of Amendment of 24 June 
1986. Concluded at Brussels on 14 June 1983. 168 UNTS 1988. 
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“new” products exported with the “Made-in-Italy” logo. Sometimes the 
country of origin is indicated using the “Made-in” mark, even if the 
“Product-of” is also used. They have the same meaning, although the latter 
one is probably more frequently used for food products in American 
markets. However, from now on, we will use the term “Made-in” to define 
the mark for country of origin of a product. 
There are several reports on mushroom and truffle seizures. We consider 
only the most recent and significant ones. They were conducted by the 
Corpo Forestale dello Stato110 and the Guardia di Finanza111. The latter also 
set the Sistema Informativo Anti-Contraffazione (S.I.A.C.) which provides 
support and technical assistance, both to consumers and to other law 
enforcement agencies, by disseminating information regarding 
counterfeiting. 
The main seizures from 2009 to 2015 are (Corpo Forestale dello Stato, 2012 
and 2015): 
• 2010, Ascoli Piceno; 100 Kg of Tuber from Romania; 
• 2011, Operation “Por-Cina”; more than 6,000 packages and more 
than 3 tons of dried Boletus edulis from China; 
• 2012, Potenza; dried Boletus edulis from Serbia and Romania with 
counterfeit “Made in Italy” labels; 
• 2012, Salerno; dried Boletus edulis from China and Eastern Europe 
with counterfeit “Made in Italy” labels; 
• 2012, Ravenna, Bologna, Potenza and Matera; more than 2,000 
packages of Boletus edulis, with “Made in Italy” counterfeit labels, 
from Romania and Macedonia; 
• 2014, Avellino; 30Kg of wild mushrooms and truffles; 
• 2015; 41,000€ worth of counterfeiting truffles. 
Among others, two big operations revealed, in recent years, the 
counterfeiting of “Made in Italy” wild mushrooms and truffles: “Por-Cina” 
                                                             
110  The State Forestry Corps (Corpo Forestale dello Stato) was a national police 
agency in Italy. From 01/01/2017 the corps become part of Carabinieri. It is 
responsible for protecting: natural resources, the environment, countryside and 
ecosystems. It is also involved in criminale investigations and typical police 
operations. 
111  Guardia di Finanza is an Italian law enforcement agency. Although it is a 
militarised police force, it operates under the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze). In addition to the traditional police 
operations, Guardia di Finanza is focused on financial crime and smuggling. 
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(in 2011) and “Por-Cina 2” (in 2013). The most relevant frauds concern 
attaching “made in Italy” label to products originating in other countries. 
The majority of them come from China and Eastern European countries. 
Relevant issues are preservation, expiry date (more than 12 months: the 
maximum period according to Italian law) and quality of ingredients (Corpo 
Forestale dello Stato, 2012). 
Law enforce agencies and the Italian Ministry of Economic Development 
(Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico) use the expression Italian Sounding to 
describe this increasing and detrimental phenomenon (Ministero dello 
Sviluppo Economico, 2012). Frauds are set up by using misleading labels 
through words, motifs, acronyms, colours, slogans recalling the quality and 
the benefits of Italian products (Corpo Forestale dello Stato, 2012). Although 
a phenomenon which extensively affects Italian agroindustry, it has 
particular relevance for the Italian trade of Boletus edulis, since the majority 
of the volume has a foreign origin (Corpo Forestale dello Stato, 2011). 
 The “new” product has no intrinsic differences with the original imported 
one. The firm that previously imported it does not further process it. The 
company simply labels the product adding the “Made-in-Italy” merchandise 
mark. Hence, they exploit the benefit purely coming from what we call 
“Made-in” Power. Neither value nor assurance about quality is added to the 
product. Therefore, the gap between import and export price entirely 
comes from the fraudulent change on country of origin. The quality usually 
acknowledged to the Italian agribusiness sector is the only factor that 
augments the price of exported product. That enhancement corresponds to 
the value of “Made-in-Italy” merchandise mark. It represents a good proxy 
of “Made-In” Power of Italy. 
According to a survey conducted by Nielsen (2016), brand origin is 
important to 75% of global customers. The survey also states that 
perceived specialisation of certain countries, with regards to specific 
products, is one of the factors enhancing the importance of country origin.  
The designation of country of origin, or at least the alleged one, represents 
both the main issue to enhance product value and the most counterfeited 
element. Therefore, it is, at the same time, an instrument useful to 
guarantee quality and a valuable tool that needs protection itself. 
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3.6.1.1 The Fungo di Borgotaro IGP Case Study 
One of the main research questions of this study explores whether GIs 
guarantee quality and contribute to local development. In consideration of 
the depicted global trade of wild mushrooms and truffles and the problems 
arising in terms of origin and quality assured to consumers, the Fungo di 
Borgotaro case represents a successful model for other local excellences. 
It could be seen as a potential natural experiment, the only one concerning 
un-cultivable agricultural products in all of Europe. However, the lack of 
data right before and right after the introduction of the GI make the Fungo 
di Borgotaro only a potential natural experiment, or a valuable example to 
be studied. 
The Fungo di Borgotaro is a trademark of four types of Boletus edulis, picked 
or processed in a specific area in Parma and Massa Carrara provinces. 
In 1957 the first consortium, “Consorzio Comunalie Parmensi”, was 
constituted with the aim of gathering all of the “comunalie” of that area. 
Seven years later, a natural reserve for the safeguard and development of 
mushroom production was established in the “Comunalia di Boschetto”. 
Nevertheless, local trade of Boletus could be dated back to the 17th century 
and the name Fungo di Borgotaro has been used since 1934 to label local 
mushrooms (Pettenella, 2007). 
The two cornerstones in the process of valorisation and protection of the 
whole area were the initiatives of 1995 and 1996, the latter was the hoped 
consequence of the former 
In 1995, the “Consorzio di tutela” was instituted with the aim of 
guaranteeing, enhancing and promoting the main product through specific 
product regulations. The official recognition as Protected Geographical 
Indication (PGI) from the European Commission (EC), the first and only one 
about wild edible products, was finally obtained in 1996112. In 2016 the 
Fungo di Borgotaro was also the first one to receive a quality certification 
from a certification and inspection company (CSQA)113. 
                                                             
112  Source: European Commission, Agriculture and Rural Development, DOOR. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/registeredName.html?denominatio
nId=320 
113  Source: Qualivita Foundation. http://www.qualivita.it/news/il-fungo-di-
borgotaro-igp-diventa-lunico-certificato-in-europa/ 
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The Consortium has the tasks to define rules and control their 
implementation and also to manage, promote and support the activities 
aimed to improve local mushrooms trade. Moreover, Consortium is in 
charge of selling a special pass that allows tourists to pick, under some 
rigorous rules, wild mushrooms in the reserved area. Niche tourism 
represents a relevant income in the Borgotaro area. 
PGI is awarded to agricultural products and foodstuffs closely linked to that 
specific geographical area. Hence, at least one of the stages of production, 
processing or preparation must take place there. Goods under the Fungo di 
Borgotaro label must therefore be picked or at least processed in the 
indicated circumscribed area. 
As documented by Pettenella (2007), fresh mushrooms mainly come from 
the area and sometimes are marked with the EC label. Much of processed 
(i.e. dried, in oil or frozen) mushrooms comes from outside. This is also the 
prevalent behaviour in the majority of Italian territory, as discussed in the 
previous section. However, the excellence of the Fungo di Borgotaro area is 
represented by the expertise, the ability and the inclination towards quality 
goods of the local firms. These factors represent, for consumers, a good 
reason for buying labelled goods. Those issues make the Fungo di Borgotaro 
widely recognised and trusted by consumers.  
There are few firms operating in the mushroom business. A few of them are 
extremely small: two of them buy and trade only local harvested 
mushrooms. There are also two bigger companies, which employ from 8 to 
20 workers and, mainly, import mushrooms. Then, they exploit their well-
recognised expertise to process and then trade the imported porcini 
(Pettenella, 2007). 
Local production is much lower than the demand (see Table 16 for 
production and variations over recent years). Pettenella (2007) states that 
it represents only 5% of the traded mushrooms. The largest amount comes 
from other areas in Italy or is imported from Eastern Europe and China.  
While local mushroom price is around 15 or 25 €/Kg, from Table 8 and 
Table 10 we know that average prices go from a minimum of 3.21 US $/Kg 
to 15.90 US $/Kg. Therefore, prices of imported wild mushrooms are, on 
average, consistently less than the value of Boletus edulis treated and then 
sold by a firm in Borgotaro.  
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Table 16 Fungo di Borgotaro production (in Kilograms). Years: 2005, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012 and 2013.  
Fungo di Borgotaro 
Year (production in Kg) 
2005 21,448 
2009 16,366.45 
2010 7,198.79 
2011 4,473 
2012 2,442 
2013 4,470 
Variations and % of Variations 
Var. 2010/2009 -9,167.66 Kg 
% Var. -56.01% 
Var. 2011/2010 -2,725.70 Kg 
% Var. 37.86% 
Var. 2012/2011 -2,031 Kg 
% Var. -45.41% 
Var. 2013/2012 2,028 Kg 
% Var. 83.05% 
Notes: Source: “Rapporto sulle Produzioni Dop E Igp in Emilia Romagna. 2009, 2010, 2012. In: 
Ittica, Attivita’ Faunistico-Venatorie. Servizio Percorsi Di Qualità, Relazioni Di Mercato e 
Integrazioni Di Filiera Regione Emilia Romagna”; www.qualigeo.eu. 
Brand awareness of the Fungo di Borgotaro, together with its 
acknowledged traditions, represents the rationale of higher prices. The 
underlying logic is the same as for imported Boletus edulis sold at higher 
prices when labelled with the “Made in Italy” logo. However, there is a 
substantial difference: while in the case of the Fungo di Borgotaro there is 
the EC label guaranteeing quality and standards, counterfeiting “Made in 
Italy” labels do not provide any assurance. Furthermore, in many seizures, 
products were found in dreadful state of preservation. These relevant 
differences are detrimental to consumer health and safety. 
The Italian mushroom industry demonstrates its persistent incapability to 
fulfil the demand with domestic production by requiring massive import. 
At the same time, the acknowledged Italian competencies and traditions in 
food quality make it possible to set higher prices, hence providing an 
arbitrage based on different consumer behaviour. Being impossible to 
either to stop importation nor to fulfil demand in other ways (i.e. domestic 
production), it is evident, based on the Fungo di Borgotaro case study, how 
the use of GIs represents a required solution to the phenomenon. 
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GIs provide assurances to consumers regarding the quality and safety of 
products. The higher price consumers pay for GI products are therefore 
justified by this assurance. 
EC labels for geographical excellence have beneficial effects for the involved 
territory, too. The case of the Fungo di Borgotaro demonstrates that the PGI 
label has a positive impact on the whole area. Regni (2005) identifies that 
desirable consequences in the Borgotaro area come from: 
• Sales of tourist pass 
• Trade of Boletus edulis 
• Satellite activities 
• Local area promotion 
• Investments 
• Other forest products sales 
Therefore, we can easily notice a strong connection of the previous aspects 
(linked with the presence of a PGI label) with the important advantages 
coming from the increasing of commercialisation and the augmentation in 
touristic flows. This is just a simple suggestion which follows other studies 
on this topic. Much debate might arise from what we described above. 
However, we believe that the Fungo di Borgotaro represents a winning 
example that should be followed by other areas in Italy. This is true not only 
for Boletus edulis, but for many other wild mushrooms and truffles, whose 
production and commerce is relevant in some Italian regions (Marone, 
2011). 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
This research leverages different methods to depict global trade and 
anomalies of wild mushroom and truffle industry. 
Three different groups of countries can be identified in global trade: Asian 
Countries, Western countries and Eastern European countries. Within 
Asian countries, China represents a distinctive case. 
We identify some Asian countries (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan) and 
Western countries (i.e. Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, France and USA) 
as funnels. They import considerable quantities of fresh/chilled products 
(070959), in case of nearby trade, or dried/powdered (071239), if faraway, 
wild mushrooms and truffles and re-export them. Opacity of origin and 
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quality concerning many of those products is crucial for the existence of 
some anomalies. 
Differences in average prices between countries make it possible for firms 
from certain countries (mainly Western ones) to profit from a kind of 
arbitrage. They exploit the existing ambiguities of product origin in the 
market. 
The average prices analysis reveals how it is possible to gain advantage for 
operators in some specific countries (e.g. major European ones) by buying 
products from the places with lower APs and then sell them again (i.e. re-
export) exploiting the price gap. 
They profit from what we call “Made-in” power. It is not the intrinsic quality 
of a product to generate the price gap and to augment its value. The 
acknowledged competencies in the food industry recognised by the re-
exporting country are the basis of the kind of arbitrage in wild mushroom 
and truffle industry. 
Frauds are possible because origin is uncertain and exporters do not clearly 
specify the country in which the good has been actually produced or 
treated. 
Quality assurance and certification of origin are the two most relevant 
issues that should be guaranteed for the health of consumers and 
trustworthiness of the market. The Fungo di Borgotaro represents a 
significant example of how the importance of extending GI labels to those 
areas in which their quality and know-how is famous worldwide. Local 
areas will also benefit from the introduction of GI labels, both socially and 
economically. We hope that this study contributes to the improved 
understanding of worldwide trade anomalies and possible solutions. 
Many topics that we have addressed in this study open to further analysis 
and debates. We firmly believe that “Made-in” power is a key concept to 
understand and explore many of the features involved. 
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Appendix A: Time 
In this appendix, we report a descriptive analysis of time variables used in 
the empirical analyses of chapter 2. Private Label Promotion: a new 
defensive and supporting strategy? 
We first list all the periods for which we have data. Although we do not 
consider period as explanatory variable in our model, since raw data are 
expressed in this way, a description seemed necessary. A list matches each 
period (as reported in raw data) with the corresponding months and year 
to which it refers. 
Even if the dataset we received only indicates quarters, we built two other 
variables for studying seasonal strategies and yearly trends. As mentioned 
in the chapter, the two variables are: year and season. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that seasons start at the end of 
(respectively) March, June, September and December. 
 
Periods (quarters): 
Period 1: January- March 2013 
Period 2: April – June 2013 
Period 3: July – September 2013 
Period 4: October - December 2013 
Period 5: January- March 2014 
Period 6: April – June 2014 
Period 7: July – September 2014 
Period 8: October - December 2014 
Period 9: January- March 2015 
Period 10: April – June 2015 
Period 11: July – September 2015 
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Years: 
Year 1: 2013 
Year 2: 2014 
Year 3: 2015 
Seasons: 
Season 1: “Winter” – January-March of years 2013, 2014 and 2015 
Season 2: “Spring” – April-June of years 2013, 2014 and 2015 
Season 3: “Summer” – July-September of years 2013, 2014 and 2015 
Season 4: “Autumn” – October-December of years 2013 and 2014 
 
Table 17 Seasons shows the frequency and the percentage of each season. 
 
Table 17 Seasons 
Season Freq. Percent Cumulative 
Season 1: “Winter” 363 27.27 27.27 
Season 2: “Spring” 363 27.27 54.55 
Season 3: “Summer” 363 27.27 81.82 
Season 4: “Autumn” 242 18.18 100.00 
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Appendix B: Categories 
In this appendix, we report a descriptive analysis of the variable category, 
which is used in the empirical analyses of chapter 2. Private Label 
Promotion: a new defensive and supporting strategy? 
We built 15 categories, accordingly to our specific dataset and considering 
the categories in which products are divided by Nielsen’s major reports. 
We first report the complete list of all the categories. In parentheses we 
specify the original Italian names. 
Categories: 
1. Other Ingredients (Altri ingredient) 
2. Coffee and Infusions (Caffe' e Infusi) 
3. Chocolate (Cioccolato) 
4. Seasonings, Marinated Vegetables and Pickles (Condimenti, Sottoli 
e Sottaceti) 
5. Spread Creams (Creme Spalmabili) 
6. Cakes and Snacks (Dolci e Snack) 
7. Basic Ingredients (Ingredienti Base) 
8. Legumes and Side Dishes (Legumi e Contorni)  
9. Oils and Vinegars (Olii ed Aceti) 
10. Bread and Similar (i.e. salted baked products) (Pane e Simili)  
11. Purees and Sauces (Passate e Salse) 
12. Pasta and Rice (Pasta e Riso) 
13. Fish (Pesce) 
14. Ready meals (Preparati) 
15. Breakfast Products, Patisserie (Prima Colazione e Pasticceria) 
Then, Table 18 shows the number of products per category, their frequency 
and, in the notes, the average number of products per category as well as 
the minimum and the maximum. 
A bar graph showing the number of products in promo and not in promo 
for each category is reported in Figure 14. Finally, we list the products for 
each relevant category analysed in the discussion. 
 
 
 
153 
 
Table 18 Categories and Number of Products 
Category Name 
Number 
of 
products 
Freq. Percent Cum. 
Other Ingredients 
(Altri ingredienti) 
6 
66 4.96 4.96 
Coffee and Infusions 
(Caffe' e Infusi) 
9 
99 7.44 12.40 
Chocolate 
(Cioccolato) 
5 
55 4.13 16.53 
Seasonings, Marinated Vegetables and Pickles 
(Condimenti, Sottoli e Sottaceti) 
7 
77 5.79 22.31 
Spread Creams 
(Creme Spalmabili) 
9 
99 7.44 29.75 
Cakes and Snacks 
(Dolci e Snack) 
8 
88 6.61 36.36 
Basic Ingredients 
(Ingredienti Base) 
8 
88 6.61 42.98 
Legume and Side Dishes 
(Legumi e Contorni) 
6 
66 4.96 47.93 
Oils and Vinegars 
(Olii ed Aceti) 
6 
66 4.96 52.89 
Bread and Similar (i.e. salted baked products) 
(Pane e Simili) 
11 
121 9.09 61.98 
Purees and Sauces 
(Passate e Salse) 
8 
88 6.61 68.60 
Pasta and Rice 
(Pasta e Riso) 
11 
121 9.09 77.69 
Fish 
(Pesce) 
9 
99 7.44 85.12 
Ready meals 
(Preparati) 
7 
77 5.79 90.91 
Breakfast Products and Patisserie 
(Prima Colazione e Pasticceria) 
11 
121 9.09 100.00 
Notes: Average products per category: 8.1. Minimum: 5. Maximum: 11. 
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Figure 14 Number of Products in Promo/not in Promo for each Category. 
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Products from the relevant categories examined in the discussion: 
Pasta e Riso: 
• Fusilli Integr.BIO G.500 
• Fusilloni Napoletani G.500 PREMIUM 
• Pasta All'uovo 
• Pasta All'uovo PREMIUM 
• Pasta Di Semola BIO 
• Pasta Di Semola PREMIUM 
• Pasta Secca Ripiena 
• Riso Normale 
• Riso Normale BIO 
• Riso Parboiled 
• Spec.Fusilli Bucati G500 
Prima Colazione e Pasticceria: 
• Biscotti Classici 
• Biscotti Farciti/Ricoperti 
• Biscotti Farciti/Ricoperti PREMIUM 
• Cereali Per Prima Colazione 
• Colazioni Energetiche 
• Fette Biscottate 
• Fette Biscottate BIO 
• Miele e Affini 
• Miele e Affini PREMIUM 
• Miele e Affini BIO 
• Pasticceria Industriale 
Condimenti, Sottoli e Sottaceti 
• Condimenti Pronti 
• Condimenti Pronti PREMIUM 
• Maionese 
• Ortaggi Sott'aceto 
• Ortaggi Sott'aceto PREMIUM 
• Ortaggi Sott'olio 
• Ortaggi Sott'olio PREMIUM 
 
Dolci e Snack 
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• Caramelle / Pastigliaggi 
• Frutta Sciroppata 
• Frutta Secca/Snack/Piccoli F. 
• Merendine 
• Olive 
• Olive PREMIUM 
• Patatine 
• Salatini 
Cioccolato 
• Cacao 
• Cacao BIO 
• Tavolette Cioccolato 
• Tavolette Cioccolato BIO 
• Wafers 
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Appendix C: The Pasta 
Industry 
Since a relevant part of the discussion on chapter 2. Private Label 
Promotion: a new defensive and supporting strategy? is about pasta and 
rice, in this appendix we propose a brief review of the evolution of the pasta 
industry in Italy. This helps in understanding the concentration of the 
industry and therefore lends idea of the main manufacturers and the most 
relevant NB producers. 
As thoroughly explained by Magnatti (2007), the pasta sector in the 70s was 
characterized by small local manufacturers. Then, competition and the 
appearance of retail chains acutely changed the market. Lack of 
competitiveness and limited markets reduced the number of pasta factories 
from almost 240 in 1981 to 149 in 1997. Between 1983 and 1998 there 
were many takeovers that concentrated the market, introducing or creating 
some multinationals in the Italian market (Benfratello, 2002). Table 19 
shows the biggest 24 acquisitions in the Italian pasta industry, from the 80s 
until the end of the last century. 
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Table 19 Pasta industry acquisitions 1983-1998.  
.  
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Notes of Benfratello (2012): in bold the 9 acquisitions for which the acquired firm is included 
in the sample. In the table, he considers to be Northern regions Valle D’Aosta, Piemonte, 
Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia; Central regions 
Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Marche Umbria, Abruzzo, Molise and Lazio; Southern regions 
Puglia, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna. Gazzola is a former owner of a firm 
in the pasta industry who, after selling his stakes in that firm, subsequently acquired Arrighi. 
Source: Benfratello (2012). 
The period leading up to 2005 saw a new reduction in pasta producers 
(about 13%), even though production capacity rose by 18% (Magnatti, 
2007). In recent years, about 70% of the pasta sold in Italy came from big 
companies, with only about 24% from medium and 6% from small 
enterprises (Federalimentare-ISMEA Centro Studi Confindustria, 2005). 
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Appendix D: Networks for the 
Years 2006, 2009 and 2015 
To not report too many figures in chapter 3. The role of Geographical 
Indications and Countries’ “Made-In” Power in Global Trade of Wild Edible 
Mushrooms and Truffles, we decided to show only the networks for the 
years 2003 and 2012, both for fresh/chilled (070959) and for 
dried/powdered (071239) products. However, for the sake of 
completeness, it is helpful to show in this appendix the remaining networks 
for both categories concerning the years 2006, 2009 and 2015. 
D.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) Networks 
 
 
Figure 15 Global network of fresh/chilled wild mushroom and truffle trade (070959) 
referred to 2006.  
Notes: Each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Figure 16 Global network of fresh/chilled wild mushroom and truffle trade (070959) 
referred to 2009.  
Notes: Each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Figure 17 Global network of fresh/chilled wild mushroom and truffle trade (070959) 
referred to 2015.  
Notes: Each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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D.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) Networks 
 
Figure 18 Global network of “dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken or in powder […]” 
mushroom and truffle trade (071239) referred to 2006. 
Notes: Each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Figure 19 Global network of “dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken or in powder […]” 
mushroom and truffle trade (071239) referred to 2009. 
Notes: Each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
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Figure 20 Global network of “dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken or in powder […]” 
mushroom and truffle trade (071239) referred to 2015. 
Notes: Each country is identified by the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 codes (the full detailed list 
is shown in Appendix J: Countries ISO Code and Digit). 
166 
 
Appendix E: Effect of “Areas 
NES (not elsewhere 
specified)” and "Bunkers" 
elimination 
As data from the "United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database" 
(UN Comtrade), which are used in chapter 3. The role of Geographical 
Indications and Countries’ “Made-In” Power in Global Trade of Wild Edible 
Mushrooms and Truffles  might report some trades that are not useful for 
our work, we decided to eliminate the records that might negatively impact 
the trustworthiness of our analysis. In the following two sections, we 
describe the deleted records and we provide, when needed, the motivation 
behind that choice. 
 
E.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) 
In the case of fresh or chilled mushrooms and truffles, Japan is the country 
most affected by this elimination. Its exports towards “Asia, not elsewhere 
specified” reach roughly between 41 and 46 percent of the total exportation 
volume starting from 2006, 2003 being the only year to not affected by this 
anomaly. 2003 seems to be the only year with no significant impact of 
“World”, “Areas NES (not elsewhere specified)”, "Free Zones" and "Bunkers" 
elimination, with the USA being the only country affected by more than 
0.25% of its total volume (0.26%). Then, from 2006 Japan has almost half 
of its exports to not specified Asian countries: 2,758,859 $ (out of a total of 
6,029,959 $, 45%) in 2006, 1,181,836 $ (of 2,861,999 $, 41.2%) in 2009 and 
1,831,353 $ (out of 3,936,701 $, 46.5%) in 2012. However, even if by far the 
most affected, Japan is not the only one influenced by these cuts. Other 
Asian countries export a significant amount to “Asia, not elsewhere 
specified”, among them the most involved are: Korea in 2006 (306,646 $ out 
of 10,475,294 $: 2.9%), Thailand in 2009 (414,181 $ of 5,512,311 $: 7.5%) 
and again Korea in 2012 (345,326 $ of 35,390,949 $: 0.97%). Not only “Asia, 
not elsewhere specified” is considered a partner country, but it might also be 
a reporter (i.e. a country from which an export flow origins). In 2006, 2009 
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and 2012, our dataset presents “Asia, not elsewhere specified” as report 
country 12, 11 and 15 times respectively. Those are not relevant values; 
export to Singapore in 2012 is the only relevant one (132,999 $ from “Asia, 
not elsewhere specified” to Singapore), but still we think is fairer to 
underline this. 
 
E.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) 
For “mushrooms and truffles, dried, whole/cut/sliced/broken/in powder but 
not furth. prepd.”, impact of elimination is much less important than for 
070959. In 2003, the most affected country is Italy, with a total deleted 
amount of US dollars equal to approximately 0.7% of its total export 
(62,260 $ over 8,335,972 $). Then from 2006, China is the most impacted: 
2,245,696 $ out of a total value of 200,077,170 $ (1.1%) in 2006, 0.6% in 
2009 (2,175,661 $ of 346,299,082 $) and 3,941,980 $ deleted over a total 
export value of 601,974,565 $ for the year 2012 (0.6%). 
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Appendix F: Betweenness 
Centrality and Out Degree 
Table 2015 
Due to the problems we highlighted in the discussion, we have not 
considered the year 2015 in the main argument of chapter 3. The role of 
Geographical Indications and Countries’ “Made-In” Power in Global Trade 
of Wild Edible Mushrooms and Truffles. However, in this appendix we 
report the Betweenness Centrality (BC) and the Out Degree (OD) for the top 
22 countries (both for fresh/chilled, 070959, and dried/powdered, 071239) 
for the year 2015. As shown by the tables, the major countries that result 
from the analysis of this year are very different from those shown by the 
analyses of the years 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2012. This is due, in our 
opinion, to some problems in collecting data (e.g. delays, failed 
communication, etc.). As far as we know, data are communicated by 
national agencies and it might take time to have a complete database for 
this kind of products, which usually present problems for data collection. 
 
F.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) BC and OD - 2015 
Betweenness Centrality and Out Degree (Ordered by OD) – Top 22 
countries – 2015 
 
2015 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
ITA  0.041286 62 
ESP  0.115457 43 
DEU  0.066420 34 
USA  0.065913 24 
BGR  0.004636 21 
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LTU  0.007098 20 
AUS  0.023830 20 
HUN  0.004563 17 
SRB  0.002318 17 
GBR  0.145951 16 
SVN  0.007316 14 
CAN  0.005070 14 
BIH  0.007171 13 
MKD  0.006736 13 
DNK  0.054904 12 
PRT  0.017239 12 
HKG  0.009706 12 
SWE  0.081631 12 
MNE  0.000256 10 
LVA  0.007026 9 
EST  0.015428 8 
CHE  0.020933 8 
 
F.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) BC and OD - 2015 
Betweenness Centrality and Out Degree (Ordered by OD) – Top 22 
countries – 2015 
2015 
 
Country 
Betweenneess 
Centrality 
Out 
Degree 
ITA  0.055997 60 
DEU  0.071364 52 
USA  0.049625 35 
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HKG  0.029610 33 
ESP  0.060345 28 
GBR  0.153223 22 
BGR  0.005847 20 
DNK  0.099025 17 
SRB  0.023913 17 
MNE  0.004648 15 
MKD  0.004948 14 
BIH  0.002474 14 
CAN  0.009670 13 
IND 0.004438 13 
CZE  0.010045 11 
CHL  0.004798 11 
JPN 0.001537 11 
PRT  0.009895 10 
LTU  0.096252 9 
CHE  0.003298 8 
GRC  0.001649 7 
NZL  0.047226 6 
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Appendix G: Graphs: BC / OD 
Even though in chapter 3. The role of Geographical Indications and 
Countries’ “Made-In” Power in Global Trade of Wild Edible Mushrooms and 
Truffles we report BC and OD using tables, in this appendix we want to 
show several graphs in which a scatter plot between BC and OD are 
reported. We provide graphs both for fresh/chilled (070959) and 
dried/powdered (071239) wild mushrooms and truffles for the years 2003, 
2006, 2009 and 2012. Category and year are reported in the graph titles. 
G.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) Graphs: BC / OD 
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G.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) Graphs: BC / OD 
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Appendix H: Graphs BC / OD 
(log) 
As for Appendix H: Graphs BC / OD (log), in this appendix we report several 
graphs of BC and OD values (for both categories: fresh/chilled, 070959, and 
dried/powdered, 071239) for the years from 2003 to 2012. However, in 
these graphs, BC and OD are reported in logarithmic scale. This helps in 
understanding, from a different analysis, the major countries and their role 
in the worldwide trade. 
H.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) Graphs: BC / OD (log) 
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H.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) Graphs: BC / OD (log) 
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Appendix I: Adjustments of 
Average Prices 
For the analyses on prices of chapter 3. The role of Geographical Indications 
and Countries’ “Made-In” Power in Global Trade of Wild Edible Mushrooms 
and Truffles, a data cleaning was needed in order to avoid problems due to 
some anomalies in recording and reporting data. This is both due to the 
intrinsic problems of the analysed products and also, as far as we know, to 
the possible differences in recording systems of national agencies from 
which data was gathered. We report the records deleted, the motivation 
(when needed) and a few additional pieces information to aid in the 
comprehension of the impact of the deletions. There are two different 
sections, one for fresh/chilled (070959) and the other for dried/powdered 
(071239) wild mushrooms and truffles. 
 
I.1 Fresh/Chilled (070959) 
 
CHINA 2003 -> average without MAX (30): 2.098606883 - (median: 
1.57884) 
CHINA 2009 -> average without MAX (47.25): 6.729045545 - (median: 
3.94) 
CHINA 2012 -> average without MAX (99): 7.052054642 - (median: 3.718) 
 
HONG KONG 2009 -> average without MAX (1608): 9.519440428 - 
(median: 8.205) 
HONG KONG 2012 -> average without MAX (56,692): 5.394325017 - 
(median: 3.762) 
 
GERMANY 2009 -> average without MAX (100): 9.978085927 - (median: 8) 
GEMANY 2012 -> we delete the last except for one (6.571): median: 11 
Average: 289.9578059 
we delete the last except for two (5,226.66666666667): - (median: 10.9) 
Average:148.9089813 
we delete the last except for three: (2,472.98863636364): - (median: 
10.7954) 
Average: 80.5536973 
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we delete the last except for four (835.5): - (median: 10.7) 
Average: 57.67653661 
 
NETHERLAND 2012 -> average without MAX (318): 8.937628163 - 
(median: 7.307) 
 
FRANCE 2012 -> average without MAX (1,215.9): 117.5217668 - (median: 
42.5513) 
 
ITALY 2006 -> average without MAX (797) [i.e. only one transaction with 
Kazakhstan (one unit)]: 26.93926226 – (median: 6.2766) 
we delete the last except for one (597) [i.e. only two transactions with 
Nigeria (two units)]: - (median: 6.22) 
Average: 11.53221529 
ITALY 2009 -> there are “anomalous” transactions with some countries 
[i.e.one or two unit transactions per year]. We delete those considered 
“anomalous”: 
we delete the last except for one (3,218.5) [i.e. only two transactions with 
Indonesia (two units)] – (median: 82.41) 
Average:327.2916361 
we delete the last except for two (2,189) [i.e. only two transactions with 
China (one unit)]: – (median: 63.80455) 
Average: 291.4895522 
we delete the last except for three [i.e. only two transactions with Macao 
(one unit)]: – (median: 45.2) 
Average: 261.4207199 
we delete Iceland, because it has only one trade, even though it is not the 
last except for four. - (median: 40.68793) 
Average: 243.4891343 
ITALY 2012 -> we delete only one/two transaction records, it perceived 
“anomalous” 
we delete the last except for one: [i.e. Peru, which has only two very high 
transactions (two units)]: - (median: 68.67) 
Average: 336.5013783 
we delete the last except for two [i.e. only one transaction with Curacao 
(one unit)]: - (median: 62.22) 
Average: 261.8764013 
we delete the last except for three [i.e. only two transactions with Macao 
(one unit)]: - (median: 55.77) 
Average: 216.6878657 
 
189 
 
USA 2003 -> average without MAX: 12.64508266 - (median: 8.45) 
USA 2012 -> average without MAX: 19.58131475 - (median: 15.4454) 
 
ROMANIA 2012 -> average without MAX: 9.91071519 - (median: 10.33) 
[i.e. only two transactions with Finland (one unit)]. 
 
I.2 Dried/Powdered (071239) 
Singapore 2009 - > average without MAX (72.7): 10.06508401 - (median: 
7.796) 
France 2012 -> we delete non-significant transactions. Average: 
40.34073523 - (median: 34.28479657) 
 
Table 20  List of Deleted Non-Significant Transactions for France (2012) 
Report
er 
Alt 
Qt. 
Net 
weig
ht 
(kg) 
Trade 
Value 
(US$) 
Rep. 
ISO 
Partner 
Partner 
ISO 
US$/
Kg 
France 1 1 27 FRA Benin BEN 27 
France 1 1 265 FRA Curacao CUW 265 
France 1 1 324 FRA 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 
SPM 324 
France 1 1 450 FRA Venezuela VEN 450 
France 2 2 1 FRA Chile CHL 0.5 
France 2 2 185 FRA Haiti HTI 92.5 
France 2 2 72 FRA Nigeria NGA 36 
France 4 4 327 FRA Bulgaria BGR 81.75 
France 4 4 1,741 FRA Gabon GAB 
435.2
5 
France 4 4 737 FRA Uganda UGA 
184.2
5 
France 5 5 400 FRA Cameroon CMR 80 
France 5 5 391 FRA Equatorial Guinea GNQ 78.2 
France 6 6 2,205 FRA French Polynesia PYF 367.5 
France 7 7 1,114 FRA 
Wallis and Futuna 
Isds 
WLF 
159.1
4 
France 9 9 1,186 FRA Côte d'Ivoire CIV 
131.7
8 
France 12 12 1,321 FRA Jordan JOR 
110.0
8 
 
190 
 
The Netherlands 2006 -> average without MAX (99,18421053): 
14.8316387 - (median: 11.5229) 
The Netherlands 2012 -> average without MAX and last except for one 
(118.5128205 and 115.6666667): 21.54182837 - (median: 17) 
 
USA 2003 -> average without MAX and last except for one (104.7173913 
and 103.1159) 20.22076747 - (median: 14.6969) 
USA 2006 -> average without MAX (97.38709677): 14.5353494 - (median: 
11.7356) 
 
BULGARIA 2003 -> average without MAX (78): 22.72613862 - (median: 
17.33) 
BULGARIA 2012 -> average without MAX (93.77192982) 28.53316948 - 
(median: 23.997) 
 
ROMANIA 2012 - > we delete the peculiar and “anomalous” transaction 
with the USA [i.e. 1kg quantity and 1$ amount]: - (median: 24.2933) 
Average: 21.63953233 
we delete the peculiar and “anomalous” transaction with GBR [i.e. 4Kgs at 
18$]: - (median: 24.5566) 
Average: 23.5439 
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Appendix J: Countries ISO Code 
and Digit 
In the analyses of chapter 3. The role of Geographical Indications and 
Countries’ “Made-In” Power in Global Trade of Wild Edible Mushrooms and 
Truffles, we use the countries’ ISO code. This is reported both in figures and 
in tables throughout the whole chapter. For the sake of clarity, we show in 
Table 21 the code for each country, as well as its English name, the country 
abbreviation, the ISO 3 digit and the period of validity. 
 
Table 21 Comtrade Country Code and Name. 
Coun
try 
Code 
Country Name 
English 
Country 
Abbrevation 
ISO3-
digit 
Alpha 
Start 
Valid 
Year 
End 
Valid 
Year 
4 Afghanistan Afghanistan AFG 1962 2061 
472 Africa CAMEU 
region, nes 
Africa CAMEU region, 
nes 
NULL 1962 2004 
8 Albania Albania ALB 1962 2061 
12 Algeria Algeria DZA 1962 2061 
16 American Samoa American Samoa ASM 1962 2061 
20 Andorra Andorra AND 1962 2061 
24 Angola Angola AGO 1962 2061 
660 Anguilla Anguilla AIA 1981 2061 
10 Antarctica Antarctica ANT 1962 2061 
28 Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 1962 2061 
899 Areas, nes Areas, nes NULL 1962 2061 
32 Argentina Argentina ARG 1962 2061 
51 Armenia Armenia ARM 1992 2061 
533 Aruba Aruba ARB 1988 2061 
36 Australia Australia AUS 1962 2061 
40 Austria Austria AUT 1962 2061 
31 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan AZE 1992 2061 
44 Bahamas Bahamas BHS 1962 2061 
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48 Bahrain Bahrain BHR 1962 2061 
50 Bangladesh Bangladesh BGD 1972 2061 
52 Barbados Barbados BRB 1962 2061 
112 Belarus Belarus BLR 1992 2061 
56 Belgium Belgium BEL 1999 2061 
84 Belize Belize BLZ 1962 2061 
204 Benin Benin BEN 1962 2061 
60 Bermuda Bermuda BMU 1962 2061 
64 Bhutan Bhutan BTN 1962 2061 
68 Bolivia Bolivia BOL 1962 2061 
70 Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
Bosnia Herzegovina BIH 1992 2061 
72 Botswana Botswana BWA 2000 2061 
74 Bouvet Island Bouvet Island   BVT 1962 2061 
80 Br. Antarctic Terr. Br. Antarctic Terr. NULL 1962 2061 
86 Br. Indian Ocean 
Terr. 
Br. Indian Ocean 
Terr. 
IOT 1962 2061 
92 Br. Virgin Isds Br. Virgin Isds VGB 1962 2061 
76 Brazil Brazil BRA 1962 2061 
96 Brunei 
Darussalam 
Brunei Darussalam BRN 1962 2061 
100 Bulgaria Bulgaria BGR 1962 2061 
837 Bunkers Bunkers NULL 1962 2061 
854 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso BFA 1962 2061 
108 Burundi Burundi BDI 1962 2061 
471 CACM, nes CACM, nes NULL 1962 2004 
116 Cambodia Cambodia KHM 1962 2061 
120 Cameroon Cameroon CMR 1962 2061 
124 Canada Canada CAN 1962 2061 
132 Cape Verde Cape Verde CPV 1962 2061 
129 Caribbean, nes Caribbean, nes NULL 1962 2004 
136 Cayman Isds Cayman Isds CYM 1962 2061 
140 Central African 
Rep. 
Central African Rep. CAF 1962 2061 
148 Chad Chad TCD 1962 2061 
152 Chile Chile CHL 1962 2061 
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156 China China CHN 1962 2061 
344 China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
HKG 1962 2061 
446 China, Macao SAR China, Macao SAR MAC 1962 2061 
162 Christmas Isds Christmas Isds CXR 1962 2061 
166 Cocos Isds Cocos Isds CCK 1962 2061 
170 Colombia Colombia COL 1962 2061 
174 Comoros Comoros COM 1962 2061 
178 Congo Congo COG 1962 2061 
184 Cook Isds Cook Isds COK 1962 2061 
188 Costa Rica Costa Rica CRI 1962 2061 
384 Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire CIV 1962 2061 
191 Croatia Croatia HRV 1992 2061 
192 Cuba Cuba CUB 1962 2061 
196 Cyprus Cyprus CYP 1962 2061 
203 Czech Rep. Czech Rep. CZE 1993 2061 
408 Dem. People's 
Rep. of Korea 
Dem. People's Rep. of 
Korea 
PRK 1962 2061 
180 Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
COD 1962 2061 
208 Denmark Denmark DNK 1962 2061 
262 Djibouti Djibouti DJI 1962 2061 
212 Dominica Dominica DMA 1962 2061 
214 Dominican Rep. Dominican Rep. DOM 1962 2061 
221 Eastern Europe, 
nes 
Eastern Europe, nes NULL 1962 2004 
218 Ecuador Ecuador ECU 1962 2061 
818 Egypt Egypt EGY 1962 2061 
222 El Salvador El Salvador SLV 1962 2061 
226 Equatorial Guinea Equatorial Guinea GNQ 1962 2061 
232 Eritrea Eritrea ERI 1993 2061 
233 Estonia Estonia EST 1992 2061 
231 Ethiopia Ethiopia ETH 1993 2061 
697 Europe EFTA, nes Europe EFTA, nes NULL 1962 2004 
492 Europe EU, nes Europe EU, nes NULL NULL NULL 
234 Faeroe Isds Faeroe Isds FRO 1962 2061 
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238 Falkland Isds 
(Malvinas) 
Falkland Isds 
(Malvinas) 
FLK 1962 2061 
242 Fiji Fiji FJI 1962 2061 
246 Finland Finland FIN 1962 2061 
260 Fr. South 
Antarctic Terr. 
Fr. South Antarctic 
Terr. 
ATF 1962 2061 
251 France France FRA 1962 2061 
838 Free Zones Free Zones NULL 1962 2061 
258 French Polynesia French Polynesia PYF 1962 2061 
583 FS Micronesia Micronesia FSM 1992 2061 
266 Gabon Gabon GAB 1962 2061 
270 Gambia Gambia GMB 1962 2061 
268 Georgia Georgia GEO 1992 2061 
276 Germany Germany DEU 1991 2061 
288 Ghana Ghana GHA 1962 2061 
292 Gibraltar Gibraltar GIB 1962 2061 
300 Greece Greece GRC 1962 2061 
304 Greenland Greenland GRL 1962 2061 
308 Grenada Grenada GRD 1962 2061 
316 Guam Guam GUM 1962 2061 
320 Guatemala Guatemala GTM 1962 2061 
324 Guinea Guinea GIN 1962 2061 
624 Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau GNB 1962 2061 
328 Guyana Guyana GUY 1962 2061 
332 Haiti Haiti HTI 1962 2061 
334 Heard Island and 
McDonald Islands 
Heard Island and 
McDonald Islands 
HMD 1962 2061 
336 Holy See (Vatican 
City State) 
Holy See (Vatican 
City State) 
VAT 2000 2061 
340 Honduras Honduras HND 1962 2061 
348 Hungary Hungary HUN 1962 2061 
352 Iceland Iceland ISL 1962 2061 
699 India India IND 1975 2061 
360 Indonesia Indonesia IDN 1962 2061 
364 Iran Iran IRN 1962 2061 
368 Iraq Iraq IRQ 1962 2061 
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372 Ireland Ireland IRL 1962 2061 
376 Israel Israel ISR 1962 2061 
381 Italy Italy ITA 1962 2061 
388 Jamaica Jamaica JAM 1962 2061 
392 Japan Japan JPN 1962 2061 
400 Jordan Jordan JOR 1962 2061 
398 Kazakhstan Kazakhstan KAZ 1992 2061 
404 Kenya Kenya KEN 1962 2061 
296 Kiribati Kiribati KIR 1962 2061 
414 Kuwait Kuwait KWT 1962 2061 
417 Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1992 2061 
473 LAIA, nes LAIA, nes NULL 1962 2061 
418 Lao People's Dem. 
Rep. 
Lao People's Dem. 
Rep. 
LAO 1962 2061 
428 Latvia Latvia LVA 1992 2061 
422 Lebanon Lebanon LBN 1962 2061 
426 Lesotho Lesotho LSO 2000 2061 
430 Liberia Liberia LBR 1962 2061 
434 Libya Libya LBY 1962 2061 
440 Lithuania Lithuania LTU 1992 2061 
442 Luxembourg Luxembourg LUX 1999 2061 
450 Madagascar Madagascar MDG 1962 2061 
454 Malawi Malawi MWI 1965 2061 
458 Malaysia Malaysia MYS 1964 2061 
462 Maldives Maldives MDV 1962 2061 
466 Mali Mali MLI 1962 2061 
470 Malta Malta MLT 1962 2061 
584 Marshall Isds Marshall Isds MHL 1992 2061 
478 Mauritania Mauritania MRT 1962 2061 
480 Mauritius Mauritius MUS 1962 2061 
175 Mayotte Mayotte MYT 1962 2061 
484 Mexico Mexico MEX 1962 2061 
496 Mongolia Mongolia MNG 1962 2061 
499 Montenegro Montenegro MNE 2006 2061 
500 Montserrat Montserrat MSR 1962 2061 
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504 Morocco Morocco MAR 1962 2061 
508 Mozambique Mozambique MOZ 1962 2061 
104 Myanmar Myanmar MMR 1962 2061 
580 N. Mariana Isds N. Mariana Isds MNP 1992 2061 
516 Namibia Namibia NAM 2000 2061 
520 Nauru Nauru NRU 1962 2061 
524 Nepal Nepal NPL 1962 2061 
530 Neth. Antilles Neth. Antilles ANT 1988 2061 
528 Netherlands Netherlands NLD 1962 2061 
536 Neutral Zone Neutral Zone NULL 1962 2061 
540 New Caledonia New Caledonia NCL 1962 2061 
554 New Zealand New Zealand NZL 1962 2061 
558 Nicaragua Nicaragua NIC 1962 2061 
562 Niger Niger NER 1962 2061 
566 Nigeria Nigeria NGA 1962 2061 
570 Niue Niue NIU 1962 2061 
574 Norfolk Isds Norfolk Isds NFK 1962 2061 
637 North America 
and Central 
America, nes 
North America, the 
Caribbean and 
Central America, nes 
NULL 1962 2061 
290 Northern Africa, 
nes 
Northern Africa, nes NULL 1962 2004 
579 Norway Norway NOR 1962 2061 
275 Occ. Palestinian 
Terr. 
Occ. Palestinian Terr. PSE 2000 2061 
527 Oceania, nes Oceania, nes NULL 1962 2061 
512 Oman Oman OMN 1962 2061 
577 Other Africa, nes Other Africa, nes NULL 1962 2061 
490 Other Asia, nes Other Asia, nes NULL 1962 2061 
568 Other Europe, nes Other Europe, nes NULL 1962 2061 
586 Pakistan Pakistan PAK 1972 2061 
585 Palau Palau PLW 1992 2061 
591 Panama Panama PAN 1978 2061 
598 Papua New 
Guinea 
Papua New Guinea PNG 1962 2061 
600 Paraguay Paraguay PRY 1962 2061 
604 Peru Peru PER 1962 2061 
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608 Philippines Philippines PHL 1962 2061 
612 Pitcairn Pitcairn PCN 1962 2061 
616 Poland Poland POL 1962 2061 
620 Portugal Portugal PRT 1962 2061 
634 Qatar Qatar QAT 1962 2061 
410 Rep. of Korea Rep. of Korea KOR 1962 2061 
498 Rep. of Moldova Rep. of Moldova MDA 1992 2061 
636 Rest of America, 
nes 
Rest of America, nes NULL 1962 2004 
642 Romania Romania ROU 1962 2061 
643 Russian 
Federation 
Russian Federation RUS 1992 2061 
646 Rwanda Rwanda RWA 1962 2061 
654 Saint Helena Saint Helena SHN 1962 2061 
659 Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
Saint Kitts and Nevis KNA 1981 2061 
662 Saint Lucia Saint Lucia LCA 1962 2061 
666 Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 
SPM 1962 2061 
670 Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
VCT 1962 2061 
882 Samoa Samoa WSM 1962 2061 
674 San Marino San Marino SMR 2000 2061 
678 Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
STP 1962 2061 
682 Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia SAU 1962 2061 
686 Senegal Senegal SEN 1962 2061 
688 Serbia Serbia SRB 2006 2061 
891 Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
SCG 1992 2005 
690 Seychelles Seychelles SYC 1962 2061 
694 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone SLE 1962 2061 
702 Singapore Singapore SGP 1962 2061 
703 Slovakia Slovakia SVK 1993 2061 
705 Slovenia Slovenia SVN 1992 2061 
90 Solomon Isds Solomon Isds SLB 1962 2061 
706 Somalia Somalia SOM 1962 2061 
710 South Africa South Africa ZAF 2000 2061 
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239 South Georgia 
and the South 
Sandwich Islands 
South Georgia and 
the South Sandwich 
Islands 
SGS 1962 2061 
724 Spain Spain ESP 1962 2061 
839 Special Categories Special Categories NULL 1962 2061 
144 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka LKA 1962 2061 
736 Sudan Sudan SDN 1962 2061 
740 Suriname Suriname SUR 1962 2061 
748 Swaziland Swaziland SWZ 2000 2061 
752 Sweden Sweden SWE 1962 2061 
757 Switzerland Switzerland CHE 1962 2061 
760 Syria Syria SYR 1962 2061 
762 Tajikistan Tajikistan TJK 1992 2061 
807 TFYR of 
Macedonia 
TFYR of Macedonia MKD 1993 2061 
764 Thailand Thailand THA 1962 2061 
626 Timor-Leste Timor-Leste TMP 1962 2061 
768 Togo Togo TGO 1962 2061 
772 Tokelau Tokelau TKL 1962 2061 
776 Tonga Tonga TON 1962 2061 
780 Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 1962 2061 
788 Tunisia Tunisia TUN 1962 2061 
792 Turkey Turkey TUR 1962 2061 
795 Turkmenistan Turkmenistan TKM 1992 2061 
796 Turks and Caicos 
Isds 
Turks and Caicos Isds TCA 1962 2061 
798 Tuvalu Tuvalu TUV 1962 2061 
800 Uganda Uganda UGA 1962 2061 
804 Ukraine Ukraine UKR 1992 2061 
784 United Arab 
Emirates 
United Arab Emirates ARE 1962 2061 
826 United Kingdom United Kingdom GBR 1962 2061 
834 United Rep. of 
Tanzania 
United Rep. of 
Tanzania 
TZA 1965 2061 
581 United States 
Minor Outlying 
Islands 
United States Minor 
Outlying Islands 
UMI 1962 2061 
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858 Uruguay Uruguay URY 1962 2061 
842 USA USA USA 1981 2061 
860 Uzbekistan Uzbekistan UZB 1992 2061 
548 Vanuatu Vanuatu VUT 1962 2061 
862 Venezuela Venezuela VEN 1962 2061 
704 Viet Nam Viet Nam VNM 1975 2061 
876 Wallis and Futuna 
Isds 
Wallis and Futuna 
Isds 
WLF 1962 2061 
879 Western Asia, nes Western Asia, nes NULL 1962 2004 
732 Western Sahara Western Sahara ESH 1962 2061 
0 World World WLD 1962 2061 
887 Yemen Yemen YEM 1991 2061 
894 Zambia Zambia ZMB 1965 2061 
716 Zimbabwe Zimbabwe ZWE 1965 2061 
Notes: Source: 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/Comtrade-
Country-Code-and-Name   
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